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**THE HALE LECTURES**  
**WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY**  
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THE HALE LECTURES 1927-28

# NEW HORIZONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

By

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## EXTRACTS

FROM THE WILL OF THE RT. REV. CHARLES REUBEN  
HALE, D.D., LL.D., BISHOP COADJUTOR OF SPRING-  
FIELD, *born 1837; consecrated July 26, 1892; died*  
*December 25, 1900.*



In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the  
Holy Ghost. Amen.

I, CHARLES REUBEN HALE, BISHOP OF CAIRO, BISHOP COADJUTOR OF SPRINGFIELD, of the City of Cairo, Illinois, do make, publish, and declare this, as and for my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made.

First. First of all, I commit myself, soul and body, into the hands of Jesus Christ, my Lord and Saviour, in Whose Merits alone I trust, looking for the Resurrection of the Body and the Life of the World to come.

. . . . .

Fourteenth. All the fest and residue of my Estate, personal and real, not in this my Will otherwise specifically devised, wheresoever situate, and whether legal or equitable, I give, devise, and bequeath to "THE WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS," above mentioned, but nevertheless *In Trust*, provided it shall accept the trust by an instrument in writing so stating, filed with this Will in the Court where probated, within six months after the probate of this Will—for the general purpose of promoting the Catholic Faith, in its purity and integrity, as taught in Holy Scripture, held by the Primitive Church, summed up in the Creeds and affirmed by the undisputed Gen-

eral Councils, and, in particular, to be used only and exclusively for the purposes following, to-wit:—

. . . . .

(2) The establishment, endowment, publication, and due circulation of Courses of Lectures, to be delivered annually forever, to be called "The Hale Lectures."

The Lectures shall treat of one of the following subjects:

- (a) Liturgies and Liturgics.
- (b) Church Hymns and Church Music.
- (c) The History of the Eastern Churches.
- (d) The History of National Churches.
- (e) Contemporaneous Church History: *i.e.*, treating of events happening since the beginning of what is called "The Oxford Movement," in 1833.

It is the aim of the Seminary, through the Hale Lectures, to make from time to time some valuable contribution to certain of the Church's problems, without thereby committing itself to agreement with the utterances of its own selected Preachers.

TO CHRISTIAN MEN AND WOMEN  
EVERYWHERE WHO BY PRAYER  
AND EFFORT ARE SHARING IN  
THE MINISTRY OF RECONCILIATION



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## FOREWORD

THE INVITATION to deliver a course of lectures upon 'Contemporaneous Church History,' with which the Hale Committee honored me last autumn, offered an opportunity to survey one aspect of that huge and intricate subject, *viz.*, the contemporaneous history of doctrine. It seemed worth while to pause, in the midst of the current debate, take fresh bearings, and inquire the present position of Christian doctrine as related to modern thought, particularly scientific, religious-historical, and philosophical. 'Modern,' of course, is a most unstable adjective: 'modernity' moves on, ceaselessly, with the progress of time; and the debate is one that is continually adjourned, never finished. Nevertheless it is possible now and then to reckon up the changes, the loss and gain, and the general advancement in ideas which affect our understanding and presentation of the Church's Faith. The earlier chapters of this volume are in reality 'prolegomena' to Chapter VIII, where I have attempted to set forth what seems to be the present position of Christian Doctrine, in an age of thorough-going 'modernity,' of growing science and changing philosophy.

The standpoint from which this book has been

written is one that assumes theology to be a living, developing science, as genuinely progressive and fruitful as the other sciences; that assumes common ground between 'Modernism' and 'Orthodoxy,' 'Liberalism' and 'Catholicity,' and maintains alike the rights of the future and the claims of the past. For a scholar—I speak humbly—no other position is possible. Great as is our joint-indebtedness to the past, the true 'Catholic' idea is an ideal for whose full realization we still look to the future. No age in the past has seen its complete exemplification; and 'the best is yet to be.' Such optimism does not, however, dispense us from thorough historical study and evaluation of the past; on the contrary, it is itself one of the lessons of the past. For the conviction is grounded in history: a Faith so potent through successive ages, so various in its manifestations, so adaptable to changing conditions in generation after generation, so rich in the spiritual illumination of different races and nations of men, has still a secret to unfold in this new age. In fact, one cannot well share the 'Catholic' outlook in the twentieth century unless he is something of a 'Modernist,' nor be an ardent 'Modernist' unless he has caught some glimpse of the meaning of the Catholic Faith in the past. Far from providing divisive party-labels, both terms are required if we are to describe the outlook of intelligent faith and loyal Churchmanship in the present day.

The doctrinal history of the past century and

a half, or let us say since the French Revolution, has apparently led to a serious impasse. For the two schools just named have not only divided the field between them (as the two main tendencies of modern theological thought, liberalism and historical orthodoxy), but have now reached a position where they are sometimes referred to as two 'religions' rather than two extremes of a common faith. These two are the most vigorous schools of our day. In comparison, Evangelicalism has apparently less to offer; its theology is conservative enough, but not so rational as either the 'Catholic' or the 'Modernist'; more religious, perhaps, at least more closely allied to religious feeling and emotion. Where it does become theologically articulate, it tends to become either 'Evangelical Catholicity,' as in Germany, or 'Liberal Evangelicalism,' as in Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> If therefore it is possible to reconcile the two points of view represented by 'Modernism' and 'Catholicism'—most vigorous within Anglicanism, but by no means limited to one communion—and if this potential reconciliation lies chiefly in the recognition that the true Catholic Church, the true fulfilment of the ideal of corporate Christianity, is future and not past; and if this book shall contribute in any measure toward making clear this point of view, it will not have been written in vain.

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<sup>1</sup> The titles, respectively, of Prof. Friedrich Heiler's collected essays (Vol. i., *Evangelische Katholizität*, Munich, 1926) and of the two volumes of essays and papers edited by the Rev. T. G. Rogers (*The Inner Life: Essays in Liberal Evangelicalism*, London, 1925).



At the same time, no attempt at theological reconstruction can afford to leave the Evangelical position out of account. The absence from it of extreme emphases of the kind just named, its thoroughly religious character when presented at its best, its great practical concern with the propagation of the Faith and the nurture of spiritual life, its centrality and inner power—all these features guarantee its place in the doctrinal construction of the future. And with the main tenets of the Evangelical school the position of the writer is, I believe, in fundamental harmony. 'Theology based on experience' has sometimes been charged with minimizing doctrine; yet if the charge be carefully examined, it will be recognized to be by no means a necessary one. In the last resort, *all* doctrine will be found to be based upon religious experience—experience not only reflected in the Bible, and in ecclesiastical doctrine or dogma, but also to be found in the common Christian life of today.

Hence the contrast between 'religions of authority' and 'religions of the Spirit' or of inner experience is after all not an absolute one. St. Augustine, for example, appealed often enough to ecclesiastical or biblical authority; yet he placed himself on record as admitting the basis of authority in experience itself. "Everyone recognizes that there are two sources of knowledge: Authority and Reason. And I am convinced that I shall never be separated from the authority of Christ

—for I know none greater. . . . In the sequence of time, authority takes precedence; logically, reason precedes.”<sup>2</sup> “For,” he says in another place, “we could not believe at all unless we were rational beings.”<sup>3</sup> “Believe, and you thereby understand. . . . Yet, since no one can exercise faith who does not understand what is said to him, the principle also holds good, I will understand, in order to believe.”<sup>4</sup> It is the emphasis on the priority of religious experience, characteristic of Evangelicalism, with which the position here advocated is most consonant, and which is perhaps the most important contribution it has to make to the theological synthesis of the future.

‘Fundamentalism’ is not a good term, not even a fair term, for this conservative tendency; neither is ‘Modernism’ a good term for the freedom we require. Something beyond both is needed, not only for the eventual reconciliation of the schools but for the sake of religious and theological progress. ‘Modernism’ must be more than merely modern; ‘Fundamentalism’ must concern itself with more than the reiteration of a few shibboleths, the defence of a few doctrines—not all of these really fundamental for religion—and the exclusive and intolerant insistence upon a type of orthodoxy out of contact with the best in modern thought. Extremely emotional religion, so fre-

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<sup>2</sup> *Contra Academicos*, iii. 43 (cf. *De Ordine*, ii. 26).

<sup>3</sup> *Epistle cxx.* 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Sermon xliii.* 4.

quently associated with Evangelicalism, equally with anti-rational dogmatism, is already impossible and has no guarantee of further survival. The great danger—at least here in America—is that in the pendulum-swing between emotionalism and dogmatism on one hand, and scientific rationalism on the other, the true religious outlook will be lost.

Hence for some of us the hope for the future of religious thought, and of thoughtful and intelligent religion, lies in the combination of utmost intellectual freedom with a sane recognition and positive affirmation of the genuine and indispensable data of religious experience. Religion is no mere way of thinking, or of accepting the deliverances of past thought; the basic religious experience exists prior to reflection upon it, alike in the race and in the individual, just as experience and observation of the external world of nature is prior to its scientific analysis and formulation. For some of us there is no possibility of halting further between two opinions, or of halting anywhere at all: the pressure of inner necessity urges forward from the antitheses of the present to the synthesis to come. And we hail it with relief, confident that no real values in the past can ever be lost, and that the future holds a promise of richer, more satisfying insight than any of us possesses here and now.

In conclusion I wish to thank the Hale Committee for the appointment as lecturer, and the

President and other officers of Northwestern University for their generous hospitality. The lectures were delivered in the public lecture room of Harris Hall.

F. C. G.

Ascension Day, 1928.

## SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS

### I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Lectureship and the aim of these lectures. History of Doctrine as a phase of Church History; its importance in Contemporaneous Church History. Necessary prolegomena to Modern History of Doctrine.

The theological point of view distinguished from the philosophical and historico-scientific, though genuine theology presupposes the latter. "Taking Science seriously." Possibility and necessity of a new intellectual synthesis: a task for theology as a whole rather than for apologetics. Justification for a necessary degree of conservatism, parallel to that presupposed in science and philosophy.

New problems confronting the Christian religion at the present day. Their immediate rise in the nineteenth century. What is needed is more than defensive sorties, or the satisfactory solution of particular problems, or comforting reassurance: it is nothing less than a new formulation of theology, a new synthesis of thought.

Contrast between the theological disunity of our age and the unity of the past: Baron von Hügel and Professor Webb quoted. Disunity the result of tendencies at work since the Middle Ages, and perhaps even earlier. The modern scientific world-view only one—though most crucial—phase of the general world-view evolved by occidental European-American thought since the days of barbarism.

General forecast of subjects and method of treatment. Physical science: Astronomy, Geology, Chemistry, Physics, Biology. The 'science of religion': its History and Psychology. The new Bible and the data of Christian doctrine. Theology and modern Philosophy: absence of homogeneity in the latter. Finally, Christian doctrine in the twentieth century, a summing up of the whole situation as it relates to the major Christian doctrines.

Signs of promise in modern thinking as related to theology: Freedom from dogmatism; the 'experimental' method in investigation and the 'psychological' method in interpretation; insistence upon completeness of outlook, and concern for the practical results of knowledge; the primacy of experience, particularly in interpreting religion and theology.

Not impossible that the really great age of Christianity, *i.e.*, of true spiritual religion, is still to come. Responsibility of every thinking Christian to share in working out the new synthesis. "Fair is the prize, and the hope great."

## II. RELIGION IN A CHANGING UNIVERSE

The changes in the modern outlook upon the world sunder our age not only from the generations immediately preceding but from every age that has gone before. Loss and gain. What is an age of faith? Faith not equivalent to credulity; a victory rather than a possession. The first age of Christianity a greater age of faith than any later period.

The dawn of the age of science first threw into relief the elemental contours of the world; the main issues (*e.g.*, Evolution) now generally settled. But we begin to be aware of the further implications of the theory, *e.g.*, that the world is still in process. Present forms of existence due

to average equilibrium of forces, and the world holds no unlimited guarantee of permanence. No novelty in this for the religious mind. A provisional solution.

The significance of change, and of existence within a changing universe, for the human spirit: Tennyson; W. V. Moody. 'Relativism' involved in modern physics and astronomy. This is the real crux of the problem for religion. Meredith; Goethe; Heraclitus. What place has religion in such a universe? Is not religion itself caught in the maelstrom of relativism? The need for either an adequate philosophy of religion or an enlarged faith. Hopeful signs: modern philosophy of values; renewed interest in mysticism and mystical experience; the recognition of purpose in the universe; the qualified teleology of S. Alexander, C. L. Morgan, and A. N. Whitehead.

Neither religion nor philosophy can ever dispense with the conception of a genuine and unchanging ground of all existence, found either in the Will of God or in the divine nature. A 'realm of ends.' The relation of religion to science more than a question of 'miracles'; religion has somewhat to contribute toward a new *Weltanschauung*: it offers a faith which justifies itself as an account of the whole of our experience, which declines to leave out any particular group of facts, which aims to bring unity and coherence into all our thinking, and to unveil in some measure the inner meaning of existence generally.

Three practical suggestions: (a) The religious-educational use of the Story of Creation; (b) the spiritual evaluation of miracles; (c) the presentation of Christianity as a faith, not a system of evidences. Faith needed to break through the charmed circle of relativism into the Kingdom of ultimate freedom and of imperishable values, the Kingdom of God.

## III. RELIGION AND NATURAL SCIENCE

The 'spiritualizing of science' (Dean Inge) or the creation of a 'scientific' religion (Lord Morley)? Sense of the term 'spiritualize.' The *rapprochement* of science and religion: true religion and true science have nothing to fear from each other. New light on the persecution of science by religion. Promising situation at the present time. Problems that remain.

The Darwinian revolution in Biology. Professor Thomson's summary of the 'six points' of Darwinism. Indirect bearing on religion. Man's homelessness in the universe. Alternative 'refuge' in dogma or agnosticism. Progress since the nineteenth century: (a) wider horizon of biology; life related forward and backward, and the recognition of some kind of teleology in nature; (b) the disentanglement of religion from association with pre-scientific ideas and the development of a more reflective attitude toward its own functions. Biology no longer sharply marked off from other sciences. 'Mental' quality of the 'world-stuff' (J. S. Huxley). Contemporary application to biology of terms and conceptions derived from physics. 'Discrete steps' or 'jumps' in evolution. Professor Whitehead's 'organic' theory. The 'evolution of the laws of nature'—a great contrast to nineteenth century theory. 'Law' only relatively 'unalterable.' Impermanence of 'patterns' and changing 'laws.' The new horizon of biology. Biology now in quest of unity of thought. Practical certainty of the theory of evolution; no longer 'an unproved hypothesis.'

Successive inferences from the data of modern biology: (a) Agnostic Realism or 'Materialism'; (b) Mechanistic Naturalism; (c) Vitalism; (d) Psycho-physical Monism accompanied by 'Provisional Realism.' Importance of the



latest formulation; need for 'taking it seriously' in Theology.

Fundamental importance for Christian doctrine of the idea of God as Creator. Simplicity of the conception. Has it significance for modern scientific thought? Alternative hypotheses impossible for either modern science or the Christian religion. The Christian theistic solution the most satisfactory. What Theism offers Biology. (a) Does it involve the idea of a creation in time? Meaning of the terms 'Almighty' and 'Maker,' found in the Creed. (b) Does it involve the idea of a *creatio ex nihilo*? Source of the traditional view, and its one-time significance. The question irrelevant as well as unanswerable. True significance of the Christian doctrine. The Christian idea of Creation greater than its symbolic representation as a process. The assumption of continuity, with 'discontinuous steps' modifying continuity: its parallel in the Christian conception. 'Hiatuses' in evolution bridged by creative fiat? Unity found in the concept of divine purpose. The quality of 'freedom' found in the biological process. Unity, continuity, and emergence. Life appears to be thoroughly 'immaterial.' The mystery of the creation. Our hand-hold upon permanence more than biological.

Points of contact between the biological and the religious views of the universe.

- i. The traditional Story of Creation (Genesis i.-ii.).
- ii. The account of the origin of the race and of the individual; the 'Fall of Man' and 'original sin.'
- iii. The doctrine of the Incarnation: its congruity with the modern conception of 'creation'; revival of the Logos-doctrine.
- iv. The possibility of survival beyond death.

- v. The unity of the human race; its ethical significance.
- vi. The conscious 'control of evolution': sociology.
  - (a) The right of mind to enforce rationality upon its environment; (b) scientific measures no real infringement of human rights; (c) the bearing of biological principles upon ethics generally—an unsolved set of problems.
- vii. Biology, *i.e.*, Evolution, teaches us something of the technique of the Creator. St. Augustine; Dante. The one Reality back of all things guarantees the revelation through nature as well as through human life and through the Bible. The Christian view of God a really satisfying explanation of evolutionary phenomena.

#### IV. CHRISTIANITY AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Modern interest in 'Comparative Religions.' Contrast between 'comparative religions' and the 'history of religions.' Quest for the one true religion.

General characteristics of religion. 'Phenomenology.' Sacrifice and its rationale. Relation of religion to culture. God and the natural background of man's life. The notion of *mana*. Local deities: numens and 'sprites.'

The problem of religious origins. 'Primitive' religion. The friendly gods. Theories of origin: Fear; priestly artifice; 'animism'; superstition, etc. Testimony of the cavern at Le Moustier. Professor Otto's theory of the 'Numinous.' Does origin determine nature? Parallel origins of science, art, philosophy. Retention of 'primitive' elements in the higher religions.

The problem of psychology. Comparative theology:

Various types of religious subject, and variety of emphasis in the historical religions. Religion as salvation. Various levels of 'emergence' in religion. The 'once-born,' the 'twice-born' or convert, and the mystic. The problem of epistemology: Is the mind equipped to know religious truth? Kant's treatment.

The problem of finality. Is there an 'absolute' religion? Religion an envisagement of reality, comparable to art, science, morality. The 'law' of decline in religions. Concurrent 'law' of revival. Vestiges, and mutual influence. Comparison of religions: Sacred scriptures, institutions, ethics, the idea of God. Who is the saint?—this the real question. Christian origins and the religions of antiquity, especially the Mystery Religions. Does dependence discredit? Christianity the consummation of religion, as Christ is the fulfiller of all the faiths of mankind.

Does the study of other religions and their history cut the nerve of missionary endeavor? Why "carry coals to Newcastle"? Importance of this for contemporaneous Church History, and especially History of Doctrine.

## V. CHRISTIANITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

The Psychology of Religion a new science. James' *Varieties* (1902). Application of psychology to the study of religion inevitable and salutary. Religious psychology as a science. Earlier psychological explanations of religion, from Epicurus to the nineteenth century. The Psychology of Religion begins with a study of the facts, not with a preconceived explanation; *i.e.*, it is a science. William James' motive and aim, as revealed in his *Letters*. Psychology of Religion includes both analysis and application. A practical science.

Problem raised by the varied origins of religion. What is conversion? Various phenomena: (a) An adolescent ex-

perience; (b) induced by expectancy; (c) uniform content; (d) not indispensable for religious development; (e) dependence upon emotional development and relation to sexual change. Overemphasis upon sex, and too great identification of sin with sex, in the past. Emotional emphasis in American religion since 1800, in need of correction. Professor Paterson's three stages of religious development: Natural man, convert, and saint. Is there a predisposition (*Anlage*) to religion in all men? The roots of religion disclosed in worship. Its crude beginnings. May religion be outgrown? Origin no criterion of final value. 'Man's best part.' Practical application of this principle.

Problem of diverse goals in religion. Legalism; social idealism; individual piety; sacramentalism; mysticism. Unity of religion possible only upon a theory of a scale of values and of gradations in reality. Practical application of the principle.

Problem of religious knowledge, *i.e.*, the epistemological value of religious experience. Mr. Thouless' treatment of the problem. Religious experience provides the stuff of which religious knowledge is made; knowledge not a mere inference. 'Categories' of religious knowledge. The validity of religious experience: "By their fruits ye shall know them"; and the accompaniment of intuitive certainty. Kant; Otto; F. W. Myers. "The vision of the Highest." The transfer of religious insight and the meaning of religious authority.

## VI. THE NEW BIBLE

"The Bible of Civilization." The Hebrew-Christian Bible of the past and the Bible of modern science and scientific history. Is the old Bible antiquated? Its importance in the past. Must we drop the Old Testament? or St. Paul? The 'Jewishness' of the Bible, not only of the

Old Testament but likewise of the New. Not a *reductio ad absurdum*, but a new and better solution of the problem required.

Change in the Church's view of the Bible. 'Mistakes' in the Bible. Antiquity of the problem of the Old Testament. Criticism of the Old Testament in the New, in the Apostolic Fathers, and in Marcion. Origen and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. St. Augustine and the practical solution of the Western Church. Contrast of the Protestant-Puritan treatment.

Confusion at the present day, both practical and theoretical. Outline of a solution.

- i. Historical and literary criticism taken for granted.
- ii. Gradations of spiritual insight—though the Church appears still to treat all on one flat level. A better lectionary needed, and explanatory settings of passages selected for reading in public worship.
- iii. What we require in a Bible, as a collection of sacred, inspiring literature: (a) Historical background—the history of our religion and the background of Western civilization: a 'traditional book'; (b) a book for use in public worship, to be used selectively; (c) a spiritual or devotional manual, illuminating and inspiring. The Bible all these, but needing to be set in proper perspective. Plea for a modern 'mystical' commentary.

Practical suggestions. Summary. The new horizon of the Bible, and its significance for Christian doctrine.

## VII. THEOLOGY AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Has theology any proper concern with philosophy? The Ritschlian 'exclusion of metaphysics.' The swing from Kant to Romanticism. Ritschlian 'metaphysics.' Christianity a 'philosophical' religion. The task of modern theology, confronting both orthodoxy and modernism.

The New Testament attitude toward philosophy. Influence of Judaism. The Apologists. Gnosticism and the Anti-gnostic reaction. Clement; Origen; the school of Alexandria. Its fundamental Platonism. The rival (?) school of Antioch. The Neoplatonic revival and its influence. Augustine; Pseudo-Dionysius. The mediaeval synthesis. Nominalism and Realism. Triumph of Platonic Realism on eve of the revival of Aristotle. Thirteenth century Scholasticism. Aquinas and his impossible task. Survival of the basic structure of Thomism in later theologies, even in the Protestant.

This development the background of orthodox theology in the past, and even to-day. The philosophy of to-day must be brought to bear upon a theology which, historically, was moulded by a very different philosophy in the past. Danger of exaggeration of the influence of philosophy in the history of doctrine. Not all doctrines influenced in the same degree: *e.g.*, the doctrine of the Two Natures; Transubstantiation. Antecedent religious experience at least equally as important in the formulation of doctrine as the philosophical terminology adopted.

Beginnings of modern philosophy traced in the decline of Scholasticism. Concerned from the beginning with epistemology: the problem of knowing. Other fields of philosophy amenable to the canons of epistemology. Modern philosophy as 'philosophy of science.' Its limitations in this respect, since science is abstractive and limited. As a

philosophy, pure (modern) Realism ends in negation. Wider horizons of other philosophies: 'human' interests. Two tendencies in modern philosophy (Professor Taylor). Do extremes meet?

Present tendencies: (a) Knowledge the revelation of an objective reality; (b) the abandonment of materialism; (c) the *nisus* or urge underlying nature; (d) trans-individual and trans-social values; (e) the importance of mysticism and religion (Professor Muirhead). Modern philosophy not one complete and unified system. Necessity of tentative, experimental steps.

Final plea: (a) Thorough, sympathetic, historical study of doctrine; (b) tolerance of experimental efforts, and study of motives; (c) recognition of the primary importance of religious experience. Metaphysics begins in ethics. "If any man will know of the doctrine . . ." Christianity preëminently a faith, not a philosophy.

#### VIII. CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The continuance of traditional doctrines the basic problem of 'contemporaneous Church History,' recognized within and without the Church. Need for revision or 'restatement.' Upon what principle shall revision be undertaken? Various answers. Difficulty of the task, and impossibility of declining it. Christianity has all along been a doctrinal religion.

Distinction between primitive doctrines and later accretions, the 'deposit' and later 'developments.' Decline of earlier syntheses. The Catholic ideal of the Church still unrealized. Hence the impossibility of a mere 'revival' of Catholicism. Realization of the ideal, in its largest aspects, still future. This applies equally to the formulation of its

doctrine. A richer spiritual life to follow the restoration of the Church's unity, and a more adequate expression of its faith. Absorption and enlargement of earlier formulae. The great Reformation and Post-Reformation 'Articles' and 'Confessions' no longer adequate. Even the ecumenical formulae betray marks of contemporary conflict. They are true, but not exhaustive, statements of the Faith. The doctrine of the Church greater than any of its historical formulations.

'Doctrine' as the teaching of the Church. The Faith much wider than the body of authorized *dogmata*. The 'unity of the Faith' compatible with a certain amount of doctrinal variety and even divergence. Hopefulness of this principle in view of the ecumenical movement of to-day. Conceivable that the Church might never have set forth the Faith in creeds and formulae—and still have been true to its nature as the organ of a doctrinal religion. Nature and function of doctrine as the intellectual formulation or expression of the data or presuppositions of religious experience. Doctrinal authority therefore rests upon the testimony of a Spirit-guided, Christ-inspired body, the Church, and finds its verification in the religious experience of this body.

Distinction between primary and secondary doctrines, on this principle. Dependence of the latter upon the former. The process by which the presuppositions of religious experience come to be defined. The use of contemporary terminology inevitable; hence it is possible for a considerable process of inference to intervene. Doctrines not all equally important: *e.g.*, the doctrine of God, and the doctrine of Angels. Contrast of the conception of rigid uniformity in doctrine; impossible classification of theology with the exact sciences.

Examples of particular doctrines, as related to modern



thought. (a) The doctrine of God; (b) Creation; (c) Satan; (d) Angels; (e) Man; (f) the Fall; (g) Divine Revelation; (h) the Incarnation; (i) the Holy Spirit, the Church, Grace, and Eschatology.

Four final observations. (a) The primacy of the ethical element in Christianity; (b) as an ethical religion Christianity can dispense with certainty on some points; (c) Christian doctrine not empirical knowledge, but the setting forth of the implications of Christian experience; (d) faith, not theology, indispensable for the Christian life. It is faith that saves, not doctrine or theology. The promise of the new day.



## I. INTRODUCTION

THE GENEROUS FOUNDER of this Lectureship provided<sup>1</sup> for "the establishment, endowment, publication, and due circulation of Courses of Lectures" upon the following five subjects: "Liturgies and Liturgics, Church Hymns and Church Music, The History of the Eastern Churches, The History of National Churches, and Contemporaneous Church History, *i.e.*, treating of events happening since the beginning of what is called 'the Oxford Movement,' in 1833." It is the stated aim of the Seminary "to make from time to time some . . . contribution to certain of the Church's problems," obviously such problems as come within the provisions of Bishop Hale's last will and testament.

Earlier lecturers upon this foundation have treated the subjects of Liturgy, Church Music, the Eastern Churches, and National Churches;<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bishop Hale's *Last Will and Testament*, § xiv. 2. c.

<sup>2</sup> *Church Hymns and Church Music*, by Professor Peter C. Lutkin, Mus.D., A.G.O., 1908-09;

*The Church of Sweden*, by the Rt. Rev. John Wordsworth, D.D., LL.D., 1910;

*Biographical Studies in Scottish Church History*, by the Rt. Rev. Anthony Mitchell, D.D., 1913;

*The Ethiopic Liturgy: Its Sources, Development, and Present Form*, by the Rev. Samuel A. B. Mercer, D.D., Ph.D., 1915;

*Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought*, by the Rev. Frank Gavin, M.A., Th.D., 1921.

but no one thus far has essayed 'Contemporaneous Church History,' although the preachers of the parallel series of 'Hale Sermons' have frequently dealt therewith. It is the purpose of the present course to deal with one aspect of 'Contemporaneous Church History,' an aspect which is generally recognized as both valid and important, *viz.*, the *History of Doctrine*. Indeed, taking Church History in its full definition, the History of Doctrine (also taken in its widest definition, and not reducing it simply to 'History of Dogma') is seen to be of major importance for understanding and interpreting the past. And when we come to the present, and discuss 'contemporaneous' Church History, the importance of doctrine can hardly be exaggerated. The outstanding events or movements in the Church History of the past century are almost wholly events or movements whose significance is doctrinal. The Oxford Movement was certainly in its origin concerned primarily with doctrine. The persistence and spread of Evangelical teaching, the rise of Liberalism, of biblical criticism, and the controversy over Evolution in Protestant circles; Vaticanism, Ultramontaniam, the Neo-Scholastic movement, in the Roman Church, and their opposition in 'Old-Catholicism' and in Modernism—these movements bulk largely in the Church History of the nineteenth century, and were all at root matters of doctrine. Within Anglicanism, the present-day movements of Anglo-Catholicism and Modernism are certainly con-

cerned primarily with doctrine rather than with practice. The controversy between Fundamentalism and Liberalism, though more vehemently conducted in some other religious bodies than the Anglican, and hence not so important for our present purpose, is almost exclusively a doctrinal controversy. One might almost say that the formal or external ecclesiastical history of the past hundred years has been shaped and determined by internal stresses whose essential nature was doctrinal.

Nevertheless, the difficulty of writing upon contemporary history is so great that only the boldest or the least informed will claim finality for their views. Far from attempting a formal account of the doctrinal development of the past century, what I shall endeavor to present in this course is only a discussion of certain prolegomena to such a history.<sup>3</sup> The question with which we shall steadily be concerned is the actual and inescapable bearing of certain modern attitudes and views, chiefly scientific, upon the traditional, historical Christian Faith.

Let me state frankly at the outset that my point of view is theological: not philosophical or historico-scientific. Yet, if I am not greatly mistaken, a genuinely theological point of view pre-

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<sup>3</sup> Without such *Vorarbeit* the history might be written, and indeed is sometimes written, as if it were the record of the *decline* of Christianity or of the Christian Faith. But before the details of any historical period can be accurately described, the general tendency or development or 'drift' underlying them must be made out. Hence the need for preparatory investigation.

supposes and includes philosophic thinking, and likewise scientific and historical. A satisfactory theology must take for granted all three: philosophy, science, and history. And it must 'take them seriously.'<sup>4</sup> For the theologian who ignores either philosophy, science, or history is foredoomed to failure. Faith may survive in isolation, at least for a time; but theology is committed to the rational task of effecting a synthesis of Faith and Reason, of religious experience and scientific knowledge; and to be true to itself it must face the problems arising from the conflict, real or apparent, between the world-view of modern science, modern philosophy, and modern history, and the world-view of received religion. There are some who would question the possibility of this synthesis. The theologian is supposed to derive all his data from Revelation, and to follow a method purely aprioristic and rational. 'Scientific method' is often set in contrast with the method of theology, as of religious thinking generally.<sup>5</sup> The theologian, like the preacher, is a 'retained advocate,' in Emerson's phrase; his professional task is to procure conviction, not to weigh in delicate balances the truth or probability or justice of opposing views. In a word, the theologian is supposed to be first

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<sup>4</sup> A phrase of Professor John H. Randall, Jr. See *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 1926, which begins by describing the 'mediaeval synthesis,' and traces the development of thought in its manifold aspects down to the present.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. H. N. Wieman, *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, 1926.

and last an apologist, one whose business it is to maintain the orthodox, traditional view-point at all costs. But the case is surely overstated. The great theologians of the past have frequently been great philosophers as well, and often great historians; and some of them have been scientists. Indeed, there have been theologians who held points of view, as philosophers or as scientific thinkers, which were simply incompatible with the rest of their theology: an example may be seen in St. Thomas Aquinas' view of the world's eternity, which he held on purely philosophical grounds, though recognizing the difficulty of squaring it with the theological doctrine of Creation.<sup>6</sup> At the same time the ideal has been that unity of thought in which the presuppositions and inferences alike of theology, philosophy, science, and common human interests are not left in isolation and independence, but become complementary and form a unified whole. If we recognize, as today many of us are inclined to recognize, the social backgrounds of theological as well as of philosophical and even of scientific thought, the right of the theologian to work at his synthesis of philosophy, faith, and common thought is as valid as anyone's else: he is as truly a servant of society as is the scientist, the philosopher, or the historian. It may also be true that the factors with

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<sup>6</sup> *Summa* I. 46. i. 5, 9-10; *Contra Gentiles* ii. 32-33; *De Pot.* III. 17. ii, iv. See E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Eng. tr., Ch. vii, and notes, esp. pp. 118 f., 124.

which Theology specifically deals are as genuine as those of Science or Philosophy. There are 'more things in heaven and earth' than are embraced within either strict science or strict philosophy—at least as science and philosophy are ordinarily conceived at the present time. Hence a true theology has the right, as it has also the responsibility, to undertake its task of synthesis: the right, that is, to attempt the synthesis, and the responsibility of taking into account all factors which have any bearing upon it or contribution to make. The task is therefore frankly no task for the apologist—though the apologist has his rights, as well, in a somewhat different field, *e.g.*, as an interpreter who makes sure that men understand before they reject or denounce.

The aim, accordingly, of this course of lectures is to consider the status of Christian doctrine in the midst of the intellectual changes that have taken place and of the new problems that have arisen "since the beginning of what is called 'the Oxford Movement,' in 1833," as the necessary prolegomena to 'Contemporaneous Church History.' I do not believe that anyone here present will challenge the propriety of such a treatment from the point of view of theology, rather than from that of strict history, philosophy, or science. Like other scientific workers, the theologian must have his point of departure, his *ποῦ στᾶ*; he must start from his theological tradition, just as the scientist starts from his scientific tradition, the



philosopher from the philosophical tradition. No man can be expected to begin *de novo* and erect his science slowly from its foundations, disregarding the discoveries, formulas, and other short-cuts provided by his predecessors. This much at least of 'orthodoxy' must candidly be allowed; and no one will suspect an insidious apologetic motive if we assume the inherited position, certainly until fresh discovery or unanswerable criticism renders that position no longer tenable.

It is the veriest commonplace to say that the Christian religion is today confronted with problems that never confronted it before. The sweep and range of these problems is greater than those of earlier ages—at least, this idea is so commonly expressed and so generally accepted that one is not saying anything new when he makes such a remark. As a matter of fact, the problems which the Christian Church faced in the second and third centuries, in the seventeenth and the nineteenth, may have been just as grave as those of to-day; but they were different in kind, and they came from a different quarter. As in wars between nations, so on the battlefield of the moral, intellectual, and spiritual life the front is constantly changing. New sectors are attacked; here a line advances, there it falls back; and sometimes a retreat in one sector makes possible an advance on some other. Only the total result, the final action, is decisive; only after a long period can we ascer-

tain whether victory or defeat has taken place. In the thick of action, both sides may claim victory with apparent justification—as at Verdun and in the Battle of Jutland. 'One more such victory and we are undone' may occasionally be true of intellectual warfare as of earthly. For example, the Church of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries seemed to dominate Europe; but at what fearful cost!

The problems of to-day arise on more than a single front. In the nineteenth century, though latent long before, they could be observed to arise, one after another, in the various fields of human interest: the Ecclesiastical Problem in England in the '30s; the Industrial Problem of the '40s and '50s; the Scientific Problem (Evolution) of the '60s and '70s; the Biblical Problem ('higher criticism') in the '80s and '90s. In each the Christian Church was involved; *i.e.*, the theology of the Church seemed imperilled. Each problem was attacked by a sortie of special apologetic—*e.g.*, the Oxford Movement, the Christian Socialist Movement, the pulpit 'refutations' of 'Darwinism,' the 'Replies' to *Essays and Reviews*. The castle of traditional orthodoxy seemed inviolable. Squads of skilful apologists sallying forth from her gates to meet the attackers were all that was necessary. But the problems remained. No angel of the Lord smote Sennacherib's host overnight. The movements, like the problems, are with us yet. Their task was only well-begun, in the nineteenth cen-

tury. Sacred Thebes is now surrounded on seven sides, and the attack has settled down to a siege. Many persons anticipate a capitulation sooner or later. 'Religion has run its course, has served its purpose, and seen its day.' 'The Church is decadent, and has no future in the modern world.' These are among the sentiments and opinions freely expressed in Europe and America to-day. And it is no wonder if ordinary men and women, even in the Christian Churches, feel that something is wrong, that something needs to be done. The worldly and once-born, who do not really care, lapse into cynicism or indifference. Give them enough golf, and the daily newspapers, and steady markets—*i.e.*, healthy recreation, information, and publicity, and plenty of work for everybody—and the Church will probably survive: money and members and good music and clever clergy are the chief desiderata. The loyal and the twice-born view the situation differently. If the wells and granaries of beleaguered Zion are running low, no outward ease can induce in them a sense of security. They catch the full drift of the casual utterances of some educated men for whom religion is a waning influence. And they take to heart the recent words of one of America's leading chemists, Edward E. Slosson:

"If the Church is to be anything more than a booster's club of Zenith City, there has got to be some hard thinking done by those at the head of it during the next twenty years. Somebody has got to seize hold of these new

conceptions [of science] and point out their moral applications. Otherwise, somebody else will make immoral application of them."<sup>7</sup>

What is most wanted, I believe, what we all want, clergy and laity and even non-churchgoers, is more than comforting reassurance. We also are children of to-day; the world's knowledge is ours—to share; its problems are ours—to solve, if we can. The greatest need of the present day, I believe, is a thought-out, defensible, modern theology.<sup>8</sup> We wish to take our world as it is, in a frank, comprehensive way, not ignoring any of the data or evidences it offers us, and think through to a ground-principle or set of principles that will not only give satisfactory recognition to every reliable and ascertained fact, but will find a place for the meaning of each and of all in an explanation adequate to the whole of our experience. We want no closed doors, no fire-walls, no water-proof compartments; a living theology must be master of the whole and possess the freedom of the city of Mansoul. Like Arjuna on the field of battle, in the Hindu *Song of the Lord*, besiegers and besieged alike belong to us and we to them. Unity of thought is indispensable. We cannot live without it. We can no longer limp between two—

<sup>7</sup> *Homiletic Review*, Oct., 1926, p. 227.

<sup>8</sup> Dean Albert C. Knudson even goes so far as to appeal for 'a revival of metaphysical theology'; see his *Philosophy of Personalism*, 1927, p. 13. But whether it is metaphysical or not, and regardless of the amount of metaphysics involved, a theology we must have. Cf. also A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, 1926, pp. 83 ff.

or twenty—opinions. We have religion, we have faith, we believe in God; we have also science, and at least some kind of philosophy—reasoned or opinionated, or half one and half the other; and we must somehow think in terms of the whole.

So we cannot wait until some great leader in thought arises, some modern St. Augustine or St. Thomas, and performs the Herculean labor for us. We must make the attempt, each man for himself; taking what guidance and accepting what help we can derive from others, studying the methods of other men but applying our whole strength to the immediate task, each one of us for himself. For that is what a living theology is, and offers; St. Augustine's theology was first his own, before it became dominant in the Western Church for a thousand years and more; St. Thomas first wrought out a synthesis of contemporary science, philosophy, and Christian faith in his own mind before he dictated the *Summa* and cast his mantle over the later Middle Ages. The work of theology is thus a very personal and practical affair. Each man must discover, or create, a theology for himself, certainly if he is to preach and teach, yes, if he is even to think satisfactorily and constructively in the privacy of his own mind.<sup>9</sup>

The general contrast in outlook between our age and the past was vividly set forth by the late Baron von Hügel in the second, posthumous vol-

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<sup>9</sup> See *Anglican Theological Review*, x. 1 (July, 1927), pp. 1 ff.

ume of his *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*.<sup>10</sup>

"Let us picture to ourselves," he says, "a state of things which has existed in the past, for all men of education in Western Europe; which still exists now, for many intellectually half-awake souls in the same regions; which will, thank God, certainly obtain again, for all educated men willing to believe—a state of things in which the 'matter,' if not of the official formularies, at least of the current official interpretation of them, harmonizes with (even whilst rightly transcending) all that is recognized at the time as otherwise assured truth by the average educated man, in his average moods and moments."

And he proceeds to ask:

"Does this average educated man, in proportion as he truly and deeply (though, perhaps, quite partially and intermittently) lives the life of the mind and of the spirit—does he apprehend and discover, feel, think, will and act; does he suffer, love, rejoice, produce in the same manner, with the same forms and categories, as [ecclesiastical] officialism seems to do and to direct him to do? The question readily answers itself: there is no kind of similarity here, between these two series of activities, in any single respect."

Even more pointedly is the contrast drawn by Prof. C. C. J. Webb, in his recent book on *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> London, 1926, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Oxford, 1926, pp. 206 ff. The rationality of the ancient theology comes out finely in a passage of St. Augustine, worth looking up: *Ep. cxx. 3*.

"It is a note of modern civilization, as compared with ancient and medieval . . . that the universality of religion and its fundamental importance in human affairs are no longer assumed as a matter of course, as in earlier ages they were wont to be. . . . The result of this change is that, whereas Christianity was at first discriminated from rival religions by the comparative rationality of its beliefs, the spirituality of its worship, and the moral elevation of the life which it required, in modern days, in the presence of a civilization (largely its own creation) which is scientific in its intellectual habits, and which, if it admits worship at all, seeks in it rather aesthetic expression than a magical or quasi-magical control of the environment, and is inclined to find in the promotion of morality the only generally intelligible justification of religious teaching, Christianity appears to be discriminated by retaining beliefs in supernatural occurrences, in the mysterious efficacy of ritual acts, and in the obligation, over and above ordinary moral duties, of a kind of behaviour, the value of which is only intelligible on a hypothesis not universally or perhaps even generally admitted."

The full history of the stages by which this change has come about would begin far earlier than the Oxford Movement and the nineteenth century, earlier than Kant and the *saeculum rationalisticum*, earlier than the Reformation, or the Renaissance; one can see its beginnings in the earliest foreshadowings of modern, occidental, critical thinking, which we find in certain isolated individuals and groups of the Middle Ages. But the full development has taken place since the

early seventeenth century, and hence synchronizes with the development of modern science. It is not, however, simply 'modern science' which has brought about the crisis in religious thought; for science itself is only one—though most important—phase of the whole tidal movement of western, European-American, intellectual activity since the days of barbarism.<sup>12</sup> Hence in discussing the new horizons of the Christian faith, or Christian doctrine in its relations with modern science and philosophy, we shall be dealing not with science alone, or with specified sciences, or with particular schools of philosophy, but with the world-view which has arisen during the recent past (especially during the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth) and of which 'science' is only the most crucial and perhaps the most fundamental expression. We shall begin by considering the status of religion and religious thought in a world which finds itself in constant change,

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<sup>12</sup> There is some truth in Mr. Hilaire Belloc's well known thesis that Northern Europe had not the long tradition of Catholic Christianity behind it, which Southern Europe possessed, at the dawn of the Reformation (though his apologetic interest considerably disguises the sound historical judgment upon which the statement is based). And there was disunity at the very heart of the 'mediaeval synthesis,' as Dr. C. R. S. Harris has pointed out in his recent work, *Duns Scotus*, Vol. I, ch. ii, esp. pp. 57 f. Cf. W. H. V. Reade, in *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, V, pp. 826 f. Incompatibles were combined by a superbly subtle logic, but the eventual disintegration of the synthesis—as perhaps of every intellectual synthesis—was only a matter of time. On the other hand, James Ward's view (in 1889; see his recent posthumous *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 118), which is the popular view, of 'the doctrine that there are two kinds of truth—book-keeping by double entry,' is much exaggerated and applies chiefly to the decadent Scholasticism of Occam and his successors.



where science has discovered afresh and indubitably that 'nothing continueth in one stay,' where knowledge is progressive and changing and largely relative, where man begins to take measure of his own achievements and capacities and discerns their apparent relative insignificance to the whole of nature.

This new world-view, rooted in science, seems at first glance the most formidable of all challenges to the religious outlook upon life. Contrasted with the ascertained realities of the external universe, man's religious aspirations and imaginings seem but cherished illusions; the wish is father to the thought, and the faith enshrined in ancient creeds, dogmas, and religious doctrines is but an ineffectual and now antiquated 'defense-mechanism' for combatting the evils of human existence. Here is the most vital and most vigorously assailed sector on the whole front in the 'warfare between science and theology'—a warfare that some of us hold to be, like the generality of wars, futile and unnecessary, but that nevertheless continues, and continues without success to either side.<sup>13</sup> Since it is Biology which is now queen of the sciences, we shall go into more detail (in Lecture III) in discussing the bearing of the biological world-view upon Christian doctrine: it is biology without doubt that brings the new intellectual *schema* closest 'home to men's business' and sug-

<sup>13</sup> See W. R. Inge, essay in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, 1925, 'Conclusion' ('Science and Theology' in *The Church and the World*, 1927, pp. 141 ff.).

gests the boundless possibilities of a world greater than anything dreamed of in biblical or in earlier ecclesiastical thought. And since it is partly in the vigor of the imagination that the strength of a religion manifests itself, so, too, apparently, the power and appeal of a non-religious world-view lie partly in its stimulus to the imagination. If we are to compare the two, and discover how far science has really affected the foundations of Christian faith, we must inquire here; for the hold which either science or religion maintains is in no small part its grip upon the imaginations of men. From either a science or a religion which atrophies the imagination, may the Lord deliver us!

As Biology traces the 'descent' of man in a way not dreamed of in the traditional theology, and sets him against the minimizing background of the vast world-process, so the History of Religions has set the Christian religion against the background of other religions and has propounded the question, What becomes of its uniqueness, its professed Revelation, its supernatural claims, in the light of the general evolution of religions? This also forms a vital chapter in the contemporary History of Doctrine, and to this subject we shall devote a lecture (IV). The question is one which theology makes no effort to escape, but has—as we shall see—carefully considered since its beginning in the days of the earliest Christian thinkers. The wealth of new material, of new

knowledge of the history of other religions, is welcomed by the theologian; and it only increases in acuteness a question that is as old as Christianity itself. Parallel to the History of Religions is the Psychology of Religion (Lecture V), and equally scientific in its present-day method of investigation. The problems it sets are also similar.<sup>24</sup> What becomes of Christian doctrine if the processes of religious emotion and thought are to be explained—or explained away—in terms of mechanistic or behavioristic psychology?—or if the objective validity of religious experience be done away in favor of repressions, inhibitions, and bad dreams?

The first two lectures will deal with religion and science, natural and biological, the next two with the history and psychology of religion. Lecture VI, coming still closer home and dealing with the traditional data of Christian doctrine, will discuss 'the new Bible'—*i.e.*, the Bible as understood by modern textual, historical, and literary criticism. Here also is a related group of problems, important for the contemporary History of Doctrine. Few features mark off our century from those that have preceded more sharply than the changed attitude toward the Bible. Is the Bible still to be viewed as an inspired book, or collection of books? Does it retain its authority as a

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<sup>24</sup> A certain amount of inevitable overlapping will be discerned in these two lectures, and may be accounted for partly by the fact that our concern in both is with the nature of religion, as analyzed from the two viewpoints of the history and psychology of religion.

source for Christian doctrine? What is its permanent value for the religious life and for the formulation of religious conceptions? It may be that the great transition has not yet been fully effected, and that a final view is not entirely possible, here as in other parts of our subject. Nevertheless, it is worth while to point out the positive gains, the real values achieved, and to note the general direction of constructive Christian thought at the present time.

Approaching even more closely to the goal of our investigation, Lecture VII will deal with Theology and Modern Philosophy; and in order to gain a proper perspective, an outline will be made of the relations of Christian doctrine to what was in earlier ages 'contemporary' philosophical thought. 'Modern philosophy' is of course not one homogeneous and unified body of thought; no one common outlook has thus far been achieved; Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Personalism, and other schools represent a wide variety of competing views.<sup>35</sup> Hence the impossibility of Christian doctrine 'coming to terms with modern philosophy'—since for no one set of 'terms' can universal allegiance be claimed at the present day. A similar difficulty attends all efforts at the 'restatement' of Christian doctrine in terms of 'modern thought,' since 'modern thought' has almost as many varieties as there are individual modern

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<sup>35</sup> In spite of the obvious 'meeting of extremes'; cf. B. Bosanquet, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1921.

thinkers.<sup>16</sup> For this reason our suggestions will perforce be only tentative; we can do little more than plot *general tendencies* of contemporary philosophy, and study their bearing upon Christian doctrine. If modern philosophy were one homogeneous body of thought, like mediaeval Aristotelianism, or like fourth-century Neoplatonism, the task would be simpler, and finality of statement somewhat more within the bounds of possibility. Nevertheless, a general drift can be made out, and its relation to the main tendencies of Christian thought and doctrine can be charted with some assurance. Out of it all may be gathered, for example, the modern emphasis upon the primacy of experience (an emphasis common to Idealists and Realists, and to other schools as well); and the bearing of such an emphasis upon the intellectual formulation of the Christian faith can be studied—even if only, as I have said, with somewhat tentative results.

Finally, an attempt will be made, in Lecture VIII, to sum up the whole situation as it relates to the major Christian doctrines: the doctrine of God, of Creation, of Satan and evil, of angels, of

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<sup>16</sup> Professor Whitehead goes so far as to maintain that this has been equally true in the past: see his *Religion in the Making*, p. 145. And he adds a warning which we do well to bear in mind. "In fact, there never has been any exact, complete system of philosophic thought, and there never has been any exact understanding of dogmas, an understanding which has been properly confined to strict interpretation in terms of a philosophic system, complete or incomplete."—For example, no historian or theologian can subscribe to the dictum that 'fixity of interpretation is of the essence of the creeds.'

man, of the Fall, of divine Revelation, the Incarnation, the Holy Spirit; and in conclusion certain observations will be offered concerning the nature of the Christian religion and its relation to knowledge. For it is possible that the best practical result of such a study as we are now undertaking will be a more exact and a more fruitful conception of Christian doctrine itself—what precisely its claims are, what their authority, what the relation of religious thought to religious experience, what the value of concrete intellectual formulations of the Faith, and the relation of religious 'knowledge' to all other 'knowledge' howsoever acquired. It is not a question, primarily, of orthodoxy or heterodoxy; such distinctions may be useful in other connections, but here our concern is rather with richness, vitality, and adequacy of thought. Our quest is for truth, the truth which 'shall make free.' And if our results should turn out in the end to be 'conservative' rather than 'radical,' this ought not to disconcert us—strange as it may seem that such an observation should be necessary! We have grown so accustomed to appeals to 'truth' and 'freedom' only as the prologue to 'radical' theses that we scarcely realize that truth must also be conservative, and that freedom need not necessarily be destructive. At the same time, we must be prepared for the revision of present outlooks and conceptions, if revision—even if 'radical' revision—proves necessary.

Of course it may once more be urged, either from the conservative camp or from the radical, that the shoemaker should stick to his last, and likewise the student of theology. Let him leave science and philosophy and history to go their own ways, and let him concern himself solely with religion or the Gospel. But in spite of such admonitions we cannot hesitate to undertake what seems a clear duty—assuming that theology has certain tasks and duties in the modern world, and that it is really possible to make out the bearing of modern thought upon traditional Christian doctrine. And we have confidence that the task is one that is really possible of performance, not by one individual, certainly not by the present writer, but in concert and at the end of many separate attempts. The spirit of the age is not disconsonant with true Christianity, nor with the fair and unprejudiced study of Christian doctrine.<sup>17</sup> The dogmatic spirit is passing away, in science, in philosophy, and in theology. The 'experimental method,' though not exclusive or exhaustive, has made good its right as a tool of investigation, as has also the 'psychological method' in the study and interpretation of religion and of other human interests. In history, *e.g.*, it is not dates and reigns, wars and dynasties that occupy the forefront of attention, but the states of mind, the ideals, the social attitudes, the aims and purposes, the hopes and fears, the response to changing conditions of environ-

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Anglican Theological Review*, x. 1, pp. 9 f.; cf. pp. 5 ff.

ment, the whole continuous movement of human life—this is the first concern of the interpreter of the past. Art, religion, philosophy, moral ideals, social standards, and the external conditionings of these by geographic, economic, industrial, and political relations, take their proper place. History is story once more, and story with a meaning, vast, intricate, fascinating: not a 'moral' or a 'lesson,' but a Bible of revelation of the significance of human life.

Again, somewhat in contrast to the nineteenth century and the earlier years of the twentieth, the present-day insistence upon completeness of outlook is an auspicious sign. Our philosophers and scientists, and our theologians, are not content with partial and fragmentary views. Specialism, even in science, is recognized as a limitation—however practically necessary it may be. The mathematician and the physicist, the biologist and the astronomer, the psychologist and the archaeologist and the anthropologist, each recognizes that for a complete understanding even of his own special 'branch' of science the work of those in other fields is indispensable. In place of the short and easy application of one simple formula for the interpretation of the universe (as in the days of Tyndall, Spencer, and Haeckel), scientists are now engaged in the patient study and correlation of the known facts about the universe, with no less synoptic or comprehensive an aim but with a recognition that the formula may not turn out to be



so simple or so easy of application as was once assumed.

Moreover, our 'practical' age is aware, as some ages were not aware, of the importance of the 'practical results' of knowledge, the application of the principles of science to daily life, the recognition of wholesome utility as one criterion (not the only criterion, as was assumed early in the last century by some thinkers) of the truth anywhere or anyhow discovered. Indeed, truth itself has a new definition, or at least interpretation, *viz.*, Value. That theory, or doctrine, or belief, or hypothesis which drags in the dust the noblest qualities in life, or outrages the higher nature of man, is suspected at once of being false. The 'philosophy of dirt,' as Carlyle once called materialism, is having a harder time every day to maintain itself in respectability; and this not only on account of its theoretical difficulty but also because of the devastating results of its influence upon society. Conclusions so deplorable, and consequences so annihilating to the best we know and hope, betray the insecurity of their premises. The ethical urge is alive and at work to-day, even though its task may seem at present overwhelming. For one thing, William James has been here and lived among us, and his work lies between us and the nineteenth century. If not 'the will to believe,'<sup>18</sup> at least the will *not* to believe things too dreadful, too inimical to man's highest aspirations, is recog-

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<sup>18</sup> William James, *The Will to Believe*, 1897.

nized as a valid and justifiable exercise of human, rational freedom.

Finally, the best thought of to-day is inclined to recognize the reality, and even primacy, of religious *experience*—apart from and prior to intellectual constructions of religion. We see this most markedly in the work of Prof. Rudolf Otto, and in the world-wide reception of his book, *The Idea of the Holy*;<sup>19</sup> we see it in the 'ecumenical' movements of the day, symbolized by Stockholm and Lausanne, where common religious experience either provides the bond of unity or raises expectations of theological unanimity whose failure of realization is widely disappointing; we see it in the widespread modern interest in personal devotion and mysticism. To a religious-minded student, this may well seem the harbinger of spiritual revival, and the direct 'work of the Holy Spirit,' whose vivifying breath 'goeth forth to renew the face of the earth.'<sup>20</sup> Indeed, it is not impossible that the really great age of Christianity, *i.e.*, of true spiritual religion, is still to come. Freedom, the absence of the dogmatic spirit; the 'psychological' approach to the study of religion, of philosophy, of history; the aspiration toward wholeness of outlook and toward unity of thought; the recognition of the claims of the practical, the

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<sup>19</sup> English translation by J. W. Harvey, Oxford, 1923; revised edition, 1925; fourteenth edition of the original, revised and enlarged, Gotha, 1926. The book has already been translated into Swedish, Spanish, Italian, and Japanese, as well as English.

<sup>20</sup> Psalm civ. 30.

test of applicability, the working-results of every creed, doctrine, opinion or belief as well as every standard of action; the recognition of the priority of experience to intellectual formulation and of the reality of religion here and now and not simply in the ages of the past or in the pages of an ancient book: these features of the new age seem to me entirely suited to bring out qualities in our religion too often ignored and overlooked, or too readily forgotten, in the past. Yet if the age is full of promise, no less—but even more—responsible are we for doing our modest best toward the working-out of the new synthesis of thought, of Faith, Reason, Ethics, Science, Philosophy, History, Art, and common knowledge. For in fact it is little less than a Christian philosophy that we require, a philosophy of life, of the world, of destiny, of the spiritual significance of the universe: a central position which shall dominate all our thinking and give order to the whole of experience, thought, and feeling. Such a value we believe to be implicit in the Gospel. No matter how modest our achievement may be, each in his particular field of study, I believe that nothing less than this is our common goal. Rather than be alarmed over the prospect we may well congratulate ourselves, and especially the younger minds now beginning their life-work as students and teachers, upon the new horizons of their faith and thought. For it may well be that men will some day look back to this age and say,

"Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,  
But to be young was very heaven."<sup>21</sup>

The task is great; there is work enough for  
all; and 'fair is the prize and the hope great'—  
καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Bk. xi.

<sup>22</sup> *Phaedo* 114c.

## II. RELIGION IN A CHANGING UNIVERSE

THE CONTRAST between the age in which we live and that in which our great-grandfathers lived is apparent to everyone. Ours is the age of steam, of steel, and of electricity. The outward aspect of human life has vastly changed in a hundred years. But an equally important change has taken place in the outlook upon human life, upon the world in which we live, and upon the beliefs and the practices of religion; it is a change that sunders our age not only from that of our great-grandfathers but also from every age that has gone before. I am not one to claim that every advantage is on our side. It does not seem to me that an inevitable and irresistible progress is the formula to explain every change—or even the majority of changes, necessarily—which take place in the world.<sup>1</sup> There has been loss and gain both. And no age is in a position to compare or contrast its total wealth, spiritual or material, with that of any other. We simply cannot presume to be impartial judges. Nor, on the other hand, am I prepared to join the chorus of the *laudatores tempo-*

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. R. Inge, 'The Idea of Progress' (1920), reprinted in *Outspoken Essays*, i. 158-183; J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, London, 1924.

*ris acti*, the belated Nestors who praise the 'good old days' and mourn the passing of 'the ages of faith.' It does little credit to our idea of faith to make it the virtue of a credulous, unsophisticated time when belief was easy, when few or none of the problems now confronting us were even dreamed of, and when 'faith,' so defined, meant little more than unquestioning acceptance of that view of the world which prevailed generally. No, faith is the fruit of a hardier tree; it is a virtue called forth when appearances are to the contrary;<sup>2</sup> it requires in truth an exercise of the will. And today faith has the opportunity to prove itself a real virtue, something to be won rather than inherited, a victory rather than a possession. And I believe—if you will allow me to repeat a personal profession—that the great 'age of faith' lies in the future, or rather, indeed, that it has already begun. As I see it, the first age of Christianity was a greater 'age of faith' than the Dark and Middle Ages that followed; and it is the temper of that heroic age of conviction, hope, and experiment which is needed once more in the Church, and which, I believe, is already on the way.

The dawn of the new age in which we live, like every dawn, threw into relief the great elemental contours and configurations of the land. Only gradually the details of trees and rocks and

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<sup>2</sup> As when believing Peter confessed his confidence in a Messiah who was virtually in exile, in the region of Caesarea Philippi, outside the borders of the Holy Land: Matthew xvi. 16.

common objects came into view. The battle between 'Genesis and Geology' was one of the first and most crucial conflicts between the old world-view and the new. The period of that struggle is past. Only in backward and ultra-conservative circles is there still any question of the general truth of evolution, or any lingering refusal to accept the main outline of the story of our earth as reconstructed by modern astronomy and geology. Facts speak for themselves. The story 'hangs together.' New facts as they are discovered fit in with this general outline, modifying its details, filling in its lacunae, but not disturbing the main sequence of the narrative. All this we can simply take for granted. There is no one here who is unfamiliar with the modern astronomical and geological version of the origins of the earth, or who hesitates to accept it, at least in a general recognition. The dawn has come, and we begin to see clearly the 'lay of the land' about us. No one here would think of trying to refute this general theory either by appeal to the facts of immediate observation, to the 'articles of religion' literally understood, or to the Mosaic-Miltonic 'epic of creation' which our forefathers took for granted.

But it is the further implications of the theory with which we are all concerned, in this clearer light of the morning of our age. We begin to be aware of a revolution in thought as great as that effected by Copernicus—indeed, even greater. It is not enough simply to 'interpret' Genesis i.-ii. in

terms borrowed from geology, or to call that ancient story—or perhaps poem—a ‘symbolic’ account. Origen could have done that, or any Church Father, by ‘allegorical exegesis.’<sup>3</sup> Nor is it enough even to discount Genesis i.-ii. entirely, and substitute a narrative in accordance with modern science, keeping only the principal truth, ‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.’<sup>4</sup> The problem goes deeper. The world unveiled to our wondering eyes by modern physical science is a world *still in process*. The change from amorphous, inchoate matter—whatever it was: gas, star-dust, boiling seas of atoms, abysmally deep, or of protons and electrons not yet stabilized as elements<sup>5</sup>—to a universe of law and order, of physical and biological forms, was not a change once-for-all, after which the Creator could ‘rest.’

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<sup>3</sup> Some of them came very near doing so. Cf. Basil, *Hexaëmeron* ii. 8, on the ‘day’ in Genesis i. 5: “We are hereby shown not so much the limits, ends, and successions of ages [in the scriptural use of terms referring to time], as distinctions between various states and modes of action.”

<sup>4</sup> Genesis i. 1. There is no doubt that the ‘principal truth’ of the narrative is the one stated in this verse, and that this was the (perhaps novel) thesis proposed by the author of the narrative. Over against the Babylonian or accepted Semitic cosmogony the Hebrew author insisted that God created all things—his God, *Elohim*. In much the same way a modern man of faith insists that the God he knows is the Originator and Creator of the universe. Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, pp. 119 ff. This ‘principal truth’ is no doubt still valid, and important, if religion is to concern itself with cosmology at all—distinguished, of course, from its picturesque ancient formulation.

<sup>5</sup> If indeed some prior and for us inconceivable state may not have preceded the differentiation of electric charges into positive and negative—of which ‘protons’ and ‘electrons’ are only the arbitrary terms used in measurement of energy. Cf. A. Haas, *The World of Atoms*, 1928, pp. 16, 114 f.



The universe is more than the shop where Paley's big pocket-watch was fashioned and put together. Creation is still going on, God is still creative, still active.<sup>6</sup> The world in which we live represents an equilibrium of forces, but not a perfect equilibrium, which would be static and unchangeable. It is an equilibrium under pressure—like that indicated by the tiny ammeter on a motor car. The needle seems to rest, if the engine is running smoothly and 'in tune'; but place it under a microscope, or look carefully with the naked eye, and it will be seen to be quivering incessantly under the lightning-swift blows of the electric charge from the generator-dynamo. What we call stability is nothing more than average balance, maintained for a certain period of duration. A universe that has come into being as has this one, and that is maintained in existence as ours is maintained, may conceivably degenerate and return once more to its primal state, as its energies subside and its equilibrium totters, and

"That which drew from out of the boundless deep  
Turns again home."<sup>7</sup>

It is not only the first chapters of Genesis, but the whole of human history, as a part—a really tran-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. John v. 17—a statement that might be pressed into contrast with Genesis ii. 2, as popularly understood.

<sup>7</sup> Tennyson, 'Crossing the Bar.'—Of course the universe may not actually 'dissolve, and . . . leave not a rack behind,' as Prospero predicted, but may gradually shift—by further evolution—into a state quite different from the average system at present prevailing, just as it appears to have done in the past. Cf. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 160. "The universe

sitory and episodic part—of the history of this planet, and the ultimate destiny of man and of all that he holds dear or dreadful in it, that is affected by the discovery that the world in which we live is a universe of change.

Now this is not so very remote from what men have sometimes recognized in the past as characteristic of their world.

“Change and decay in all around I see;  
O Thou who changest not, abide with me.”<sup>8</sup>

Or, as a later poet has expressed it,

“The world, which seems  
To lie before us like a land of dreams,  
So various, so beautiful, so new,  
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain.”<sup>9</sup>

The soul cries out for certitude and permanence; but the world, *i.e.*, the external universe, offers us neither, and for religion these are to be sought and found elsewhere—within, or above, or by the power of God. Nor must we forget the ancient Jewish and early Christian eschatology, or doc-

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shows us two aspects: on one side it is physically wasting, on the other side it is spiritually ascending. It is thus passing with a slowness, inconceivable in our measure of time, to new conditions, amid which the physical world, as we at present know it, will be represented by a ripple barely to be distinguished from non-entity.” Cf. Sir Oliver Lodge, *Science and Human Progress*, 1927, pp. 12, 193 f., 236 ff. Such a flowering of the universe in some higher and hitherto unsuspected state of existence is an open possibility; for religion, however, something more is required, something that it is not mere egotism for the individual to ask.

<sup>8</sup> Henry F. Lyte, ‘Abide With Me,’ 1847.

<sup>9</sup> Matthew Arnold, ‘Dover Beach.’

trine of 'the last things,' according to which it was held that the world we now live in must some day come to an end, either by dissolution or destruction, or by transformation into the eternal celestial kingdom. "The day of the Lord will come as a thief; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the heavenly bodies [or elements] shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up."<sup>10</sup> The normal Christian has never been dismayed by the prospect of such a catastrophe. Like Emerson, informed by an Adventist of the approaching destruction of the world, he has replied, "Very well, I can get along without it." Indeed, it is characteristic of the religious man that he has never pinned his hopes to the permanence of the external universe.<sup>11</sup> True permanence, man's true life, is to be sought, and is found, upon another level than that of the natural world, whose glories fade and which itself shall in the end be folded up as a tent and vanish away.

So much for a provisional answer to the threat of impermanence which faces our physical uni-

<sup>10</sup> II Peter iii. 10.

<sup>11</sup> Though Origen (cf. *De Princ.* i. 7; ii. 2; iii. 6, etc.) and other philosophic theologians have held the doctrine of the eternity of the created world (without, however, making any great use of the doctrine), it is one question whether or not they meant a universe of matter, and still another question whether we do not have to face the problem ourselves and to some extent agree with them—i.e., defining 'matter' in some non-'materialistic' way! More than one phrase in current philosophical discussion of the problem reminds one of Origen and his school. On the view held by Aquinas, see the preceding lecture. See also Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 18; Lodge, *Science and Human Progress*, pp. 50, 54.

verse. What of it? we say. Let the universe grow cold, crystallize, shatter in pieces, die down into a Dead Sea of lifeless, inert 'matter,' if such be its possible or certain destiny;<sup>12</sup> we do not expect to be here, or to suffer any loss or disadvantage in the *grande débâcle*. The life of the spirit, that *for* which and *by* which it all exists, remains undisturbed upon a higher level. This is our provisional answer; perhaps it will turn out to be our final one. Meanwhile, let us go back to the problem raised for religious thought (if not for vital religion) by the unversality of change.

The very ground we tread, the rock through which we tunnel, the ancient hills to which we lift up our eyes and from which we, like all who have gone before, catch the suggestion of permanence and changelessness—all this is in motion; it quivers constantly like a ship at sea,<sup>13</sup> and changes continually from age to age.

"There rolls the deep where grew the tree.

O earth, what changes hast thou seen!

There where the long street roars, hath been  
The stillness of the central sea.

"The hills are shadows, and they flow

From form to form, and nothing stands;

They melt like mist, the solid lands,  
Like clouds they shape themselves and go."

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<sup>12</sup> Though scientists are by no means unanimous in looking forward to such a state as Mr. Bertrand Russell describes in his brilliant but depressing 'Free Man's Worship' (*Logic and Mysticism*, 1918, pp. 46 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> We now have instruments delicate enough to record these constant tremors. Cf. R. A. Daly, *Our Mobile Earth*, 1926.

Thus Tennyson;<sup>14</sup> and for prosaic commentary see the maps in any good modern work on historical geology. For example, the heart of this continent, they tell us, has been fourteen times at the bottom of the sea. Our American poet, William Vaughn Moody, has a similar feeling:

"This earth is not the steadfast place  
 We landmen build upon;  
 From deep to deep she varies pace,  
 And while she comes is gone.  
 Beneath my feet I feel  
 Her smooth bulk heave and dip;  
 With velvet plunge and soft upreel  
 She swings and steadies to her keel  
 Like a gallant, gallant ship."<sup>15</sup>

Modern physics and astronomy introduce us to a universe that is thoroughly relativistic. Take physics: the stability of the very elements, which was the basic dogma of physics when we were at school, is now discovered to be only a relative stability. Increase their temperature sufficiently and they appear to pass under the control of an entirely new set of laws. Bombard their atoms with a sufficient charge of electricity, in the laboratory, and they break down in dissolution. Their

<sup>14</sup> *In Memoriam*, cxxiii. Compare the lines of the modern German lyricist, Rainer Maria Rilke (d. 1926), in his *Sonnets to Orpheus*:

*"Wandelt sich rasch auch die Welt  
 wie Wolkengestalten,  
 alles Vollendete fällt  
 heim zum Uralten."*

<sup>15</sup> 'Gloucester Moors.'

structure seems thoroughly relative, and to depend upon the temperatures and pressures which now normally obtain in the world as we know it.<sup>16</sup> Or take astronomy: the whole planetary, solar, and stellar universe is discovered to be in ceaseless flux. Galileo and Tycho Brahe assumed a stable planetary or solar system—as stable as the concentric spheres of Eudoxus, Aristotle, and Dante, but with a heliocentric system in place of the ancient geocentric. Like all their predecessors, from the days of the ancient Chaldean astronomers down to their own days—and with them, we must add, most astronomers until comparatively recent times—they assumed that the ‘fixed stars,’ including our sun, were really fixed. But we now know that our aged luminary and his flock of cooling satellites are really adrift in space—

“And Whither vainer sounds than Whence  
For word with such wayfarers!”<sup>17</sup>

Whether this drift of the solar system is in a straight line, which seems improbable, or whether our sun is tethered to some vast radius and swings like a ship at its hawser, no one at present knows.<sup>17a</sup>

<sup>16</sup> ‘Temperatures and pressures’ which they themselves no doubt share in producing—and if so, it is obvious that Naturalism (or Naturalistic Determinism) is more completely than ever an argument in a circle; and that only creative *purpose* can account for the existence of precisely this—or this kind of—universe rather than of any other. Cf. P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, 1927, pp. 209 ff.

<sup>17</sup> G. Meredith, ‘The Question Whither.’

<sup>17a</sup> It may be noted that Dr. Harlow Shapley of Harvard Observatory locates the center of this particular universe at a distance of 52,000 light-years from our solar system, and finds evidence that the sun is moving about this center. See *Literary Digest*, June 2, 1928, p. 20.

And *why* all this should be so—the question leads us into a metaphysical region where sufficient data are not at hand for an answer. For all motion in the universe seems to lie under the spell of relativity, whether it be on the large celestial scale or on the tiny one of electronic charges, where motion is only the average result of restrained but competing forces.

It is this thorough-going relativism that constitutes the greatest problem for the religious view of the world at the present day.<sup>18</sup> It affects—we might say, with Whitehead, it infects—the whole imaginative outlook of modern educated men. It invades the conception of history; it tampers with the foundation of ethics; it leaves man once more

*“nur ein trüber Gast  
Auf der dunklen Erde.”*<sup>19</sup>

Nothing stays. Not only “man fleeth, as it were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay”; but the whole universe falls under this aspect in scientific contemplation. The early Greek philosopher<sup>20</sup> who taught that ‘all things flow’—τὰ πάντα ῥεῖ—would find in modern science the most consummate vindication of his doctrine.

What place has religion in such a universe—

<sup>18</sup> I say ‘relativism,’ for I am not concerned with the mathematical doctrine of relativity as applied to astronomy and physics—which, however, is perhaps its fullest logical statement. Cf. T. L. Haering, *Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft*, 1923, Part v; Bridgman, *op. cit.*, ch. iii. (more critical); C. L. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Lect. ix.

<sup>19</sup> Goethe, ‘*Selige Sehnsucht*,’ in *West-östliche Divan*, Bk. i.

<sup>20</sup> Heraclitus of Ephesus, b. 509 B.C.

religion the offspring of the mind of man, who is only nature's latest, and, in some respects, feeblest biological species in a tiny and remote province of creation? Is not religion itself caught in this general maelstrom of relativism? Have not the modern psychology and history of religion given a final *coup de grâce* to the inherited notion of an absolute and static system of religious truth and practice?—These are among the questions which rise constantly to vex and harass religious thought at the present time. They show clearly enough the necessity that constrains us to think out our faith, if we can, in terms of the new world-view—the necessity, at least, of the effort to do so, whatever the success or failure with which it is destined to be crowned. Indeed, it seems to me that they show clearly the necessity of achieving either an adequate philosophy of religion, an intellectually satisfying background for the faith that is in us as Christians, or else of achieving a faith which has room for the data of modern science: a faith, or a philosophy, or both. Now, it is surely significant—and important for our purpose—that much of modern philosophy, which is largely philosophy of science, is trying to do just this for the higher life of man generally, for his faith in ultimate beauty, truth, and goodness, and to find the place, whatever it is, of this higher life in the changing and eventually dying universe discovered by modern physical science. It is significant, moreover, that modern thought (especially modern



philosophical thought) takes into account the beliefs and practices of mysticism, and lays real weight upon the intuitions of men who have—at least to their own satisfaction—pressed on beyond 'the flaming ramparts of the world' into a region of supersensible and permanent reality: at the very least, the deliverances of such men are taken seriously and made the subject of careful study and investigation. Significant also are the more recent philosophies of such thinkers as Samuel Alexander,<sup>21</sup> Conwy Lloyd Morgan,<sup>22</sup> and Alfred North Whitehead,<sup>23</sup> who see more in nature than order or even progress, indeed, nothing less than genuine purpose—whether it be the immanent purpose of a universe tending toward God (Alexander) or the working out of a transcendent purpose whose ultimate and real source is a God above and greater than the whole of nature (Morgan, Whitehead). Prof. Lloyd Morgan, for example, begins by championing a most uncompromising naturalism;<sup>24</sup> but he leads us in the end to the conception of a God who is in essence personal, purposeful, and eternal.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Space, Time, and Deity*, two vols., 1920.

<sup>22</sup> *Emergent Evolution*, 1923; *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, 1925. "Signs are not wanting that, somewhat along the lines of this book [the former], a new Religious Realism is being worked out which will fill for the modern world the place of the Scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages."—C. W. Dibble, in *Anglican Theological Review*, vii. 183.

<sup>23</sup> *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, 1919; *The Concept of Nature*, 1920; *Science and the Modern World*, 1925; *Religion in the Making*, 1926; *Symbolism*, 1927.

<sup>24</sup> *Emergent Evolution*, § 1; *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, § 1.

<sup>25</sup> *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, Preface, and Lect. x. I shall return to this subject later on.

As I see it, neither religion nor philosophy can ever dispense with the conception of a genuine and unchanging ground of all existence.<sup>26</sup> For religion this is found either in the *Will* of God (as with Augustine and his famous dictum: 'The will of God is the nature of things')<sup>27</sup> or in the very *nature* of God (as with Hegel and his theological followers, for whom all existence is an unfolding manifestation of the Absolute).<sup>28</sup> Beyond, or outside, or above, or within, or underneath—however we visualize it in spatial metaphor—there must be a 'realm of ends' where nature's long strivings are realized, toward which they tend, and in which they are achieved. These 'ends' must be in some sense regulative: what takes place in the universe does so relatively to these hidden causes. As Leibniz put it, of course in his own terminology, "the two realms, of efficient and of

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. A. E. Taylor, 'The Vindication of Religion,' in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, 1926, esp. pp. 46 ff.

<sup>27</sup> *City of God*, xxi. 8. 2. "*Quomodo est enim contra naturam, quod Dei fit voluntate, cum voluntas tanti utique Conditoris conditae rei cuiusque natura sit.*"

<sup>28</sup> Compare Professor Whitehead's view, according to which God is 'the principle of concretion,' by which a certain range of the possible becomes the actual in the world about us. "God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality."—*Science and the Modern World*, pp. 249 f. Cf. *Religion in the Making*, pp. 149 ff. A similar position seems implicit in one phase of Leibniz's theism, though he never worked it out and certainly leaned in the opposite direction in describing the divine choice of 'the best of possible worlds.'

final causes, are in harmony with one another.”<sup>29</sup> For unity of thought, for wholeness, for complete rationality, the idea of something—or Someone—like Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover’ is simply indispensable. Indefinite progress, like indefinite regress, is a logical impossibility; and a closed circle of indefinite repetition—aside from its psychological unsatisfactoriness—cuts the nerve of action, action without which neither religion nor thought can live.

It is thus more than the question of miracles with which religion is now concerned in its relations with modern science. And it may very well be—indeed, I think it is—true that religion has a point of view to offer science which, in the working-out of a modern *Weltanschauung*, is full of promise. For religion as well as science has been and still is one of the profoundest concerns of the

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<sup>29</sup> *Monadology*, § 79. On the distinction of ‘final causes’ from the crass form of the Argument from Design, see Hegel, *Logic*, § 205. Professor Whitehead has pointed out the unsatisfactory quality of Hume’s philosophy from a scientific standpoint (*Science and the Modern World*, pp. 5 f., 47, etc.), since he undertook to uproot not only final causes but all causation whatsoever. Hence his philosophy is ‘sceptical’ not only from the religious but even more so from the scientific standpoint—though (like religious) ‘scientific faith has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the philosophic mountain.’ If science is to tell us anything about the universe *as a whole*—perhaps it cannot do so, strictly speaking, but if it undertakes to do so—it simply cannot dispense with the theory of final causes. The same unsatisfactory quality inheres in many a later philosophy than Hume’s. Kant drew Hume’s logical slip-knot tight, though deftly escaping the fatal consequences himself. And a whole century and more of scientific thought since Kant’s day has continued more or less blissfully unaware of the hiatus between the Humistic-Kantian position and that which all scientific knowledge and theory presupposes.

human mind. In a thoroughly relativistic universe, religion certainly has as much right—relative right—to be heard as science itself, or aesthetics, or logic, or ethics, or any rational philosophy that presumes to deal with genuine data of experience. But more than this: it offers a faith (and in the end, in a purely scientific, thoroughly relativistic scheme of things, faith may be required as our final guide)—a faith which justifies itself as an account of the whole of our experience, which (at least in its ideal formulation) declines to leave out any particular group of facts (as science does, by ‘abstraction’),<sup>30</sup> and which indeed promises to bring unity and coherence into all our thinking, and to unveil in some measure, ‘as we are able to receive it,’ the inner meaning of existence generally.

Such a faith vindicates its right to a place in a changing universe. For it carries on the age-old task of unifying and coördinating human thought and activity, of bringing men into contact with and obedience to the highest and most real ‘ends’ of existence (what religion has called ‘the purposes of God’), of supplying concretely conceivable goals to the noblest human motives, of lifting men out of the ebb and flow of meaningless circumstance, of supplying the adequate and indispensable symbols of ‘spiritual’ realities apart from which man cannot deal with them or become fully conscious of his relation to them—in a word,

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, 1923, pp. 29 f.

of giving order and meaning to human life. If for no other purpose, or with no other justification than this quasi-pragmatic one, religion must maintain its rights within a universe of change. Instead of being caught and engulfed within the maelstrom of scientific relativism, is not one of its values precisely the escape it provides onto high and firm standing-ground? Nothing that the psychology or comparative history of religion may bring forward can suffice to destroy this assurance of some sort of permanence and certitude which religious conviction always gives.

As a negative testimony to the reality and necessity of such an interpretation and ordering of life, does not the very 'decline of faith' which is frequently attributed to the growth of modern science (*i.e.*, to the dissemination of the scientific point of view and acceptance of the 'assured results of modern knowledge') point this way? Intelligent men who have abandoned faith have not done so as a rule—at least not in our century—because they believed religion to be inimical to human welfare, or to be founded upon superstition, or to be the repressive device of kings and priests, but solely because they have found, or have expected to find, in 'science' or 'the modern outlook' precisely that interpretation of the meaning of life, and its reasonable ordering, which of old was supplied by religion. It is the religious world-view, or the world-view associated with religion, which they have wished to abandon rather

than—if the distinction were possible—religion itself. Therein lies the crisis, and the tragedy, for many a contemporary student and thinker!

Now this religion of which I am speaking is not Sunday School doctrine—though if true it should be taught in all our schools, and the foundation for it ought certainly to be laid in every religious school, even the most elementary. The beginning of a *rapprochement* between science and religion must be made in the most thorough-going way. Let me offer, in conclusion, one or two practical suggestions:

I. The doctrine of creation must be so modified as to include—or rather so as not to exclude—the theory of evolution, and the whole general findings of modern astronomy, geology, and other related sciences. Let us teach Genesis i. and ii., the narrative of the Six Days of Creation and the Garden of Eden, if we will, in the Primary Department of the Church School—but let us teach it *as a story*, as an *ancient* story, as a poem, a beautiful intuition or guess, with a sublime and everlastingly true message, *viz.*, ‘In the beginning *God* created heaven and earth’ . . . ‘and all that in them is.’ But let us not teach the Hebraic cosmogony as literal fact, certainly not to High School students, or even to Juniors. We have no right to ‘bind men with burdens grievous to be borne,’ or to lay obstacles in the way of children which can be removed later only at fearful cost, and sometimes at jeopardy of their faith.

II. Let us do likewise in the treatment of miracles.<sup>31</sup> They come down, as stories, from a different age than ours. As stories, they are often sublime. Their real message is religious, not scientific. Back of them, almost one and all, lies the impression of a great personality;<sup>32</sup> and without

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<sup>31</sup> I introduce this section partly because for many persons the problem of miracles is still the most vigorously contested area of contact between religion and physical science, partly because the new scientific view may be claimed—in an apologetic method of handling—to validate miracles generally. This is done either (a) by emphasizing novelty in natural sequences, and the pluralist conception of diverse systems of natural law operating upon different levels (*e.g.*, the levels of the inorganic and the mental); or (b) by emphasizing the limited range of possible scientific observation and the 'abstractive' character of scientific method. Both emphases may be discovered in modern apologetic works, and (as arguments for miracles) they make scant impression upon minds trained in scientific thinking. One of the first requirements for a true appraisal of the modern situation, or for the understanding of the contemporary history of Christian doctrine, is the abandonment of a too facile apologetic founded upon a bare speaking acquaintance with science. A more fruitful apologetic will result when the great basic conceptions of modern science are thoroughly taken to heart and meditated upon day and night by Christian theologians, and when the great underlying principles of religion are laid bare, stripped of the accretions of successive but transitory philosophies, antiquated world-views, and complexes of common thought. The world awaits such a soundly scientific, thoroughly philosophic, genuinely religious *Apologia pro Fide Christiana*.

<sup>32</sup> This is true not only of the Old and New Testament miracles generally but also—and supremely—of those narrated in the Gospels. It is not the miracle that Jesus does, but Jesus who does the miracle, which gives the story of the miracle its religious (and religious educational) value. What if the stories of the miracles were found in other books, ascribed to other persons? Some of them, in fact, do have close parallels elsewhere—*e.g.*, in the ancient Jewish literature and in the (perhaps imitative) *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by Philostratus. But the difference, in practically every instance, between a gospel miracle and its parallel lies in the impression created by Jesus' personality—not only at the time, but even in the written narrative. This is not to deny the power of faith to 'do mighty works' anywhere and in any age, nor the effectiveness of any spiritual personality to provide a channel for the release of fresh and hitherto unrecognized forces—especially in such ways as the healing of the sick.

that antecedent impression the religious value is often *nil*—instead of awakening faith they awaken doubt. We should have the courage of our Lord, who steadfastly refused to give ‘signs’ any evidential value for the truth of faith.<sup>33</sup> If a miracle is attested as a fact,<sup>34</sup> that is one thing; if a miracle has teaching-value, as a story, as an example of faith, that is likewise something; but if a miracle is only a breach of nature’s uniformity, a lawless invasion of capricious supernatural forces, that is still another, and less desirable, thing. I strongly feel that we need a new definition of ‘miracle,’ in terms of the *impression* of divine power and goodness which it creates.<sup>35</sup> Such miracles are with us still, and need not be sought for only in ancient documents: though the ‘ancient documents’ (*e.g.*,

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<sup>33</sup> Mark viii. 11-12.—How differently has the Church viewed them, from the days of the first Greek Gospel down to Paley and the modern Fundamentalists!

<sup>34</sup> That this is true of a majority of the Gospel miracles is no doubt both a reasonable and defensible proposition, though the later interpretation of the fact—*e.g.*, of a miracle of exorcism—is not uniformly carried along with the attestation of the fact. The biblical miracles were reported by those who believed in and expected miracles, and for whom miracles were an important evidence of religious truth as a manifestation of the divine power; hence *their* accounts of ‘miracles’ were naturally colored in this way. It is very difficult to see the events described in any other way than as did the authors of these accounts; though, as Professor Sanday once remarked, a modern newspaper account or a scientific report would differ considerably from what we read in the Old or New Testament.

<sup>35</sup> Such a definition I attempted at the St. Louis Church Congress; see ‘The Place of Miracles in Religion,’ in *Problems of Faith and Worship*, 1926, p. 142; published also in *Church Quarterly Review*, October, 1925. I would refer the reader to the volume by F. R. Tennant, *Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions*, a fine example of a careful investigation.



the Bible) will no doubt remain the classical 'source' for this element, as for many another, in the Christian faith.

To be specific, we have taken over—not from Christianity itself, but from the general traditional view of things—a dualistic, two-storey conception of the universe. This is deeply embedded in orthodox Western theology, as a result of the influence of St. Augustine and the Schoolmen, especially of St. Thomas Aquinas; but it is not essentially Christian. Modern science has simply let it stand, for the most part ignoring (quite naturally) the upper storey—the 'supernatural'—and concerning itself with the 'natural' realm (though sometimes casting doubts upon the existence or the defined characteristics of the supernatural). And much of modern Christian apologetics simply takes for granted this dualism, assuming that the universe of natural law is sufficient in itself—at least for all but exceptional purposes—and then endeavoring to justify belief in 'higher laws' which from time to time invade the lower realm or storey. For example, Christian discussion of the Resurrection of Christ has often been prefaced by a disquisition upon (or at least an assumption of) 'the miraculous,' a category intended to include not only the Resurrection of Christ, and His earthly miracles, but also the Old Testament miracles, even the floating of the axe-head in the story of Elisha.<sup>36</sup> But this approach is

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<sup>36</sup> II Kings vi. 1-7.

not only unnecessary but fictitious and wrong, and gravely misrepresents the true attitude of Christians to the Resurrection of our Lord. Let us be perfectly clear: there is *no* general category of 'the miraculous,' save as a convenience of speech or as a lumber-room of odds and ends, undistributed remainders, and inexplicables in rational thinking. Its only significance is subjective: it covers those phenomena which impress *us* as immediately wrought by divine power. There are no 'higher' laws, ordinarily inoperative but called into play from time to time upon extraordinary occasions. Whatever 'laws' there are are operative at all times: it is only a picturesque and imaginative way of thinking, based upon fictitious analogy to the 'laws' of human society, that assumes anything else.<sup>37</sup> The 'supernatural,' if it ex-

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<sup>37</sup> It may be asked, Were biological 'laws' operative in the world before life appeared? Relatively to a world of 'mere matter,' may not such 'laws' be called 'higher,' and in a sense 'supernatural'? To which it may be replied that unless biological 'laws' had been operative from the start, life never would or could have made its appearance. Science, at least in its most recent development, does not warrant this dichotomy of laws of matter and laws of life: the whole fabric of nature is one, from start to finish. And to the teleologist, life is implicit in the first, most elementary stages of physical evolution—or, in the language of religion, God purposed it from the beginning, and the earlier stages were all preparatory. Life is not the product of matter; life, if we will, created matter in order to use it for its own manifestation (cf. Lodge, *Science and Human Progress*, p. 59; the theory underlies practically the whole of Bergson's philosophy). It is inconceivable that biological 'laws' were a kind of afterthought, or amendment to the constitution of matter; or that matter should be uniformly controlled by 'physical' law, throughout the universe, while biological 'laws' varied from sphere to sphere—*e.g.*, that the biological 'laws' effective in Mars (assuming animate forms to exist upon that planet) should differ from those operative upon earth, analogously to the variations in Roman Canon Law between different countries! If in the

ists, must be a part of the 'natural'—the 'house' is all one, and its 'laws' (if laws at all) are universal. The true 'supernatural' is the spiritual, the timeless aspect, the Godward relation, the very heart and core of the 'natural.' An initial fault lies in the anthropomorphic (or even animistic!) way of viewing 'law,' as if a 'law' of nature were a thing in itself, substantial, or dynamic; whereas a 'law' is only a brief and summary *description* of what is observed to take place normally in the course of nature.<sup>38</sup>

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course of countless ages our universe should shift into a new set of relations, with corresponding new 'laws'—as some scientists consider to be possible—it still remains that those very 'laws' are implicit even now, and that their actual operation is conditional only upon the appearance of such phenomena as they may be destined to govern. If at this instant some such phenomena should suddenly appear—*e.g.*, the creation, not the discovery, of a new element, or the appearance of a new and, let us say, super-human biological species—the 'laws' already in existence would determine their survival or extinction. For thought, even the 'evolution of laws of nature,' must be viewed as a continuous process, in which the end is regulative from the beginning, and the higher 'laws' are in control from the start. To the religious thinker this means that the universe is essentially and in meaning a spiritual process, and time, as Plato said, only 'the moving image of eternity' (*Timaeus* 37d); to the philosophic thinker it means that the whole world-process is explicitly rational. No sudden *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* takes place to defeat and undo the achievements of earlier stages in the process. There is change, even sudden change; but there is no caprice, and Tyche is not upon the throne.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, pp. 25 ff. To begin a discussion of the Resurrection of Christ, let us say, by relegating it to the category of 'the miraculous' or 'supernatural' is not only to put the cart before the horse, logically (since the question is primarily historical), but also to load the cart with superfluous and unnecessary baggage: *i.e.*, it means introducing the Resurrection of our Lord as a proof or an illustration of the general concept of 'the miraculous.' No one ever thought of adopting such a procedure until nineteenth-century 'apologetics' appeared on the scene. To the Greek Fathers, *e.g.*, the Resurrection like the Incarnation of Christ was a supremely *natural* event. The Logos who was in the world from the beginning, who created and sustained it from

III. Thirdly, I believe we must make clear to everyone, children and adults alike, the basic principle of Christianity that 'we walk by faith, not by sight.' We have too thoroughly rationalized our religion. No doubt, as Professor Whitehead points out, the conception of rational order, which was absolutely fundamental to mediaeval theology, has been of great service in the history of science;<sup>30</sup> but it was derived from Greek speculation, Platonic and Stoic, not from primitive Christianity. Valid and even precious as it is, it is not exhaustive, for religion; and we have carried it too far. We have substituted proofs and evidences and the rational schematization of doctrine for the fresh, free and living act of faith. Let us grant that the proofs of our faith are not all

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the beginning, finally manifested Himself as man—which (as some of them held) He had purposed to do from the beginning; in such a world as ours, where 'death reigns,' the supreme manifestation of Life and of Divine Intelligence could not be thought to end in the grave. Nothing was more natural than for Him to rise again. This is Athanasius' whole key and clue to the doctrine of the Incarnation: "The renewal of creation has been the work of the self-same Word that made it at the beginning"—τὴν ταύτης ἀνακαίνισιν ὑπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν δημιουργήσαντος λόγου γεγενῆσθαι (*De Inc.* i. 4). It is the Logos who has been in the world all along, who has never deserted or abandoned it, whose 'laws' (as we should say) are nature's response to his will, who becomes man, lives as man, dies as man, and rises again. "He became man in order that we might become divine." (Cf. also xvi. 3, and the whole treatment of the Resurrection in chh. xxvi-xxxii, esp. xxxi. 4, where the Resurrection of Christ is seen to be involved in the nature of the Incarnate Word: "It was impossible for it [his body] to remain dead, because it had been made the temple of life.") For an exposition of the genuinely religious view of the 'supernatural,' see the last, most charming, most moving essay in the late Baron von Hügel's *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, First Series, 1921, 'Christianity and the Supernatural.'

<sup>30</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, ch. i.

forthcoming; that the mind of man is not equipped to deal exhaustively, *i.e.*, purely rationally, with the whole of possible experience; that belief in God, in righteousness, in eternal life, are still matters of faith, rational faith no doubt, but more than a logical 'Q. E. D.'; and we shall then begin to discover a creative power in religion that has not yet dawned upon the minds of many of our contemporaries. Faith is not faith so long as it must be bolstered-up with proofs—

"Unfaith clamouring to be coined to faith by proof,"

as Meredith said;<sup>40</sup> instead, it is the free, creative life of the spirit, endowed with reason, but also with imagination, interpreting the world, but also sharing in creating it. We really make our world, as well as accept it. In a thorough-going relativistic scheme of things we are of course entitled to do this; perhaps we should say we are forced to do it. And if thorough-going relativism is not the full account of our experience, creative faith may be the only force sufficient to break through the charmed circle and lead us out into the kingdom of ultimate freedom which is at the same time the kingdom of imperishable values, the Kingdom of God. And thus the 'provisional' answer of religion shall become our final one.

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<sup>40</sup> G. Meredith, 'Earth and Man,' xli.

### III. RELIGION AND NATURAL SCIENCE

DEAN INGE has remarked, in his lectures on *Christian Mysticism*,<sup>1</sup> that "the constructive task which lies before the next century is . . . to spiritualize science, as morality and art have already been spiritualized." On the other hand, the late Lord Morley affirmed, in one of his essays, that "the next great task of science is to create a religion for humanity."<sup>2</sup> And Professor Whitehead writes, in *Science and the Modern World*: "When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them."<sup>3</sup> It detracts nothing from the truth of the first of these remarks, by Dean Inge, to suggest that it may be taken in more than one sense. The 'pure' scientist may hold that it means impressing science into the service of some one particular religion, say Christianity; and the 'Christianizing' of science is as meaningless as the Brahmanizing of it, or the Confucianizing or the

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<sup>1</sup> W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 332; cf. *Christian Saintliness*, pp. 91 f.; and C. A. Ellwood, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, 1922, Preface.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by J. S. Huxley in *Science and Civilization*, p. 279.

<sup>3</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 253.

Judaizing of it: Christianity is going outside its proper 'sphere' in undertaking a task of this sort.<sup>4</sup> A less intransigently minded scientist, or one who cares somewhat more for the unity of knowledge and life, might perhaps hold that the Christianizing of science is not nearly so desirable as the 'scientizing' of Christianity, that is, the thorough application of the rules and canons of scientific research to that element in Christianity which overlaps the sphere of possible knowledge; or that before science can be Christianized, Christianity itself must undergo a transformation, and be brought in line with modern scientific knowledge. But I think that the sense in which Dean Inge meant his dictum is one that is both clear and valid. The world has seen what an unchristian, irreligious, unspiritual, and 'godless' science leads to: *viz.*, a one-sided interpretation of experience, blending all too readily with what has passed for a materialistic philosophy of nature, and blindly submitting to be the tool of a social philosophy which uses such scientific terms as 'survival,' 'evolution,' 'biological necessity,' and so on, but *means* something quite unscientific, anti-social, ghastly, suicidal, and even devilish. We caught a glimpse of the destined outcome of such a social philosophy in the horrors of the Great War—not only the horrors of the actual slaughter, but also the

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<sup>4</sup> Though I think a case might be made for preferring Christianity. Western science and the dominant western religion are generically related. See the earlier chh. in Whitehead, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 17 ff.

abomination of ideas that accompanied and in fact prepared for and made it possible. If human experience is to be worth continuing and preserving, and the human race a species worthy of survival, something must be done to draw together and relate, indeed in some measure to identify, our judgments of value and our judgments of fact, *i.e.*, the best that we hope and believe with what we know of the world experimentally. Since our highest values are those enshrined in religion, and indeed in Christianity—at least as many of us understand it—science must be spiritualized or ‘Christianized,’ and our world of facts be related to our world of values. The two may exist in isolation, for a while; but meantime we perish, as intellectually honest persons. It is intolerable that what is true in fact should not be true in philosophy, or that what is true in theology should be false in philosophy or science, and vice versa—as the idea has been expressed by minds more ardent than profound.<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, from the point of view of both science and religion such a course of *rapprochement* is most desirable, not to say inevitable. In truth, the two cannot be kept apart; and though the nineteenth century, with its long and bitter ‘warfare of science and theology,’ may have seemed to acquiesce in a cynicism like that of the domestically unhappy man, who said of his wife that he

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<sup>5</sup> I refer to those of the later Schoolmen who thus dichotomized truth. Cf. W. P. Paterson, *The Nature of Religion*, 1925, p. 5.



'couldn't get along with her or without her,' it may be that the twentieth century has something more felicitous in store. If religion is true, it has a bearing at least upon the final reading of the scientist's data and discoveries. If science is true, a religion which would ignore, permanently and completely, the facts and hypotheses of science cannot count upon an indefinite future. Its 'expectation,' in the life-insurance sense, is limited and its days are numbered; probably the next generation or two, if modern education continues, will see its finish.

A true religion has nothing to fear from a true science, from a science willing to admit the limited and really 'abstract' range of its investigations,<sup>6</sup> and to recognize that for a full and complete account of existence, other facts, values, and hypotheses are necessary in addition to those with which science ordinarily deals. It is only the fear of new ideas,<sup>7</sup> an intellectually lazy conservatism, or even a covert scepticism, that has terrorized religious minds when confronted with the scientific account of the world. On the other hand, a true science has nothing to fear at the hands of a true

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, pp. 29 f. The fact—though often overlooked—was recognized even by Bacon; cf. *Nov. Org.*, i, 45, 51.

<sup>7</sup> There was a time when new ideas were 'damned with a phrase,' or rather with a word, 'neology'—before 'modernism' became the more convenient label. Roger Bacon, for example, was condemned for maintaining '*aliquas novitates suspectas*' (H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, ii, 491). The use of the term betrays an attitude of mind which a genuinely scientific theology must ever shun. Happily, this strange complex of assertiveness and timidity is now passing away.

religion. Many of the great names in modern scientific history, including the science of today, are those of Christian men; and if you call the roll of the real leaders in Christian history, including the present, *i.e.*, the true prophets, the creative minds, the men in whom the genius of the Christian religion is genuinely expressed, how many of them have been or are oppressors or persecutors or antagonists of science? As Newman Smyth once remarked in a Yale laboratory, "How would Butler, Aquinas, and Augustine have revelled in modern scientific research!" How would Origen, Basil, Erigena, Albertus Magnus, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and the Franciscan scientists—and perhaps even John Calvin—and, in brief, all philosophical and realistic Christian minds in the days before modern science flowered in full bloom! We say this fully mindful of the 'persecution' of rising science by conservative ecclesiastics and by fanatical religious revolutionists alike. The danger has come most frequently from little minds, swayed by loyalty to what they felt were popular interests, frightened by new views beyond their capacity of assimilation, and driven to the weakling's last weapon of defence—persecution. But the newer historical research has two or three facts to present apropos the 'persecution of science' by the Christian Church: (a) the story of the persecution, like many another such narrative related—long afterwards—by oppressed but finally victorious minor-

ities, has been somewhat exaggerated: for example, the incident of Galileo's 'recantation';<sup>8</sup> (b) the roots of the modern scientific movement go deeper than the seventeenth century, deeper than the Renaissance, ultimately—as Professor Whitehead recognizes—to the Christian educational movement in mediaeval Europe, to the monasteries and monastic schools, and to the realistic philosophy<sup>9</sup> of the much-maligned and underrated Schoolmen; (c) the actual history of the progress of modern science cannot be written with the Church left out, as if from a few names of geniuses who wrought in fictitious isolation; hundreds of men, even thousands, were interested in scientific studies, and shared the spirit that created and kept alive the scientific movement.<sup>10</sup> In every generation, we are beginning to realize, there were those who had not bowed the knee to intolerance and fanaticism. It has been reserved to our day—and chiefly, alas, to our nation—to behold the dying embers of the persecution mania fanned into a last smoky pretense of fire.<sup>11</sup> One is inevitably reminded of the decline of chivalry caricatured in the pages of Cervantes' masterpiece! If the 'Fundamentalist' movement is the full force a losing cause can muster, then its

<sup>8</sup> See Agnes M. Clerk's art., 'Galileo,' in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, esp. pp. 407 f (new ed., Vol. xi).

<sup>9</sup> I.e., Platonic Realism plus Aristotelian and even Arabian science.

<sup>10</sup> Mendel in his garden and Pasteur in the laboratory are conspicuous and well known examples of Christian scientists.

<sup>11</sup> I refer of course to the recent 'Fundamentalist' furor, culminating in the Scopes trial.

days are numbered, and neither science nor religion has much to fear from it. Were the movement stronger and more promising, religion would no doubt have more to dread in the prospect than science, and the future of intelligent faith might appear to be in jeopardy. But save for a few conspicuous Quixotes, the Christian leadership of America is in the hands of those friendly to science—indeed, more or less scientifically educated, thanks to the American college and university system; and the majority of modern scientific men, at least here in America, are said to be either professed believers in religion, or at least sympathetic in their attitude toward religion—and toward the Christian religion. The future harmony of religion and science thus seems a not impossible ideal, and at least their external harmony to be already an accomplished fact.

But if our optimism is thus justified, it does not follow that no problems remain! If no problems remained it might mean only that our optimism was not of much importance, and concerned some more trivial affair than the future of religion and science. The existence of problems, difficulties, uncertainties over real and worthwhile issues makes rational optimism a satisfactory state of mind and one worth discussing and propagating! In the present lecture, concerned as we are to ascertain the truth of the present situation and to learn how far modern thought has affected traditional Christian doctrine, we shall re-

view some of those borderline problems which are related to biology—in a word, those which concern or at least are involved in the biological doctrine of evolution.

When we speak of the relation between religion and biology, or of the modern religious problem presented by biology, it is obvious at once that we are concerned with Darwinian or Evolutionary Biology. The ancient biology, Aristotelian, scholastic (if it deserves a name), and pre-evolutionary, got on very well with traditional religion. Its main concerns were anatomy, structure, habitat, classification—what used to be called 'natural history.' There was no apparent conflict between such biology and the narrative of Genesis or the ordinary conceptions of creation and providence. But the Darwinian reorganization of the sciences goes far beyond this, and raises a multitude of problems, both in principle and in detail. So great is this change that some persons view the Darwinian revolution as a disaster: Gamaliel Bradford, for example, writes of 'Darwin the Destroyer' in a recent magazine article.<sup>22</sup>

To begin, let us take the summary of 'Darwinism' offered by one of the most competent of scientific scholars, Prof. J. A. Thomson. Taken in the large sense, he says, it includes six great ideas.

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<sup>22</sup> *Harper's Magazine*, Sept., 1926; Ch. vi. in his volume, *Darwinism* 1926.

*"First*, there is the web of life, the inter-relations binding organisms together, the linkages which form an increasingly intricate system. Cats are connected with the clover crop and with the incidence of the plague in India; water wagtails have to do with the success of sheep-farming, and little fishes with malaria. No creature lives or dies to itself. There is correlation of organs in the body; there is correlation of organisms in Nature. *Second*, there is the struggle for existence, all the answers-back that living creatures make to environing difficulties and limitations, partly in competition with fellows of the same kith and kin, partly in parrying the attacks of foes belonging to other races, and partly in reaction against the callous fates of the physical world. The struggle may mean girding the loins or tightening the belt, trimming the lamps of the senses or quickening the pace, putting on a garment of invisibility or 'attending the mind thereunto,' to use Sir Isaac Newton's phrase. *Third*, there is the idea of variability, the mysterious fountain of change which wells up from the germinal depths, sometimes resulting in a little more of this quality and a little less of that, sometimes leading to a remarkable shuffling of the hereditary cards so that the outcome is a distinct novelty. *Fourth*, there is the idea of sifting or winnowing, the selection that the struggle for existence involves, a very varied and even subtle process, as Darwin always insisted. *Fifth*, there is included in Darwinism a vindication of the general idea of evolution, that the present is the child of the past and the parent of the future. This was indeed an old idea, but Darwin made it current intellectual coin. He showed that it was a formula that fitted—a model, rather than a causal description of what has occurred. But Darwin proceeded to change it into a causal theory by showing how the constant Natural Selection of variations might work out

new adaptations. *Sixth*, we must include in Darwinism the thesis that Man is solidary with the rest of creation and the outcome of a process of natural evolution. Such then are the six great ideas included in Darwinism."<sup>13</sup>

Although 'Darwinism' has been modified at the hands of its later disciples, these six main tenets or principles are still fundamental.

It must be clear at once that the changes introduced in biological thinking by Darwin's hypothesis had no immediate and direct bearing upon religion—witness the multitude of religious men both then and now who profess adherence to Evolution. The immediate bearing was rather upon the older, static conception of nature which it displaced and which had for a long time been identified with religion—identified at least in common thought and every-day language, and chiefly perhaps in the pulpit.<sup>14</sup> The impact of the new ideas is to be seen in the general imaginative shift in center of gravity. As a first result, men began to realize their homelessness in the universe, to feel themselves in the grip of vast and unmeasured forces which could not be tamed or even under-

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<sup>13</sup> Ch. viii., 'The Influence of Darwinism on Thought and Life,' in *Science and Civilisation*, ed. F. S. Marvin, Oxford, 1923, pp. 203 ff. The reader interested in this subject should by all means make himself acquainted with this article, and indeed the whole volume.

<sup>14</sup> It is extremely difficult to read the sermonic and other popular 'refutations' of Darwinism which were delivered in the years following *The Origin of Species* (pub. Nov., 1859). The best experts assure us that by their nature sermons are necessarily ephemeral, and fuse the thought of the time with the abiding principles of religion. Even so, many of the homiletical efforts of the '60s and '70s provide a wholesome warning to all preachers who attempt to deal with science in the pulpit!

stood—as on a ship at night, in pitch dark, when we suddenly awake and realize that the hawser has slipped loose. Leopardi expressed this clearly: “Nature in all her workings has other things to think of than our good or ill.”<sup>15</sup> Or as Spencer put it, in his *Autobiography*:<sup>16</sup> “Behind these mysteries [of nature] lies the all-embracing mystery—whence this universal transformation which has gone on unceasingly through a past eternity and will go on unceasingly through a future eternity? . . . No wonder men take refuge in authoritative dogma.” But for ten who ‘took refuge in authoritative dogma,’ probably a hundred (including Spencer himself) took refuge—if refuge it may be called—in an attitude of Agnosticism. Huxley, in a famous essay,<sup>17</sup> pictured man’s place in nature as that of a puny organism or species at war with its environment, determined to assert itself, but destined inevitably to fail.

But that was the nineteenth century! And both biology and religion have made some progress since: (a) Biology by taking in a wider horizon, and recognizing the bearings of life both backward and forward—backward to inorganic ‘matter’ and forward to mind—and in recognizing more clearly the teleological thrust or direction in

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Bradford, *Darwin*, p. 245.

<sup>16</sup> *Autobiography*, ii. 548.

<sup>17</sup> ‘Man’s Place in Nature’; *Works*, Vol. vii. A similar view, but even more emphatically asserted, underlies Bertrand Russell’s essay, ‘A Free Man’s Worship,’ already cited. See the art. on ‘Huxley’s Agnosticism’ by Prof. R. M. Wenley in the *Anglican Theological Review*, viii. 124 ff.



evolutionary change; (b) Religion by disentangling itself somewhat from association with pre-scientific ideas, by recognizing more precisely the limitation of its concerns, by taking a more reflective or philosophical view of its own function, thus both narrowing and widening its horizons—at different levels, so to speak.

Science no longer affirms with Huxley that “the biological sciences are sharply marked off from the abiological, or those which treat of the phenomena manifested by not-living matter, in so far as the properties of living matter distinguish it absolutely from all other kinds of things, and as the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the living and the not-living.” T. H. Huxley wrote these words for the article ‘Biology’ in the old edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and Prof. C. L. Morgan quotes them as the ‘departure platform’ in his essay on ‘Biology’ in the recent volume, *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*;<sup>18</sup> he then proceeds to show that nature, from atom to human mind, is full of ‘discrete steps,’ where Huxley saw but one; and he accounts for them—and for much else—by his theory of ‘Emergent Evolution.’ And on the other hand, speaking of mental development, Prof. Julian S. Huxley, in his essay on ‘Science and Religion’ in the volume *Science and Civilization*, goes on to adopt a position similar to Professor Morgan’s:

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<sup>18</sup> New York: Van Nostrand; London: Blackie, 1925, p. 107.

"Since all material developments in evolution can be traced back step by step and shown to be specializations of one or more of the primitive properties of living matter, it is not only an economy of hypothesis, but also, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the proper conclusion, that mental properties also are to be traced back to the simplest and most original forms of life. What exact significance is to be attached to the term 'mental properties' in such organisms, it is hard to say; we mean, however, that something of the same general nature as mind in ourselves is inherent in all life, something standing in the same relation to living matter in general as do our minds to the particular living matter of our brains.

"But there can be no reasonable doubt that living matter, in due process of time, originated from non-living; and if that be so, we must push our conclusion farther, and believe that not only living matter, but all matter, is associated with something of the same general description as mind in higher animals. We come, that is, to a monistic conclusion, in that we believe that there is only one fundamental substance, and that this possesses not only material properties, but also properties for which the word mental is the nearest approach. We want a new word to denote this *x*, this world-stuff; matter will not do, for that is a word which the physicists and chemists have moulded to suit themselves, and since they have not yet learned to detect or measure mental phenomena, they restrict the word 'material' to mean 'non-mental,' and 'matter' to mean that which has material properties."<sup>19</sup>

I do not wish to imply that all modern biologists are monists, or that they one and all presuppose a realist philosophy. But surely it is clear that

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<sup>19</sup> *Op cit.*, pp. 284 f.

the language we are reading belongs to the twentieth century, rather than to the nineteenth. Far from mind being an 'epiphenomenon' thrown off by matter, as some nineteenth century thinkers affirmed with the elder Huxley, mind is now conceived as belonging to the very stuff and structure of the universe. The hypothetical bridges between matter, life, and mind are like the old Roman aqueducts, now in ruin; or like bridges over streams whose floods have narrowed down to pebbly brooks across which a barefoot boy may wade.

Prof. Lloyd Morgan begins the account of evolution 'near the foundations of the physical world, far down in the abiological province of inquiry,' among the atoms and the electrons, whose 'behavior' he describes in a colloquial term as 'jumpy,' or with 'only a discrete set of orbits.'<sup>20</sup> This I take to be what Professor Whitehead

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<sup>20</sup> *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, p. 109; cf. *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 3 ff., 65 ff.; J. Mills, *Within the Atom*, 1921, Chh. viii.-ix.; A. Haas, *The World of Atoms*, 1928, Chh. vi., viii. An earlier generation would have hesitated to call this 'biology,' so obviously does it belong to physics. But in its present-day quest for unity of thought, and for adequate terms of explanation, biology takes within its view the subject-matter of other sciences as well. It is apparently assumed that life, mind, and energy all belong to the same process—certainly in the theories of Whitehead and Morgan. Cf. O. Lodge, *Science and Human Progress*, pp. 175 f.: Biology is the study of larger, physics of smaller organisms. What is 'jumpiness' (as Morgan terms it) in an electron is—on the large scale—the freedom with which life steps across gap after gap and evolution leaps over its own hiatuses. The mechanical conception of force has gone by the board, and we are presented with one much less easy to grasp; indeed, the ultimate nature of energy seems veiled in impenetrable mystery. All we know is some few facts about its behavior in the particular area of observation open to our gaze.

refers to as the 'theory of discontinuous existence' required by modern mathematical physics. "What is asked from such a theory is that an orbit of an electron can be regarded as a series of detached positions, and not a continuous line."<sup>21</sup> He illustrates this principle, as you recall, by the fanciful automobile which appears successively at the end of each mile, but does not require to move through the intervening distance—no doubt at a considerable saving in 'gas.' We might also illustrate it by the electric clock, save that if you watch carefully you may observe the minute hand to slip forward once every sixty seconds. The only approximation to continuity seems to be the 'contiguity of durations' within which the electron functions,<sup>22</sup> while the electron itself is 'for us . . . merely the pattern of its aspects in its environment, so far as those aspects are relevant to the electromagnetic field'<sup>23</sup>—a pattern which, in Whitehead's 'organic' theory 'need not endure in undifferentiated sameness through time.'<sup>24</sup> The advantage of this theory is not simply that it makes possible a solution of the ancient paradox of motion set forth by Zeno, but also that it makes possible the evolution of organic structures in the universe: 'the evolution of laws of nature is concurrent with the evolution

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<sup>21</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, p. 190.

<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

<sup>23</sup> *Ib.*, p. 185.

<sup>24</sup> *Ib.*, p. 187. Cf. *The Concept of Nature*, pp. 52 ff.; 105 f.; 186 ff.; *Religion in the Making*, p. 113: "The whole world conspires to produce a new creation."

of enduring patterns.' <sup>25</sup> The old static conception of 'natural law' goes by the board, since 'physical entities may be modified in very essential ways' when grouped within larger wholes (*i.e.*, organisms), and 'developed into individualities of more fundamental types, with wider embodiment of envisagement. Such envisagement might reach to the attainment of the poising of alternative values with exercise of choice lying outside the physical laws, and expressible only in terms of purpose.' <sup>26</sup> Unless we radically misconstrue the meaning of these latest exponents of the new physics and biology—and I am not sure any amateur like myself is capable of grasping their full meaning—it must appear that the very stuff or substance of the universe is in some sense free, free, that is, to obey the guidance or will—or 'purpose'—of the Supreme Mind which 'called it into existence,' or whose will *is* perhaps its existence, in St. Augustine's phrase. The old conception of a fixity in nature's laws needs revision: it is only a relative fixity, not an absolute one. The lines of Meredith, the great poet of nineteenth century science,

"Round the ancient track marched, rank on rank,  
The army of unalterable law," <sup>27</sup>

convey an impression that will not quite square with modern physical research. For 'law' is only relatively 'unalterable.' In his article on 'Mathe-

<sup>25</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, p. 151.

<sup>26</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 150 f.

<sup>27</sup> 'Lucifer in Starlight.'

matics' in the new *Britannica*,<sup>28</sup> Professor Whitehead has ventured the prophecy that in the future the applications of mathematics to the various branches of physics 'will unify themselves into a mathematical theory of a hypothetical substructure of the universe, uniform under all the diverse phenomena.' It may be that the physicists and chemists are even now remoulding their conception of 'matter' so as to include 'mental' qualities, and Prof. J. S. Huxley's quest for a new word will be rendered unnecessary. For I take it that a 'matter' which not only declares its freedom from any absolute and finally determined scheme of laws, but at the same time shows itself amenable to the processes of higher mathematics, is not far from the kingdom of mind.<sup>29</sup> On the contrary, it is evidence for the universality of a principle which registers completely with at least our highest conception of the meaning of 'mental.'

The new horizon of biology is already appar-

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<sup>28</sup> Vol. xvii., p. 882b. The principle is not admitted without protest: Bridgman, *Logic of Modern Physics*, p. 169; Hobson, *Domain of Natural Science*, pp. 57 ff. The immediate inference from this statement is somewhat corrected in *The Concept of Nature*, pp. 44 f.

<sup>29</sup> Of course many mathematical formulae have been suggested by external physical relations, especially geometrical: the orderly arrangement of flagstones in a Greek courtyard is thought to have suggested the Pythagorean theorem. But mathematics outruns observation, and turns back to nature for verification, as in Newton's sublime feat of applying the calculus to astronomy. A more recent example, and one still in process, is the verification of Einstein's formulae of relativity. The perennial wonder is not simply man's ability to comprehend some of nature's processes, but the correspondence between man's purely logical constructions and their verification in the external world. This in itself suggests their kinship: man is not only 'organic to nature' but 'nature,' in turn, is essentially logical and spiritual.

ent. It is no longer content, as in the days before Darwin and the nineteenth century evolutionists, to anatomize and classify, more or less in accordance with Aristotle—though such a stage in scientific history was indispensable.<sup>30</sup> Nor is it satisfied to interrelate the species, man included, that inhabit or have inhabited this aged planet. Biology is in quest of unity. Evolution must begin with the lowest and not stop short of the highest manifestations of—not merely life, but—activity, energy, and intelligence. It is for this reason that biology concerns itself with the other sciences, including even physics and mathematics. And it is manifest that if religion, or theology, is to be pitted against modern biology its warfare will be one 'with no discharge' until one or the other of the contestants is utterly annihilated. For modern biology represents in one aspect the whole modern mind, and the modern mind at its best. All the energies of many of the ablest intellects in the world are now enlisted in its service. Biology, rather than theology, promises henceforth to be 'queen of the sciences.' There remain 'gaps' in the theory of evolution, it is true; but for one thing, these gaps are steadily filling up, and, for another, the structure no longer depends upon the successful filling-up of the gaps. The books and articles appearing from time to time on the other side either misconceive the doctrine, or oppose false inferences from

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<sup>30</sup> Parallels may be found in the history of other sciences, in astronomy, for example, and in chemistry.

or additions to the doctrine, or are simply 'behind the times'—belated protests from suddenly awakened Rip Van Winkles. The evolutionary theory as a whole is simply no longer 'an unproved hypothesis,' for it has all the 'proof' any hypothesis can ever ask: it works, it explains facts, it meets rational tests, and no competing theory has appeared which fully meets these three requirements. Nor is it a valid objection to evolution that false inferences have been drawn, or that too wide-sweeping generalized applications have been made to other fields.<sup>31</sup> Such errors are common to all human thought, and are found in other sciences, in theology and philosophy, and even in mathematics.

In general, the inferences drawn from the data of modern natural science, especially from biology, have run through four stages up to the present, of the earlier of which living exponents are still to be found: (a) Agnostic Realism or 'Materialism,' the theory of Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, and the late Victorians; (b) Mechanistic Naturalism, a kind of refined Materialism—one thinks of Münsterberg's psychology as an example and of the present-day school of Behaviorism; (c) Vitalism—the doctrine of Bergson in France and Hans Driesch in Germany; (d) 'Psychophysical Monism,'<sup>32</sup> accompanied by 'Provisional

<sup>31</sup> For example, to sociology and anthropology; cf. the Ch. on 'Anthropology' in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*.

<sup>32</sup> A loose term, useful only as covering in a general way a variety of views.



Realism'—the doctrine already quoted from Morgan, Whitehead, and J. Huxley, though we do not begin to exhaust the list, but cite only familiar names. I call these 'successive inferences'; but the term is hardly fair. They should properly be termed formulations, though it is clear that the evolutionary hypothesis has been the guiding principle, the fruitfully suggestive hypothesis, in the statement of the facts and research into the problems. And I believe—if a theological outsider is entitled to any opinion on the subject—that the newest school is the one destined to sway the future most effectively. For this reason I believe we should take their views most seriously.

I assume that no one here supposes that religion or theology is really to be pitted against modern biology, even in its newest form; we may therefore address ourselves at once to the problems. If biology is true (*i.e.*, not only in its findings but also in its generally accepted hypotheses), a religion of truth must welcome it wholeheartedly, not only accepting whatever light science throws upon the common problems, but also making available all the resources of religious thought toward their solution. For religion has something to contribute as well as to accept, in this new intellectual alliance.

At the forefront of the Christian Creed stands the doctrine of creation. "I believe in God, [who is] the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and

earth." No lesser deity, no Lord or *Kyrios* of a cult, no departmental god, but the Creator of the universe, 'of all things visible and invisible,' is the object of Christian faith, worship, obedience. It is true God is thus described in terms that had meaning two thousand years ago, and so simply that a multitude of meanings may be read into His title of Creator. But from the point of view of religion, of faith, worship, and obedience, this is enough. A child on his knees can grasp it; and Plato might have quoted this creed in the profoundest of his dialogues, *Timaeus*. The question arises, Has it meaning still? Are its terms admissible in the biological or physical laboratory? May we still speak of a 'creation' of the world by God? <sup>33</sup>

Now from the Christian point of view, faith in God as the Creator is of cardinal importance—around it the whole Christian system swings. The indispensableness of the doctrine has been em-

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<sup>33</sup> This is the really important question at the present time. There is now little quarrel, as we have said, between 'Genesis and Geology.' Except in certain backward circles the general theory of evolution is not questioned by intelligent Christians. The solution is set forth in a phrase: 'the technique of the Creator,' or 'God's method in creation'; and this shows how far general acceptance has gone. But the basic problems, at least for scientifically-minded persons, are still real. The great issue, as far as Christian doctrine is concerned, is between the doctrine of God as Creator and the *presuppositions* of evolutionary development. For one thing, these seem to browbeat the imagination and exclude God from the universe. As a college student stated it to me not long ago, "One after another, the sciences have broken away, that is, parts of the world—astronomy, chemistry, biology; and we see that they have nothing to do with God. What is there left for God to *do*? What is He concerned with? Just the religious experience of men?"

phasized afresh in Dean W. R. Matthews' *Studies in Christian Philosophy*.<sup>34</sup> "If we should be compelled to abandon it under the pressure of criticism," he says, "we should be left to a melancholy choice between a Pantheism for which there is no world and a Pluralism for which there is no God!"<sup>35</sup> "The motive, the religious interest, behind the idea of creation is the affirming of the thorough-going dependence of all things upon God."<sup>36</sup> This is a resolute enough faith, in view of the moral and physical evils in the world; but it is the only possible faith for a Christian. Before such a faith, the alternative explanations, such as Dualism, Emanationism, Pantheism, and blind necessity, vanish away. And I would point out at this point that biological research is the freer if these spectres of the mind are laid at rest, since, once more, biology's quest is unity, and since its newer horizon includes both a non-mechanical 'purpose' and a scale of emerging 'values.' 'Dualism' is the *bête noire* of modern biology, whose whole present tendency is monistic; 'Emanationism' is a kind of mythology, and reverses the upward tendency which evolution discovers in all nature; 'Pantheism' obliterates the scale of values which renders intelligible its long series of 'emergents'; while 'blind necessity,' like mechanical homogenesis, presupposes a steady and unbroken continuity in development, one form or species or

<sup>34</sup> New edition, 1928. Cf. also C. F. Raven, *The Creator Spirit*, 1927.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

structure merely dissolving into another, a procedure which, as we have seen, modern biology fails to discover. Biology is in search of some unifying principle, a principle which may at least from one aspect be described as 'mental,' which will hold together the 'discrete steps' and 'detached positions' observable on the large scale in the long onward march of evolution from electron to human mind. This quasi-'mental' tendency, this purpose, and these values, I submit, are best maintained upon a theistic basis, and by theistic I mean Christian.

But do we imply a Creation in time, by the Christian doctrine? I think that in answering this question we must agree with the Dean of King's College and with Professor Sorley that "an absolute beginning of creation is no part of the essential idea. . . . 'The notion of creation involves a more essential point than the idea either of a beginning in time or a beginning of time. It involves the idea of God as the ground or support of the world—not merely its beginning—for without Him it could not at any moment exist.'"<sup>87</sup> The beautiful traditional story in Genesis is a story, and of no more than—or, let us say, of completely—poetic and symbolic value. It forms no part of the Christian creed, but only of its historical and imaginative background. God has 'always' created; He is the 'Maker,' now and ever;

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<sup>87</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 201-6, qu. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 467. Cf. W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 18 f.

and no single point in 'time' is crucially relevant to his act of creating. "My Father worketh hitherto."<sup>38</sup> Time is only the measure—and a finally inadequate measure at that—of the finite side of the process.

Nor do I see how a creation 'out of nothing' is either conceivable or important. The phrase meant something when creation was conceived as Milton conceived it, or Augustine, or the writer of Genesis.<sup>39</sup> But now the 'nothing' out of which creation has been made seems either to imply a kind of Neoplatonic substantial 'non-being' (which is only a phrase in dialectic and is inadmissible in science), or to be most closely approximated by the 'patterns of energy' of the newer physics—which have non-being only for the baffled materialist. If the real substructure of the universe be an energy, only mathematically describable, I fail to see how it matters much whether you call this the 'substance' out of which all things were made, or push the doctrine one step farther back

<sup>38</sup> John v. 17.

<sup>39</sup> The traditional ecclesiastical view arose out of the effort to combine data derived from the Bible with the popular and quasi-philosophic distinction between matter and form. The full philosophical elaboration of this distinction was found in the Aristotelian tradition, whose influence is discernible in Christian thought long before the 'Aristotelian revival' about 1230 A.D. (*e.g.*, in Leontius of Byzantium); hence the precise formulation of the problem as that of the origin of *matter*, and the refusal to abide by such a solution as that of Erigena (God created the world out of His own essence) or even the one proposed by Anselm (before creation, things existed eternally as ideas in the mind of God). For a review of Christian speculation on the subject, cf. C. M. Geer, in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, iv. 141-144, and Rawlinson, *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*.

and refer to the origin of this primal energy. This 'substance,' if we may so designate it,<sup>40</sup> appears to be finite;<sup>41</sup> and if the laws of energy really hold (*i.e.*, its 'conservation' tempered by steady 'degradation'), then its behavior must appear to point regressively to some state of initial potency which may perhaps fairly be called creation from the scientific point of view. But even in its fully degraded form, dead, lifeless, inert, 'matter'—or its substrate of energy—can scarcely be imagined as non-existing; and an infinitely prolonged existence would seem logically inconceivable apart from an infinitely remote origination: *i.e.*, if it never ceases to be, it is implied that it never began.<sup>42</sup> My point is that the question is purely irrelevant as well as unanswerable; and concerns neither biology nor religion but only metaphysics—wherein, if at all, a probability can be established one way or the other.

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<sup>40</sup> The term may claim some philosophical justification—as the scholastic *substantia*—if not scientific.

<sup>41</sup> Though Professor Bridgman and others do not so view it. Cf. *Logic of Modern Physics*, p. 209; F. R. Moulton, in *The Nature of the World and Man* (Chicago, 1927), p. 28. If this alternative view be adopted it is clear, as Professor Bridgman points out, that 'scientific determinism' (*e.g.*, Bertrand Russell's kind; cf. *What I Believe*, 1925, pp. 1-3, 'Somerset House') is left with less than a leg to stand on.

<sup>42</sup> And if so, the 'act' of creation is continuous, and God is really *in the process* (as Professor Whitehead conceives), and is less than ever the 'First Cause' in a purely temporal sequence of causation described by the Deists. The whole set of images derived from chronology must doubtless give way to one that is closer to actual reality, if we are to think in modern terms. We may remind ourselves once more of Origen's view of the real world as eternal: it is only his Neoplatonic affiliations that obscure the fact that he was dealing with this very problem. No Church Father repays serious study at the present time more largely than Origen.

If the Christian idea of creation is thus one that is greater than its symbolic representation as a process, an idea in which the dependence of all things upon the will of God is the primary consideration, so likewise the biological account is one that is less than complete unless it takes for granted the 'purpose' or 'tendency' that forms the ground of all existence. We need not quarrel with the biologist for assuming continuity; we assume it also—and call it 'the will of God which is the nature of things.' Perhaps the assumption comes easier from the side of theism—*i.e.*, of philosophy and theology—as a necessary term of thought! But it is equally needed by biology—if unity of thought is to be achieved; and the facts are the same, in either view, the 'web of life' and the progressive series of evolution. We have no quarrel with the dynamic biologist when he speaks of 'discontinuous steps' or 'detached positions'; the older theology supplied here the 'fiats' of the Creator: 'Let light appear,' 'Let life, and intelligence, and the sense of right and wrong,' bridging each hiatus in the narrative. This is no doubt a fair proposal; only, we must not be beguiled into supposing the Creator inactive except at these critical points, as if the machine ran well enough alone and needed only to be shifted into higher gear from time to time. On the modern biological view, as in the view of any motorist, 'high gear' is purposively in mind all along, and is implicit from the first revolution of the generating motor. Of

course the 'discrete steps' of the bio-physicist are not just the broad hiatuses in evolution, but are found all along the way from the behavior of electrons to that of minds. Nor shall we quibble over 'spontaneous generation'; for if matter is to be redefined with something of a 'mental' connotation or implication then the process of generation will be both spontaneous and non-spontaneous at once. The first thing we should expect such 'matter' to do would be to manifest a quality similar to mental freedom and creativeness.<sup>43</sup> Somehow, life began; it is here. Somehow, it uses matter, building it up into organic structures or patterns; the patterns change, but life moves on. Somehow, what once were called 'inorganic' structures display an organizing, constructive behavior akin or at least analogous, on a lower level, to the organic processes of life.<sup>44</sup> And though we are a little nearer the final solution of our problem than were the Schoolmen with their logic of forms and substance, we do not really possess much more in the way of an adequate notion of the genuine nature

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<sup>43</sup> The notion that life originated from vitalized star-dust, drifted hither out of space, only sets the problem a step farther off, complicates the solution, and seems really superfluous and unnecessary. Though frequently viewed as fanciful, we must not, however, rule it out of court. "It is almost startling to note that the meteorites which fall on the earth include several strange minerals and compounds, not found today in the rocks of the earth, which contain precisely the elements essential for life."—Prof. R. T. Chamberlain, in *The Nature of the World and Man*, p. 52 (cf. pp. 190 f.; Prof. H. H. Newman). This is not, of course, to say that life 'came' to the earth from the stellar regions.

<sup>44</sup> For example, crystals 'grow' (cf. Sir W. Bragg, *Concerning the Nature of Things*, Lects. iv. and following), and so do the elements (cf. F. Soddy, *Science and Life*, pp. 85 ff.).



of the world-stuff or *substantia* than they held. Probe as deeply as we may, 'life' seems to be thoroughly immaterial (*i.e.*, granting the popular definition of 'material'), while 'matter' shades off into qualities, structures, or patterns of energy. 'Life,' we say, is the pattern-forming tendency,  $x$ , at work in pattern-formed 'matter,'  $y$ ; while 'matter' represents the construct of energy,  $z$ , which lies at the bottom of everything: here are the terms with which biology, with physics as its lieutenant, and under their leadership all the physical sciences, now build up their involved equations. The beginning of it all, the Efficient and the Final Cause of it all, the Mind devising it all, the Christian creed ascribes to God. And far from the mystery passing out of life, with which religion ever concerns itself, it is here in ten-fold abundance. How unsearchable are the ways of God, and past our finding out! What we know of them is only a tiny fragment of a whole which we do not know—*viz.*, His final purposes, why He created the world, why all its varied forms have been produced—some apparently fortuitous and mistaken, like the dinosaurs, some almost ludicrous, and suggesting a quality of humor in the Supreme Mind! And if the process, taken thus far, has resulted in man—*i.e.*, if man be really the highest of the creatures (and some have seen fit to question the assumption)—there is no telling what shall yet evolve, *i.e.*, no telling by mortal tongues. A higher race, perhaps even a higher species, may some day

appear, leaving us far behind among the Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons of the buried past. Other species were once as dominant on this globe as man now is, and they passed away. Our hand-hold upon permanence is of another kind—not biological, but moral and spiritual, an eternal life of another order (or, as we say, upon another 'level') than that of space, time, and physical energy.<sup>45</sup> And who can doubt the powers of the Lord—to use the old familiar language of religion—in view of the majesty of creation?

"He that planted the ear, shall He not hear?

He that formed the eye, shall He not see?"

"Is His hand shortened that it cannot save?"—

"The hand that made us is divine,"<sup>46</sup>

and that hand can doubtless form life, and create living structures, both biological and spiritual, beyond our utmost conceiving.

In conclusion, allow me to present, in addition to the general view already set forth, certain points at which a reasoned biological view of the

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, pp. 110-120. It may be true that the doctrine there developed is 'entirely neutral' on the question of immortality; but given the 'special evidence' which he allows, say no more than the religious deliverances of the inner consciousness, such a view of the world not only does not conflict with it but offers to it the promise of positive support. There is no more reason for supposing that the universe will eventually die down into extinction than that it will gradually flower into something definitely higher—as 'life' is higher than 'brute matter'—than anything hitherto attained. And our life certainly *feels* (as William James would have said) as if it were part of that higher, vaster process.

<sup>46</sup> Psalm xciv. 9; Isaiah l. 2; Joseph Addison, 'Psalm xix.'

universe and the religious view are in contact, and where each may support or supplement the other.

I. As has already been suggested,<sup>47</sup> the world-creation story in Genesis i.-ii. is an ancient poem, speculation, or myth, whose religious and biological import are alike found in the opening words: 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.' That may have been only a sublime guess; though there seems no reason why a sublime guess may not come to have the objective value of revelation, and I for one believe it is revelation.

II. The story of the origin of the race is even more sublimely told in Evolution than in the Bible, if a man have ears to hear it. Not by the andromorphic fingers of a Semitic God, and out of Babylonian clay, but through long aeons of slow progressive development, guided by a Supreme Mind and Purpose, man was at last formed, made in the 'image' of the spiritual Mind who created him—*i.e.*, on the side of his inner capacity for an intellectual and spiritual nature, which is really what makes him man. Striving, experimenting, ever thrusting upward toward new qualities and powers, new functions, new combinations of qualities and adaptations to environment, ever collecting its forces for a new spring into emergence of higher capacities, nature slowly fashioned man in response to an immanent will or purpose—either

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<sup>47</sup> In the preceding lecture.

'planted there by the Creator,' as the old theology affirmed, or immediately describable as 'God,' in the language of contemporary metaphysics.<sup>48</sup>

In much the same way the 'creation' of the individual soul must be viewed—a tiny part of the world-life, sprung from hidden depths, inheriting a 'pattern' of body and mind from its past by a long genuine inheritance, but bringing forth new combinations, manifesting qualities that work backward to modify the inherited pattern—both bodily and mental—and pressing on toward an end or ends that can have only God for their Satisfier and Satisfaction. The old theological problem of creationism and traducianism<sup>49</sup> does not present us with exclusive alternatives; both theories are true, with qualifications. The process may be described as traducianist *in modo*, creationist *in re*.

Not long ago I saw the announcement of a new book, entitled, *Man Created During Descent at the Beginning of the New Stone Age*.<sup>50</sup> I am not sure—without seeing the book—whether the author is more successful than Archbishop Ussher in dating the creation of man; but the title is suggestive, at least the first part of it, 'Man Created During Descent.' Somewhere along the line, no doubt, we must mark off 'man' from other species

<sup>48</sup> S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, bk. iv. Whitehead, *Science*, etc., Ch. xi.; *Religion*, etc., Chh. ii.-iv.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. III, pp. 259 f.

<sup>50</sup> By the Rev. Morris Morris, London, 1926.

—though I am not sure that the men of the *Old Stone Age* might not 'rise up in the judgment' and resent exclusion, if the author's meaning is what I suppose. In much the same way, it has been suggested by some modern writers that 'the fall' may likewise be understood as a gradual one which took place in successive periods as man declined from original righteousness or innocence.<sup>51</sup> Original sin, then, is literally defined by the Article: "It standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk); but it is the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man . . . an infection of nature [which] doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated."<sup>52</sup> To deal with such a problem today it must be remembered that the language of articles, creeds, and Bible antedate the modern psychological study of religion. It is the *facts* they describe or define, not the language of description or definition, with which we are concerned. Of the fact here involved, no one conscious of his own moral experience can be in doubt. Biology knows no 'fall,' no 'infection of nature'; but I know my own fall, and my impaired power of will; I see it in others; and I can trace it in the past. It is a moral fact, not a biological one. And the doctrine of the fall is our human

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, 1927 (Bampton Lectures, 1924), esp. Lect. viii. Mr. Williams holds that 'the Ultimate Fall' was indeed in a sense pre-cosmic, though he speaks of 'a collective fall of the race-soul of humanity in an indefinitely remote past' (p. 513). Cf. *Anglican Theol. Rev.*, x. 167 ff.

<sup>52</sup> *The [Thirty-nine] Articles of Religion*, Art. ix.

reading-back of moral experience into the story of human origins, a kind of superb myth, like that one of Plato's which it suggests,<sup>53</sup>—superb, or at least superbly audacious; and deriving far more, historically, from the somewhat pessimistic Jewish theology of the period between the Old and New Testaments than from specifically Old Testament revelation or Christian doctrine.<sup>54</sup> As a picture of moral evil, it is far too sombre; but it is only a picture, nothing more; and what it pictures you will find not in biology but only in religion, *i.e.*, in moral and religious experience.<sup>55</sup>

III. We have just spoken of the bearing of the scientific evolutionary doctrine upon the Christian theological doctrines of Creation, the Fall, and Original Sin. No doubt we must also speak of its bearing upon the doctrine of the Incarnation, though this properly comes in the last lecture, on 'Christian Doctrine in the Twentieth Century.' Fortunately, we may speak of it, at this point, almost in the words of the authors already frequently cited. Dr. Whitehead writes of God in the next to last chapter of *Science and the Modern World*.<sup>56</sup> "In the place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover," he says, "we require God as the

<sup>53</sup> *Phaedrus*, 246a-257a. Cf. J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, pp. 306-395.

<sup>54</sup> See Williams, *op cit.*, Lects. ii.-v.

<sup>55</sup> Though Mr. Williams, the latest writer on the subject, finds biological evidence for his view, *viz.*, 'the arrested development of the herd-instinct'; *op. cit.*, p. 518.

<sup>56</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

Principle of Concretion"—which one may think implies a doctrine half-way between Aristotle's Prime Mover and the Demiurge of Plato. In other words, how did the world of mathematically-describable abstractions ever become the concrete world of organisms, of evolving life, of finite intelligence and spirit? The answer is: God, who is "the ultimate limitation" and whose existence is "the ultimate irrationality"—*i.e.*, logically, since it cannot be rationally accounted for. "No reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. [Compare once more St. Augustine's statement of the doctrine.] No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground for rationality."<sup>87</sup> Speaking 'provisionally' one may remark that this metaphysical statement not only does not rule out the doctrine of the Incarnation but in fact suggests it, as a further step in the process of 'limitation' or 'concretion.' Why should the world of finite abstractions become concrete and actual, and yet stop short of the highest, noblest, and best abstraction the mind of man can conceive, *viz.*, 'the kindness of God our Saviour and his love toward man,' 'the grace of God . . . bringing salvation to all men,'<sup>88</sup> yes, even God him-

<sup>87</sup> *Ib.*, p. 249; *Religion in the Making*, pp. 153-158. Of course Professor Whitehead writes not as a biologist but as a mathematician; yet his 'organic' philosophy has steadily in view the phenomena and data of the organic sciences—such as chemistry, physics, biology.

<sup>88</sup> Titus iii. 4; ii. 11.

self, revealed not in his 'power and glory'<sup>59</sup> but in those qualities of love, mercy, humility, and self-sacrifice which we instinctively place upon a higher level than magnificence and power? There is no biological—or metaphysical—reason for excluding such a hypothesis; and the Catholic doctrine of divine Incarnation, stripped of the misconstructions that have been placed upon it, would seem to follow as a matter of course in a realistic interpretation of the process of evolution as one of successive 'concretions' or realizations (and at the same time 'limitations' in actuality) of 'emergent values.'

Prof. Lloyd Morgan is more explicit, in his final Gifford Lecture, on 'Divine Purpose.' "I believe," he says, "that evolutionary advance and progress is a manifestation of Divine Purpose,"<sup>60</sup> to be seen "in an ascending hierarchy with new modes of relatedness, in a series of ascending steps along different lines of evolutionary advance."<sup>61</sup> For this divine purpose he claims 'objective reality,'<sup>62</sup> a reality which "is not *other than* but emergently *more than* the reality of the rational order of the cosmos."<sup>63</sup> "If, as I claim, there need be no discrepancy, inconsistency, or contradiction in the acceptance of emergent evolution and the acknowledgment of Divine Purpose, the same array of facts may be interpreted

<sup>59</sup> Which Whitehead rightly deprecates; Cf. *Religion*, etc., pp. 55-57.

<sup>60</sup> *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 288.

<sup>61</sup> *Ib.*, p. 280.

<sup>62</sup> *Ib.*, p. 293.

<sup>63</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 296 f.



in terms of the most thorough-going naturalism and may also afford instances of Divine Purpose.”<sup>64</sup> He is even willing to grant the nomenclature of the ‘supernatural,’ if only this is not understood in a dualistic sense—in a passage worth re-reading many times. “In so far as there is progress and advance in the cosmos, God is All in all but in diverse modes and degrees of manifestation”<sup>65</sup>—including “temporal manifestations of values *which in spiritual regard are eternal.*”<sup>66</sup> In the end he implies his subscription to the doctrine of the Logos, and the faith that “Divine Personality shines through the Unique Individuality of the Christ.”<sup>67</sup>

God, the ‘Principle of Concretion,’ and Divine Personality revealed through ‘Divine Purpose’ observable in nature and culminating in ‘the Unique Individuality of the Christ’: surely we are not far from the doctrine of Origen, Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas, and orthodox theology generally, that the very God who made the world is the God revealed as incarnate in Jesus Christ; indeed, it is the faith set forth in the first chapter of the Gospel of St. John, and elaborated in the Nicene Creed! But, it will be said, it is differently conceived, and in terms of naturalistic evolution. I grant this; but I would point out that the difference is not so much that which exists between what we ordinarily call ‘naturalism’ and the Christian faith, as it is a difference between the world-view

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<sup>64</sup> *Ib.*, p. 299.    <sup>65</sup> *Ib.*, p. 302.    <sup>66</sup> *Ib.*, p. 311.    <sup>67</sup> *Ib.*, p. 313.

of modern biological and evolutionary science and the world-view of early and patristic Christianity, shaped as it was by Hebraic, Platonic, Stoic, and Neoplatonic factors—a 'static' rather than an 'evolutionary' world-view, as we say. It is a difference in the terms of thought, more than in the object of thought, or even in the conclusion set forth. If 'naturalistic evolution' is understood in the popular nineteenth century sense as the mere unrolling of what was originally wound up in a ball of primitive 'matter,' the objection is real, and may be insuperable. But 'evolution' does not mean this, in the twentieth century, as we have seen. And the Logos-doctrine, as Dr. Morgan has intimated, suggests a line of approach which in the end may enable orthodox theology to accept unreservedly the terms of thought of modern 'naturalism'—at least as Morgan and others of his school interpret it. Such 'naturalism' does not rule out uniqueness; indeed, uniqueness is taken for granted and is expected—the emergence of what is "new and unpredictable on the basis of the order of nature *as known up to date*."<sup>68</sup> Christ is no 'product of evolution,' if that implies the old and now discredited theory of evolution, according to which everything could be predicted, at least theoretically, 'from atom to perfect man.' Instead, it is suggested that the principle of emergence, of fresh creation and uniqueness, is part of a 'Divine Purpose' manifest in the whole. What

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<sup>68</sup> *Ib.*, p. 300.

if this principle be identified with the Logos 'by whom all things were made; without whom nothing was made that was made; in whom was Life, the Life that was the Light of men'; who 'was in the beginning' and was 'with God' and 'was—none less than—God'?<sup>69</sup>

IV. A further contact is perhaps to be found in the view of life as progressing on beyond this present world. And here, surely, biology has nothing to say against, and much to say in favor of, the probability of immortality. As matter grows out of energy, and life emerges from matter, mind from life, so spirit grows out of mind.<sup>70</sup> This life is 'the vale of Soul-making,' in the phrase quoted from Keats by Professor Bosanquet,<sup>71</sup> and its supreme ethical imperative is 'Grow a soul.' This may of course imply the doctrine of conditional immortality: *i.e.*, there is nothing to 'survive' unless the spirit be developed now and here. For only the spirit, the spiritual self rather than the empirical and more or less accidental 'self,' can possess 'survival value.' Christianity, I believe, has never fully endorsed the doctrine of natural immortality. Eternal life is the gift of God; it comes from Him, and is not ours *de jure*. It is ours only as we come to share the divine life and participate in the purposes of God.

<sup>69</sup> John i. 1-4.

<sup>70</sup> At least this is the temporal-causal sequence of evolution, though in the ultimate, final-causal sequence the series may be reversed.

<sup>71</sup> *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 64; cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 256, 278.

V. An interesting secondary point is the unity of the human race which biology guarantees. This fact, which has always meant much to the Church, as a parallel to and presupposition of its own unity, and of its missionary work, is confirmed by research. God has 'made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the whole earth'<sup>72</sup>—and blood normally at 98.6°, whether in Spitzbergen or the Soudan, in definite contrast to the very different compositions and temperatures of many other species.<sup>73</sup> The whole notion of 'super-races' forcibly exterminating the unfit is abhorrent to modern science—here science has been perverted by those who maintain it as a 'scientific' doctrine.<sup>74</sup> The species stands together as a whole, arrayed against certain other species, *e.g.*, the mosquito, the influenza-germ, the leopard, and the bear; but not, as a rule, man against man or race against race, biologically viewed.

VI. The conscious control of evolution is suggested by modern biology as not only a remarkable possibility but a social duty. If mind is a real emergent in nature, then mind has the right and the duty to modify both organic structures and environments for the further release of its own qualities and capacities. But what are the actual

<sup>72</sup> *Book of Common Prayer*, p. 38 (Prayer for Missions).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. arts. 'Animal Heat' and 'Blood' in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. J. A. Thomson, *What Is Man?*, 1924, Chh. iii., vii.-viii.; *The System of Animate Nature*, Lect. xvii.; Whitehead, *Science*, etc., pp. 288 ff.

social facts? Let Prof. J. A. Thomson answer: "We have to face the dilemma of civilization that the growth of social sentiment tends to favor the continuance and even the multiplication of undesirables, who would not be tolerated under Nature's regime, where there is no place for the unlit lamp and ungirt loin—unless indeed in parasitism. Man's kindness in the present is apt to mean cruelty in the future."<sup>75</sup> It is too large a problem to enter here, but one may at least offer a suggestion or two in passing.

(a) If the world is 'free,' as Bergson and Alexander insist, moral values will of course take care of themselves, and the divine laws of nature 'get themselves obeyed,' in Emerson's phrase.<sup>76</sup> But even so, mind surely has the duty of enforcing rationality upon its environment—unless its very freedom is to end in slavery! And emergent mind is no less involved in this view of evolution than in the views of Driesch, Ward, Pringle-Pattison, Taylor, Morgan, and others who believe in a 'realm of ends' toward which nature strives.

(b) Much can no doubt be done by education, though we doubt if biology permits us to expect the whole task of race-improvement to be accomplished in this way. Religion stands aloof, and perhaps must continue to do so—at least organized religion; though I think it should in fairness be recognized that vital religion has no direct con-

<sup>75</sup> *Science and Civilization*, p. 214. Cf. *What Is Man?*, pp. 214-227.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 333; Hegel, *Logic*, § 234.

cern with the methods proposed by practical scientists to achieve this end—such as the control of population, sterilization of the unfit, and so on. So far as I can see, no really Christian principle is opposed to this procedure.<sup>77</sup> No moral rights of the individual are infringed;<sup>78</sup> and the rights of many individuals, as well as of the social group, it is proposed to safeguard. The motive certainly represents both Christian and biological common-sense applied to social welfare. Indeed, the Church has long set the example of such control and practical sterilization, through celibacy and voluntary continence—too often, alas, a morally effected sterilization of the fit, rather than of the unfit.

(c) In the third place, we may venture the opinion that the whole practical problem of the bearing of modern biology upon Christian ethics is one to be worked out with great caution. We cannot ignore the ethical values which biology recognizes as emerging even in the lower species. Huxley's dualism was too sharp, as when he wrote, 'The ethical process is in opposition to the cosmic process'; or as when he stated in his Ro-

<sup>77</sup> These are purely scientific matters; the concern of religion is with the emergent type which is to be safeguarded and, so to speak, subsidized by scientific control. It is after all only a further, conscious, and intelligent application of the principle by which the 'warm-blooded, sensitive, and alert' smaller animals have cleared the wasteful, anti-social, useless, and hard-shelled monsters 'off the face of the earth' (Whitehead, *Science*, etc., p. 289).

<sup>78</sup> Though the modern fictitious 'individual' often claims rights which neither science nor religion can recognize. Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 258 f.

manes Lecture (1893), that 'the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combatting it.' <sup>79</sup> As conceived by many scientists in Huxley's day, nature was 'red in tooth and claw'; but the conception has changed—Wallace, for example, did not share such a view, nor does Prof. J. A. Thomson. And the tendency of present-day psychology, which is certainly under a strong influence from biology, is in the direction of a 'harmony with nature' which reminds one not a little of the ancient Stoic doctrine. This is likewise the present-day tendency in ethics. And if ethical values have emerged in the course of evolution, they may at least claim patril rights in nature, the rights of liberty and protection. It is of course a question if the ethical values evolved by nature include all those which are recognized by Christianity. Most Christian thinkers have replied in the negative. Yet unless we can show that the Christian ethics, *i.e.*, 'revealed' ethics, agree with the biological—even while they carry them on to a higher level—we shall not go far. For our part, we believe that such an implicit agreement already exists. The realm of grace does not destroy the realm of nature, but carries it on to completion. <sup>80</sup> In the widest sense

<sup>79</sup> *Essays*, ix. 31, 83.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I. i. 8: "*Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei.*" And cf. K. E. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, p. 43.

it is true that Christ came 'not to destroy but to fulfil.' But it must be shown that the sanctions of Christian ethics are not contrary to those operative in 'biological' ethics: indeed, as ethics of the Kingdom, one would antecedently suppose them to be in fundamental agreement, since the conception of the Kingdom of God is that of a social whole and not of the self-centered, or even God-centered, individual. Only let us learn from the shift in emphasis which biology has undergone in the last half-century not to be too ready in assuming that 'biological' ethics are clear and assured from the start. Such terms and phrases as 'natural conflict,' 'survival of the fittest,' 'the struggle for existence,' 'instinct,' 'heredity,' have been grossly abused in ethical applications—as in political, industrial, and other 'moral' relations. 'Urge,' 'libido,' 'repression,' 'satisfaction,' 'race conflict,' 'class struggle,' and other present-day jargon terms, used more often in psychology and sociology than in biology, need to be soundly criticized and weighed before being admitted into the terminology of ethics. It may turn out that their interpretative value for ethics has been considerably overrated. Whatever is absolutely certain in biology must in the end affect our understanding of ethics, and of every other science related to man. But until that time (which of course may be near at hand) we can do no better than go on with the highest ethics we possess, confident that the best we now know will not be entirely belied



and set at naught by some further revelation of the nature of things.

VII. Finally, it may be pointed out—though perhaps it is already apparent to every one—that the doctrine of evolution teaches us something about the technique of the Creator. It does little more, in one sense, than this: for it does not presume to tell us about the Creator Himself, save as He is revealed in His works. You recall the beautiful passage in St. Augustine's *Confessions*, where the author inquired of the universe if it were God, as the ancients held:

"I asked the earth, and it answered me, 'I am not He'; and whatsoever are in it, confessed the same. I asked the sea and the deeps, and the living creeping things, and they answered, 'We are not thy God, seek above us.' I asked the moving air; and the whole air with his inhabitants answered, 'Anaximenes was deceived, I am not God.' I asked the heavens, sun, moon, stars; 'Nor (say they) are we the God whom thou seekest.' And I replied unto all the things which encompass the door of my flesh: 'Ye have told me of my God, that ye are not He; tell me something of Him.' And they cried out with a loud voice, 'He made us.'—My questioning them was my thoughts on them: and their form of beauty gave the answer."<sup>81</sup>

May we not supplement Augustine, and add that not only their 'form of beauty' but also their order, their gradual evolution, their onward-marching development, their dependence upon

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<sup>81</sup> *Confessions*, x. (6) 9, Pusey's translation.

each other and upon a primal stream of energy profounder and more permanent than themselves, their repeated upward thrusts and leaps into new forms and combinations, into fresh structures and organs, emergent functions and values—is not all this a part of the story nature tells of the Creative Mind, Will, and Love which ‘makes all things new,’ and not only

‘Moves the sun in heaven and all the stars,’<sup>82</sup>

but also bids the bird gather food for her nestlings, sustains the heart of the ‘picket frozen on duty,’ and stands finally revealed in Christ hanging from the rood?<sup>83</sup> We do but dishonor God when we scorn His self-revelation in Nature, as if out of preference for His revelation in human life or in the Bible. It is the same God in both; and if there is one Reality back of all things, only folly can dictate a refusal of His message through Nature.

Biology, to be sure, does not speak in terms of revelation. This is only natural, for biology’s concern is not the ultimate source or cause but only the process of evolving life, mind, and spirit. But it is surely legitimate to accept biology’s findings and, while reading them strictly in accordance with the key supplied by science, at the same time go on to build up a view of the world into which they will fit without misrepresentation or suppression.

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<sup>82</sup> Dante, *Paradise, ad fin.*, Cary’s translation.

<sup>83</sup> William H. Carruth, ‘Each in His Own Tongue.’

That is what we all must do—the biologist included. And unless our whole effort of thought has miscarried, it would seem reasonable to maintain that the Christian doctrine of God and of His creation of the world really fits the facts, accepts them, and not only builds upon them but also, without rejecting any of them, finds still further significance in their far-ranging coördination and harmony; and that no other competing explanation quite succeeds in doing so.

#### IV. CHRISTIANITY AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

THE MODERN INTEREST in the history of religions has been a gradual and cumulative development. There was, indeed, an interest in other religions, *i.e.*, in religions other than Christianity, in the days of the Church Fathers, when the great variety of competing cults brought home to men the fact of diversity in religious ideas and practices. The discussion of them was largely apologetic, and aimed to refute polytheism, superstition, and the immorality that was as a rule fastened upon other religions by defenders of their own—whether Christian or pagan. A new interest in 'ethnic' religions awakened during the Crusades, when Christian Europe was brought face to face with Islam and other oriental faiths. The growing commerce of the Renaissance and Reformation period added to general European information and accordingly raised problems growing out of the comparison of religions. These problems were solved in one fashion or another in the Age of Reason that broke upon Europe in the seventeenth century. Hobbes, John Selden, Toland, in the seventeenth century; Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists, Hume, and Warburton, and

Benjamin Constant in the eighteenth; Karl Müller, Creuzer, the philosophers Schelling and Hegel, the poet Goethe, in the early nineteenth century, all contributed to arouse interest in the questions that naturally arose, and did their share in solving the problems. The great period in the study of History of Religion began, of course, with Max Müller in the second half of the nineteenth century, during and since whose time the literature of the subject has increased enormously, so that technical specialists are now required in almost all of its branches.<sup>1</sup>

The study arose, as we have suggested, in the form of 'Comparative Religion'—a term familiar to most of us from our college or seminary days, but one which has now been supplanted by the term, 'History of Religions.' This change in terminology represents a real change in the point of view of the study. Where 'Comparative Religion' aimed to compare religions, either with the purpose of ascertaining the best, or in order to get at the genus 'religion' behind all its species and differentia, or even purely for informational purposes, the modern point of view and of approach is primarily historical.<sup>2</sup> Before we can com-

<sup>1</sup> See the introductory chapter, 'Zur Geschichte der Religionsgeschichte,' by Prof. Edvard Lehmann, in the new edition of Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> The limitations of the 'comparative' method, as contrasted with the historical, are observable even in that vast repertory of material, Sir J. G. Frazer's *Golden Bough*. Prof. J. A. Maynard prefers the term 'religious ethnology'; cf. 'Method in the Study of Religious Ethnology,' in *Anglican Theological Review*, vii. 469 ff.

pare religions, we must know the religions themselves; and to know religions we must know their history. Instead of setting up a norm, either Christianity or some other religion, or even a purely ideal 'religion in the abstract,' and then testing all other 'forms' of religion by comparison with this norm,<sup>3</sup> the modern scientific historian of religion lays aside such metaphysical or preferential considerations and inquires what the various religions concretely are, what they teach, what kind of life they presuppose or encourage, what has been their history, what their origin (so far as this can be ascertained), what the influences and movements of thought, internal or external, which have actually molded their development, what their testimony to the inner life and religious consciousness of men under the varying conditions of human life, finally—though this is a very hypothetical matter—what is implied as to the social or other origins of religion as a human phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> The method, like the goal, is thus somewhat different today from what it was fifty or even twenty-five years ago.

But we are speaking, of course, about the technical or scientific study of religions. The popular interest in the subject, which to-day seems steadily increasing, is only partially controlled by the new method and goal; it is still largely 'comparative

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<sup>3</sup> The method of Hegel and Schleiermacher.

<sup>4</sup> See 'Contemporary Theories of Primitive Religion,' by the Rev. D. A. McGregor, in *Anglican Theological Review*, x. 343 ff.

religion.' For example, Dr. Lewis Browne's now popular book, *This Believing World*,<sup>5</sup> is only partly scientific in method or aim; its real object is to compare religions and to set forth the author's conception of the one true religion, or 'highest' religion—Judaism. One cannot of course complain of this; the author of a book has a perfect right to set forth what he believes; we expect it of him, and he ought not to write unless he is prepared to do this. Christian writers have done this over and over again; but we should bear this fact in mind as we read the book. The pressure of practical religious need is upon us all, and the people in our parishes who ask for information—or for books to read—are really, I think, led by a sense of need. Woe to us if we have no answer, having never considered the problem! Traditional Christianity seems to many, especially among the younger minds, to be only one among several traditional religions of the world. Has it any rightful claim to our preference—beyond the mere fact that it is already here, with its institutions and traditions, woven into the fabric of our inherited civilization? And in the light of general religious history, can Christianity claim an exclusive authority for its scriptures, its sacraments, its creeds and dogmas, its ethics, its ministry and organization, its ancient formulae, hymns, and worship? Have not other religions the same kind of inheritance, with scriptures, creeds, hymns, and so

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<sup>5</sup> New York, 1926.

on? What remains of the absoluteness of traditional Christianity under such circumstances as these? Such, I believe, are the questions really implied, whether clearly expressed or not, in the widespread popular interest in other religions at the present day.

I. We are now aware that 'religion in general' does have certain characteristics, for the study of various religions brings out the fact that many likenesses exist between them. So striking are these similarities that even in the days of bitter prejudice and imperfect knowledge men thought the other religions only plagiarisms of their own, unauthorized imitations, perhaps (as some of the Church Fathers thought) inspired by wicked demons in order to lead men astray. Hence a large amount of religious propaganda was devoted to the warning, 'Beware of counterfeits!' But that point of view is gone, at the present day, and gone forever, let us hope. It is true that religions sometimes 'copy' one another, or a daughter-religion is born, and in due time claims her dowry in the family inheritance; or a religious 'reform' results eventually in a new religion; moreover, religions influence one another, especially when migration or conquest has taken place; indeed, purely artificial and synthetic cults are sometimes formed, which openly profess to 'take the best' from all religions. But the striking fact remains that the great religions have certain elements in



common, elements that are internal and constitutive as well as external or structural or institutional. There are monks in Tibet as well as in Italy; the custom of sacrifice was at one time all but universal; priesthood and cult and sacred scripture are characteristic of the most diverse religions.

The study of the various phenomena of religions, past and present, is called by French and German scholars, and by some others, the 'Phenomenology' of religion.<sup>6</sup> So widespread are these phenomena that it may be said religion is to be found wherever man is. Even savage races possess it, though the definition of 'religion' must be a wide enough one to include much that in a civilized community is looked upon as superstition: and also much that in 'backward' or unsophisticated communities would be looked upon as scepticism, infidelity, or even atheism.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, there are individuals and even groups in various communities who from the pressure of want or the surfeit of prosperity or from a bad

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<sup>6</sup> See the very full and interesting chapter by Professor Lehmann, 'Erscheinungs- und Ideenwelt der Religion,' in Vol. I of the new *De la Saussaye*—the latest and best survey in print. It replaces the 'Phänomenologischer Theil' of the original.

<sup>7</sup> The problem of framing such an inclusive definition of religion may well be postponed for the present; and perhaps an entirely satisfactory one is impossible. It is only in textbooks written upon the deductive method that page 1, paragraph 1, begins with a definition. Prof. H. N. Wieman (*The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, 1927, p. vi.) has offered the latest definition: 'Religion is the way we seek adjustment to God.' For the present I am content with the general one ventured below: 'awareness of God, and the consequences thereof.'

philosophy or from other causes have abandoned—or think they have abandoned—‘religious faith.’ But they are exceptional, so exceptional, in fact, that, to use the term in the old legal logic, ‘the exception proves the rule.’

Among the earliest and most widespread of religious phenomena is the custom of sacrifice. This may originally have been, as the late W. Robertson Smith maintained,<sup>8</sup> a gift to the deity which was then shared in a common meal—if edible, *i.e.*, animal or vegetable in nature—a theory to which some of the phenomena of totemism may be held to point, and also the quasi-magical rites of the Year-Daimon, as Prof. J. E. Harrison supposes,<sup>9</sup> *i.e.*, the festival of the renewing of the year, the revival of the life-giving spirit who brings back the sun and the flowers and the vegetation without which men and their flocks and herds cannot survive. On the other hand, sacrifice may be viewed as originating in the desire to propitiate a god whose ceremonial, moral, or social requirements or laws (or, more primitively, *taboos*) have not been fulfilled. As an off-hand guess, which receives support from many of those who have carefully studied the problem, we may assume that the expiation or propitiation theory of sacrifice came *later* than the gift theory:<sup>10</sup> it

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<sup>8</sup> *Religion of the Semites*, 3d ed., 1927, Lecture viii.; cf. G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, 1925, Ch. i.

<sup>9</sup> *Themis*, 1912, p. 340, etc.

<sup>10</sup> See Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

implies a more or less carefully formulated set of regulations governing men's relations with the deity, and likewise a conception of deity which seems more developed than that which early religion presupposes. However, our sources of information are very scanty, and it is necessary to reconstruct in hypothesis much of the earliest beginning of every non-historical religion: a hypothesis which modern savagery does not help us greatly in establishing, since modern savages are not the 'untutored children of nature' which the Romanticists supposed, but are representatives either of an actual degeneration in culture or of a sterile and unprogressive culture which can only be contrasted with that of the forebears of civilization.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the actual origins of religion go back so far into the dim, remote past, to the pre-logical (or a-logical) thinking of early man, that our modern rationale of sacrifice might not have held at all: as a rule, the reasons which men assigned for what they did *πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς* were notoriously 'after-thoughts.' They did what tradition and custom decreed, often long ages after the original reason for the institution had been forgotten—supposing that any 'reason' in the civilized sense ever had been given—and they supplied their own 'reasons' for doing what *Themis* required. Finally, the cross-currents of religious

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, 1907, i. 253: "As well judge the wine by the dregs as primitive man by the savage"—a view contrasting strongly with that of Tylor (*Primitive Culture*, 3d ed., i. 32). Cf. J. A. Thomson, *What Is Man?*, p. 68—a moderating view.

thought set in so early—even before our surviving documents were produced—that the ‘reasons’ one man or community might give for his or their rites were transferred to others: ‘higher’ rationales were attached to ‘lower’ cults, and vice versa, and parallel phenomena suggested identical ‘reasons’—which may, in fact, have been quite fictitious and inapplicable.<sup>12</sup> An essential presupposition of sacrifice, however, was the unconditional demand which religion made of men to offer up something either of their property or of their own person. “Sacrifice is the appropriate expression of faith. When we realize how widespread was this custom, from the lower nature-religions up to the highly developed religions of cult and morality; when we consider the expenditure of valuables brought to the altar or dedicated to the temple; and the precious objects, domestic animals, and means of livelihood, the sacrifice of children and of adult human beings even to the extent of self-immolation, then it becomes clear that one faces a power that dominated humanity almost without limitation.”<sup>13</sup> Along with sacrifice went asceticism, as a kind of sacrifice—not solely for self-discipline, though its importance as a preparation for ecstasy and a higher spiritual state generally was very real.

So far we have noticed what may be called

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<sup>12</sup> Such ‘rationalization’ of earlier cultus is a common feature in ‘higher religions,’ and may be observed alike in the Hebrew Psalter and in the Hindu *Bhagavadgita*.

<sup>13</sup> Lehmann, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

negative elements in religion. It had, of course, a more positive side. "The great common factor which controlled the development of religion was the effort that it made to arouse the living energy of men, to develop their capacities, and to heighten the feeling of life. Thus, chiefly, came religion to maintain its cultural significance."<sup>14</sup> The customs and ceremonials attending marriage, birth, initiation, burial, and other solemn events and crises of human life were of a religious nature, and thus the individual's life was stamped with a religious character. The various trades, in early civilized society, the various tribes and families of more primitive society, the various societies and groups all had their particular cults of worship, their particular gods and religions. And when men reached a stage of reflective thought, and the problems of suffering, and sin, and future destiny arose, religion had an answer to them; the cultural, intellectual, and moral development of men was paralleled by a similar development of religion. One may even say that the history of religion gives in cross-section a view of the whole of human development, and shows it in its most vital and essential relations. When President Eliot remarked, 'The test of a civilization is its conception of God,'<sup>15</sup> he was expressing a rule that applies all along the scale from primitive, pre-his-

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, p. 25.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Hegel: "The nation which has an evil conception of God has also a bad state, a bad government, and bad laws." J. W. Povah, *Students and the Faith*, 1927, p. 119.

toric man, with whom civilization began, on to modern and civilized humanity.

Religion has likewise always stood in some relation to nature, or at least to men's idea of nature; and their gods were either 'natural' in the sense of belonging to nature as a part of the total background of man's life, or were 'supernatural' in the sense of standing above nature and its powers—as creators, rulers, all-powerful friends and allies of men. Fetishism, Totemism, Animism, all presuppose a sympathy between man and nature; and religion, even on the magical level, means the ability to transfer the power, *mana*,<sup>10</sup> resident in external nature or parts of nature to meet man's peculiar needs. Very naturally such 'powers' came to be personalized; and since already powerful, came gradually to take on positively supernatural aspects. Spirits—or sprites—living in woods and rivers and springs and lonely trees and on high hills, were such beings; the 'gentle spirits of the wild' in the poetry of Virgil and Ovid are old half-gods, numens of their localities, who had grown old and tame and lived a shadowy life alongside the great gods of the civil theology and the Homeric-Virgilian pantheon. Spirits of the departed were such powers—friendly if honored and well fed, and if the wrongs they had suffered in life were appropriately avenged by their followers and descendants; unfriendly and dangerous if neglected or unavenged,

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<sup>10</sup> R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, 1909, Ch. iv.

or if their bodies were not properly interred. Temples, sacred stones, and groves, holy enclosures, mysterious caves and sacred hilltops belonging to these local gods increased gradually in importance and in fame as men travelled and reported the miraculous cures, or the strange, significant dreams, or the answers to prayer which were told of this or that particular shrine. Here sacrifices were offered, and here in time regular priesthoods were usually established—though the priest was perhaps not originally a ‘sacrificer’ but an interpreter of oracles and dreams, a diviner who used sacred dice, animal entrails, or what not, in order to ascertain the will of the god, whose mouthpiece and interpreter he was. Around him grew up a sacred lore which all members of the sacred order had to study—for ‘the priest’s lips,’ even in primitive society, ‘should keep knowledge.’<sup>27</sup> He was a *teacher*, in some sense; and from this ancient priest has descended not only the modern celebrant of the Holy Mysteries (a ‘sacrificer’), but also the modern pedagogue, the modern scientist, the modern preacher and journalist.<sup>28</sup>

Instead of surveying the whole field of early religion—which would be impossible in an hour, and which can best be read in some authoritative book on the subject, in Jevons or Carpenter,

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<sup>27</sup> Malachi ii. 7.

<sup>28</sup> Lehmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff.

Robinson or Frazer,<sup>19</sup> or in the new edition of De la Saussaye or the articles in Hastings' great *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*—we shall only point out that 'primitive' religion (so far as we can trace it in its remains) presents a vast and often intricate development. It touches and affects the whole of life, as life was known to early man; it is no simple *addendum* or appendage to life, so that an individual man or woman could take it or leave it, ignore it or cultivate it according to his or her tastes, but was woven in subtly and inextricably with the whole social fabric of which the individual was a part. Hence the intolerance of the group, in its sacred capacity, and the persecution of those who neglected any of their religious duties or slighted the gods in thought, word, or deed. Hence the long tragedy of religious reform, the martyrdom of the best, the crucifixion or burning or at least ostracism of those who made possible the eventual advance of religion. For religion was essentially conservative—and no doubt wisely so; for without such conservatism it could never have supplied the social bond which held men together in tribe, city, nation, or empire; and the conservatism guaranteed—or was supposed to guarantee—the positive fruits of advance in the past.

There is one more point worth including: the

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<sup>19</sup> F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, 2d ed., 1902; J. E. Carpenter, *Comparative Religion* (Home University Library); T. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, 1926; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (one-vol. ed.), 1922; cf. N. Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, 2d ed., 1926.



gods were usually looked upon as friendly, as man's natural allies and defenders and life-givers and guides. It was only when they had been slighted or offended that they became vindictive, and either deserted or punished their worshippers.<sup>20</sup> Hence men looked upon their gods with a shy and awesome respect, mingled with confidence, and with a sense of mystery—since the requirements of the gods were not always altogether certain: even the traditional code might now and then fail to 'work' in complete detail; yet the gods were friendly, and if you did what you were expected to do, you could count upon their help to the very limit of their power. I picture our ancestors entering the shrines of their gods with the feeling that must have possessed some child-bride of the Middle Ages as she entered the fortress-hall of her gruff but kindly lord. 'We belong to the gods, like their flocks,' says the Elean stranger

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<sup>20</sup> This point is important. Of course various representations of the divine *will* were possible—the 'atheists,' *e.g.*, Socrates, or the early Christians, might claim a truer insight into the will of God than that of the official representatives of the state religion; and at the same time various interpretations of public *misfortune*—such as flood, fire, or defeat in war—were possible, the official and conservative 'guardians of religion' normally ascribing them to divine malevolence, occasioned by sin or offense on the part of the community or of some member of it (see the opening chapters of Augustine's *City of God*). But the point of agreement remains: the gods were normally or naturally men's friends. That was the very fulcrum of the demand for reparation. Achan's sin, David's sacrifice of Saul's sons, Iphigeneia, and other instances come to mind at once. The Fathers, *e.g.*, Tertullian and Augustine, gave vigorous answers to the charges (which were plausible, on this principle, to pagan minds) against the early Christians. Of course friendliness does not rule out fear, awe, wholesome respect, or even, on occasion, terror—as Professor Otto insists.

in Plato's *Politicus*.<sup>21</sup> They are our shepherds, owners, and guardians; but we must please them by doing their will, by obeying their commands, by humbly worshipping them with sacrifice and prayer and sacred song. If we take the early Greek religion as a fair guide—reflected not only in Homer, Pindar, and Sophocles, but in the archaeological and cultural remains (of which Pausanias and Plutarch, *e.g.*, are full), and in the history and etymology of such ancient words as had a religious use—*Themis*, *Hubris*, *Nemesis*, *Aidôs*, *Moirâ*, *Daimôn*, *Arêtê*,<sup>22</sup> it becomes clear that the relation in which men felt they ordinarily stood to the gods was one of divine kindness met by human awe. This feeling of shyness might give way on occasion to terror, as in the stories of the epic and tragic cycles: the *Iliad* and the *Oresteia*, *e.g.*, would have been impossible without it, since they purposely dramatize heavenly wrath; but the normal religious relation was not terror or even fear, but awed respect and humble, shy affection. I think this point is especially important as we approach our next problem, that of religious origins.

II. In order to understand religion in its historical development it is indispensable that one should have a first-hand acquaintance with religion itself, here and now. I fear that some schol-

<sup>21</sup> *Statesman*, 271, 275; cf. *Critias*, 109; *Phaedo*, 62.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Gilbert Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, 2d ed., 1911, Lect. iii., App. D; *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, 1925, Ch. i.; F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 1912, Chh. i.-ii.

ars have studied it too 'objectively,' as a historical phenomenon pure and simple—just as one might study the imperial policy of Justinian or the influence of river-commerce upon Babylonian civilization, or of foreign trade upon sea-power in eighteenth century England. Whereas, religion is so elemental a factor in human life that one cannot get at the secret of its influence or of its development in the past unless he feels its spell in his own heart: just as the study of aesthetics or harmonics is hopeless for one who lacks an eye or ear for beauty. 'Mankind,' says Goethe, 'is ever advancing; man remains ever the same.' And though it is possible for us to go too far, and read into the religions of the past some of the qualities of our own faith, that danger is no greater—and, I believe, not so great—as the opposite one, *viz.*, that we may leave out the essential religious attitude, and see only superstition, terror, or magic where there was really something of sunny confidence and inner satisfaction. It is at least noteworthy that the writers who have taken a low view of the origins of religion—men like Lucretius, Hobbes, Voltaire, and Hume, not to mention contemporaries—have also taken a low view of religion in their own times, and have not been conspicuous for any religious zeal or devotion of their own. As an offset to the theories of religion as originating in pure fear or terror, let us glance inside the cave at Le Moustier where once the Neanderthal race lived and buried their dead.

There lies "the skeleton of a youth about sixteen years of age . . . carefully placed in the attitude of sleep, with the right forearm under the head. A bed of flint chips formed his pillow [perhaps once softened with a cover of leaves or grass], and close by the hand was a splendid implement. Other flints of the pattern characteristic of this period were discovered in the grave, together with the bones of the wild ox. Since the latter were charred and split, it is generally thought that they were the relics of a funeral feast. Similar ceremonial burials have been found elsewhere, notably at La Chapelle-aux-Saints."<sup>23</sup> Is it a strained or artificial interpretation to see in this discovery the record of a dim, far-off expression of religious hope, emerging from the primeval mists along with man as he himself emerged? Later, we know, such ceremonies of burial, and the burial of tools or weapons with the corpse, had a religious significance—not only in savagery (as among the North American Indians) but also in civilization (in ancient Greece and in Egypt); and I believe we are justified in tracing back thus far, at least, the origins of religion among the early inhabitants of the European continent. It is obvious that this simple record is more likely one of confidence and trust than one of terror and misgiving.

One of the latest and one of the most impor-

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<sup>23</sup> From Edwin O. James, "The Emergence of Religion," in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, 1926, p. 5.

tant works on the subject of religious origins and of the essential nature of religion in the light of its history is Prof. Rudolf Otto's *Idea of the Holy*.<sup>24</sup> In it the author sets forth the view that religion has a wholly non-rational root, to which later was added the rational; and that this non-rational root is found in the recognition of the *numinous*, i.e., the presence of a power 'not ourselves' that compels adoration, awe, and sacrifice. It is the beginning of the sense—or idea—of the *Holy*. This earlier sense of the *numinous* gives rise to 'creaturely feeling'; and as it grows into a sense of the *Mysterium tremendum* it may be analyzed into (a) 'the element of Awefulness,' (b) the element of 'Overpoweringness,' (c) the element of 'Energy' or 'Urgency,' (d) the 'wholly other,' and (e) 'the element of Fascination.'<sup>25</sup> This last element is of especial importance, and if Otto's analysis is correct I believe it disposes of the equation of primitive religion with the fear of nature, or fear of the gods. True enough, there is fear in it; but not raw, crude, paralyzing terror—which could never have reproduced itself in a higher form or been the constructive force that religion has been in human history. On the other hand, such theories as those that explain re-

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<sup>24</sup> English translation, 1923; 3d ed., 1925.

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, Chh. iii.-vi. Professor J. E. Harrison sets forth a similar view in *Themis*; cf. p. xix: "The material of religion is essentially the uncharted, the ungrasped, as Herbert Spencer would say, the 'unknowable.'" For a criticism of the position see Prof. Leonard Hodgson's *Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic*, New York, 1925.

ligion as the artifice of ancient priests and kings to keep their followers in subjection are ruled out: this root of religion is 'in the human soul,' *a priori* and belonging to its native state.

"Not only the rational but also the non-rational elements of the complex category of 'holiness' are *a priori* elements and each in the same degree. Religion is not in vassalage either to morality or teleology, '*ethos*' or '*telos*,' and does not draw its life from postulates; and its non-rational content has, no less than its rational, its own independent roots in the hidden depths of the spirit itself.

"But the same *a priori* character belongs, in the third place, to the *connexion* of the rational and the non-rational elements in religion, their inward and necessary union. The histories of religion recount indeed, as though it were something axiomatic, the gradual interpenetration of the two, the process by which 'the divine' is charged and filled out with ethical meaning. And this process is, in fact, *felt* as something axiomatic, something whose inner necessity we feel to be self-evident. But then this inward self-evidence is a problem in itself; we are forced to assume an obscure, *a priori* knowledge of the necessity of this synthesis, combining rational and non-rational—though it is not by any means a *logical* necessity."<sup>26</sup>

If Otto's theory is established, and it certainly has many adherents already, we may come to look upon fear, magic, superstition, cultus, and so on, not as causes or explanations of the origin of religion, but as its historical accompaniments, *paraphernalia* (mental or social or both), and rough

<sup>26</sup> Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 140. The translation should be corrected: for 'interpretation' read, as above, 'interpenetration' (German text, p. 176).

outer bark or shell; religion itself is something necessary and indispensable in man's total life, though it has taken many and divergent forms, according to the stage or kind of culture in which it was expressed. As Dr. E. O. James has put it: "There can be little doubt that it was through the practical problems of life, coupled with an emotional attitude towards natural phenomena [which Otto stresses], that man was first made to seek God and feel after Him if haply he might find Him."<sup>27</sup> In this total response of early man to his environment, summed up in his religion, lay the germs of all his later development, the growth of art, of literature, of science, of philosophy—as well as of the higher religions. And *origin* no more determines nature, or final development, in the case of religion than in the case of science or art or philosophy. It is the final development that tells us more of the *physis* or essential nature of a thing, as Aristotle said, than its origin or earliest manifestation.<sup>28</sup> But for all that, the origins of religion are not, I believe, entirely discreditable, and the 'higher' religions have done well to retain and reënforce as well as refine more than one of its 'primitive' elements.

III. We turn now to the problem of psychology: the problem that is presented by the varied types of religious subject and the variety of em-

<sup>27</sup> *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> *Metaphysics*, 1015a; cf. 994b.

phases found in the historical religions. If the origins of religion do not disqualify it for acceptance by modern men, may it not be that the actual variety of the religious life casts some doubt upon the validity of religious experience? How can they all be true? And how are we to pick out the true from the false? How can one particular religion claim to be absolute, and command the allegiance of all men? Moreover, is the mind of man equipped to know religious truth? These questions arise naturally, and the psychological analysis of Professor Otto immediately suggests some of them.

One and all, the religions of men may be viewed from the standpoint of the theory of *Salvation*.<sup>29</sup> The primitive man no doubt sought a purely physical salvation—safety from enemies, a plentiful food-supply, increase of herd and family and tribe, perhaps even some kind of well-being in the shadowy realm of the dead. The higher religions promised future bliss—either temporal (as in primitive Hebraism) or beyond the grave (in early Mohammedanism); or they held out to men the hope of escape from the cycle of destiny, of birth and rebirth by the law of Karma (as in Buddhism); or the promise of immediate union with the supreme (in Hinduism—*i.e.*, the religion of Brahma); or of salvation from sin and death and all the evils that threaten man's moral and spiritual self with extinction or sup-

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. W. P. Paterson, *The Nature of Religion*, 1925, pp. 382 ff.



pression (the mystery religions and Christianity). The problem is not only one of fact, *i.e.*, What is the world really like, and how far do these pictures of threatening dangers and defeats or possible achievements and victories really correspond with reality?—but it is also a question of religious psychology: *i.e.*, Which one of these pictures really—or best—represents the true life, the 'good' life, for man? William James faced this problem in his lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and set it forth in unforgettable descriptive terms when he contrasted the 'once-born' and the 'twice-born' religious subject and inquired what normative value for religion the 'sick soul,' the convert, the mystic, or the saint, represent. It was possible for James, a pluralist in philosophy, to settle the matter by recognizing a variety of 'worlds' or spheres of reality, to which the various types of religious subject correspond and in which they so to speak 'live.'<sup>30</sup> But that solution may not be open to us—at least not in precisely the form James' philosophy gave to it. For most of us the spiritual world is all one, and we can only fall back upon some theory of a scale of degrees in reality. Without more ado, and without elaborating the theory, I shall simply assume it and say that I believe the scale runs something like this:

(a) The first level of emergence of religion is

<sup>30</sup> W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, Lect. xx, esp. pp. 487 f.

that of the normal worshipper of God, church-member, 'moral agent,' and so on, whose religion is none the less real for lacking the brilliant hues of the convert's or the saint's experiences.

(b) On the second level we may place the 'twice-born' or convert, whose religion stands out more clearly as a possession or a victory, as something won or achieved; he was not born into it but *reborn*; and its value is all the greater for being a conscious unification of divergent and wayward impulses, desires, aspirations. Very likely his moral behavior is more conscious than that of the 'once-born,' though it need not be any higher in quality or more serious in aim.<sup>21</sup>

(c) On the third level may be placed the religious experience which wholly transcends the limitations of the particular individual and brings him face to face with a reality which is eternal, omnipresent, and yet ineffable. Such a level is reached by saints and mystics the world over—in India as well as in Europe, in Neoplatonism as well as in Christianity; and the unanimity of their testimony to this reality is one of the most striking phenomena in the history of religion.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> In a word, ethics, the control of men's external relations, runs through the whole of religion, and is not peculiar to one or another level: though normally the driving force of the highest ethics is derived from a richer and more fully conscious inner experience, as, for example, in the ethics of the Gospel and of the saints.

<sup>22</sup> Of course imitation and credulity, not to say imposture, are not impossible; there have been pseudo-saints and pseudo-mystics who were self-deceived as well as deceiving, and the real test is the ancient one, 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'

This is, after all, not far removed at least from the *order* in which James classified his material, though the final upshot of the classification is somewhat different.<sup>33</sup> For if the *awareness of God* may be taken (with Otto) as the primary element in religion, not limited to its higher manifestations; and if we see, as in fact we do see, this element continuing, developing, rising ever to new powers and meanings in historical religion; then it seems reasonable to suppose that the problem of variety may be solved by the simple process of analysis and classification. They are all 'true,' all the religions of mankind—true in degree; and no religion that has ever swayed the hearts and nurtured the minds and guided the wills of men is wholly 'false'—but 'false' only in a narrowly relative degree.<sup>34</sup> At the same time this answers the question whether or not the mind of man is equipped to know religious truth. In spite of the Kantian philosophy, men persist in saying, 'We

<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, Lects. iv.-xvii.; cf. Paterson, *op. cit.*, Ch. ii.

<sup>34</sup> It is only within comparatively recent times that the old designation, 'false religions,' has dropped out of the nomenclature of Christian theology. It is to be hoped that it may never be reintroduced. The designation first arose in the controversy with paganism in the early patristic age, when the official religion was open to such a charge on more than one side—when, for example, the augurs winked at one another as they read the auspices, and when the best thought and religious devotion of the time was already alienated from the official cultus, even before Christianity appeared on the scene. But as a blanket-designation for all non-Christian religions it is entirely too sweeping. No religion lives by falsehood, but only by so much of truth as it contains. The application of this principle to the missionary policies of the Christian Church is quite obvious, and is already recognized by the Boards of Missions of the leading Christian groups. Christianity has nothing to fear from comparison with other faiths.

speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen, and ye receive' (or reject) 'our witness.'<sup>35</sup> In fact, Kant himself implies something of the sort: for after demolishing—in the First Critique—the three classical proofs of theism, he goes on in the *Critique of Practical Reason* to elaborate (as he had foreshadowed even in the First Critique) what he conceives to be the only valid argument for the existence of God, viz., the existence of a moral imperative.<sup>36</sup> But how do we know that moral imperative, unless it is *a priori*, or 'innate,' or, as Plato would say, 'a recollection of the Idea of the Good'? We do know it, and recognize it; and therefore the mind has the capacity at least to know *moral* truth; and if moral truth, then why not other and closely related truths—particularly when a cloud of witnesses testify that they actually have come to know?—"Now we believe, not because of thy saying, but we have seen and believed" for ourselves.<sup>37</sup>

IV. We come now, in this brief outline of the subject, to consider the problem of finality, already hinted in the questions proposed in the last section. The solution of the problem has likewise

<sup>35</sup> John iii. 11.

<sup>36</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, I. ii. 2. v. For the very different view found in Kant's 'Opus Postumum,' see N. K. Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* 2d ed., 1923, App. C; and C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, 1926, Ch. vi.

<sup>37</sup> John iv. 42.

been hinted—in fact it follows from the view of religious reality which we have already assumed and pointed out. Is there an absolute religion? Yes, and no: no—but yes! For religion itself is ‘absolute’; *i.e.*, it is a way of envisaging and responding to reality which stands on a par with ‘common sense’ in daily, practical relations; with art and literature in the appreciation of beauty; with physical science and even with mathematics in studying and manipulating the relations between particles of matter, bundles of energy, and ‘points’ in mathematical speculation. And just as the logic of some involved binomial equation has no immediate bearing upon the aesthetic judgment of Correggio’s ‘Marriage of St. Catharine’ or the spire surmounting Mont St. Michel or the moment of terror at the knocking on the gate in *Macbeth*, so neither has it upon the awareness of God’s presence in this place, or Christ’s sacramental presence in the Eucharist, or the recognition of the ‘ought’ in Christ’s ‘Blessed are ye poor,’ or the acknowledgment of my sins as I confess them to One who loves me and gave Himself for me and has power to say, ‘Arise, and sin no more.’

Does that principle do away with all formal distinctions between religions, or between religious or aesthetic judgments? I for one fail to see how it does so. The priest ringing the gongs in the temple of Shiva and the peasant lighting a candle to St. Alphege are both worshipping God

—there can be no question of that, Protestant to the core though we may be! It is a question of degree of reality. And the architect dreaming of St. Michel's spire and the monk whittling reeds for the chapel organ and the numb-fingered bedesman with frosty breath saying the midnight office, are all worshipping God; it is a matter of degrees of consciousness. So with aesthetic and religious judgments in general: If the mathematical judgment has no immediate bearing upon the aesthetic, and vice versa; nor the aesthetic upon the religious, and vice versa; nor the religious upon the mathematical (or scientific), and vice versa; this does not mean that any one of these is invalid, nor that the 'good' life for man can dispense with any of them.

What I am arguing is that all are needed, and that all—as truth, as beauty, and as goodness—are varied manifestations or theophanies of the One supreme True, Beautiful, and Good. They do not invalidate one another; instead they supplement one another. And religion, I believe, has just as much right to be viewed as an approach to this supreme Reality as has science, or art, or the crude every-day process of thought which we call common-sense. If religion itself is absolute, does this mean that no one religion may claim absoluteness? I should reply by saying no; for it is surely possible for one particular religion so to develop and perfect the 'common element' in all particular religions that it stands at the center

and includes within its circumference all those elements in other 'religions' which have risen to this level and thus partake in some measure of 'finality.' Of course it is true that religions 'decline,' like all other human expressions; science declines—look at the eighth century; art declines—look at the architecture of Victoria's reign; philosophy declines; so does religion. But they revive; and nothing is more characteristic of Christianity than its capacity for revival and renewal of its strength after decades or even eras in which the 'tide of faith' had seemed to be

'Retreating, to the breath  
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear  
And naked shingles of the world.'<sup>88</sup>

And it seems to me only a shallow view of history that fails to recognize this power of revival running parallel to the decline which is to be observed. It has been so in Buddhism, in Moham-medanism, in Brahmanism, in Judaism, as well as in Christianity. No doubt some of the forces come from without, through the influence of other religions; but not all—more than once this regenerating power has sprung from within the religion itself. And if sometimes the influence of one religion upon another, or of the survivals or vestiges of earlier faiths to be found in a living religion, seems detrimental, this is no doubt paral-

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<sup>88</sup> Matthew Arnold, 'Dover Beach.'

leled and offset by the good effects of contact. Myths crumble, but faith lives on.

The actual 'comparison' of religions brings out the fact that many of their elements are common ones, such as sacred scriptures (*i.e.*, the tradition of a sacred literature or revelation), parallel institutions (such as sacraments, sacred orders, temples, liturgies), similar ethical ideals (*e.g.*, in Stoicism and early Christianity, early Buddhism and Confucianism), parallel ideas of God (*e.g.*, the Neoplatonist and the Brahman, the early Greek and early Hindu); nevertheless a careful scrutiny of likenesses often results in a recognition of considerable divergences. The real question for the student of religions is not, What are the institutions, or the doctrines, of various religions, but, Who is the saint? What is the ideal of life, what is the highest apprehension and response to Ultimate Reality for which each religion stands?—And what does this argue if not that religion is a normal and thus far indispensable function of the human spirit? 'Thus far'—yet the generations which have prepared themselves for the demise of religion have usually been followed by generations which heralded its rebirth; that this will likewise be so in our own day we have no reason to doubt—in fact there are signs that the old miracle is once more taking place before our very eyes.

And if we compare earlier and later religions in the same area we find the likeness even closer



(*e.g.*, Greek popular religion to-day and in antiquity).<sup>39</sup> For some persons this implies an unworthy dependence upon the past. If, for example, it can be shown that Christianity took over any elements of faith or worship from the mystery religions, Christianity is in so far discredited. But I fail to see any logic in this—unless it is affirmed that Christianity is a wholly new religion, with no roots in the past. Though the influence of the mystery religions was far less than some writers assume—especially ‘popular’ writers like Dr. Browne—the fact that Christianity derived some elements from that source need not surprise us in the least. We all recognize its ‘dependence’ upon Judaism.<sup>40</sup> Some of the early Fathers, *e.g.*, Justin Martyr, Aristides, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Eusebius of Caesarea, held that the teaching of Christianity was not at all new or

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Walter W. Hyde, *Greek Religion and Its Survivals*, Boston, 1924.

<sup>40</sup> If Christianity ‘fulfilled’ Judaism, there is no reason why it should not also ‘fulfill’ the promises of Hellenism, or of the Oriental Mysteries, or of any other religion, in the degree in which spiritual religion was anticipated in it. This principle was frankly recognized by the early Greek Fathers, especially the Alexandrians, at least so far as it applied to Greek ‘philosophy.’ It was reaffirmed by the Cambridge Platonists, who distinguished ‘the truth of first inscription’ from ‘the after-revelation of God.’ “The truth of first inscription is connatural to man, it is the light of God’s creation, and it flows from the principles of which man doth consist, in his very first make. This is the soul’s complexion.” Indeed, “had there not been a law written in the heart of man, a law without him could be to no purpose.” “The great things of revealed truth tho’ they be not the reason’s invention, yet they are of the prepared mind readily entertain’d and receiv’d.”—*Works of Benjamin Whichcote*, Aberdeen, 1751, Vol. III, pp. 20-23. Cf. also Walter Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*, Ch. xxii.

strange—'what was new was the Church, the race of Christians'; but their teaching 'had been offered centuries before . . . by Abraham and Moses and the later prophets; and the religion of the patriarchs was identical with that of the Christians.'<sup>41</sup> We need to recognize that all religion is essentially one, like a great mountain with converging paths leading to its summit. Some paths stop short and leave men to scramble through the brush to a better; some run into others; some wind slowly and painfully toward the peak; some approach it directly. And this one religion, whose heart and center is the awareness of God, but with varying degrees of truth and light, has been known from the beginning 'in many parts and after divers manners.'<sup>42</sup> Christianity is not so much a religion as it is this *religion*, which reaches its consummation in Christ—just as we say of Him, in theological language, that He was not a man but *man*. It is not at all damaging to Christianity to point out the 'survival' of elements from earlier religions in its practice, its liturgy, or even in its faith. Nor does Christianity's mission to all mankind mean supplanting all other religions but

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<sup>41</sup> Prof. Kirsopp Lake, in the Introduction to his translation of Eusebius' *Church History* (Loeb Library), Vol. I, pp. xv. f.

<sup>42</sup> Hebrews i. 1. Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, 1911, pp. 277 ff. St. Paul quoted a heathen poet, and adopted a common Stoic doctrine, in his address at Athens—as reported in Acts xvii. 16 ff. If these words are now a part of inspired Scripture, no less inspired and inspiring must they have been before their quotation by St. Paul, inspired by the one God, in whom we all 'live and move and have our being.'

bringing them to their perfection, just as long ago Christianity brought Judaism to its fullest possible development and then set about purifying the religious life of the Hellenistic world under the empire; then turned to the northern European races and undertook the fulfilment of their quest for God and eternal life. It is not 'carrying coals to Newcastle' when the Christian missionary goes to China or India or Japan. He goes to represent not another and competing religion, but to represent Christ, the Fulfiller of all religions, the Saviour of all mankind, and the End of the long way men have trod in their quest for the eternal.

The new horizon of the Christian faith set by the History of Religions means, in brief, that Christianity is at last to be seen in its natural and proper perspective. It recognizes no rivals but superstition and the denial of man's highest, *i.e.*, his true and spiritual life. The other religions of mankind are its natural allies, heralds, and associates. For its Christ is not just one more 'Founder' of a religion: indeed, the 'founding' of a new 'religion' was probably farthest from His thoughts; rather He is identified, in faith, with the Logos or Mind of God which has been active in the world, as Creator and Revealer, from the beginning. The future of Christianity is to be better than its past, and the practical task of the Church is to pick up once more the half-woven threads on its loom which were left by the Greek Fathers, the Platonists, and the mystics. The

popular and increasing interest in 'comparative religion' and the scientific study of the history of religions, the vast development of world-commerce, travel, and communication, the flood of books and magazine articles, the visits of lecturers expounding foreign faiths and philosophies, the enlightened and tolerant policies now controlling missionary propaganda—all these are factors in the present situation, whose prospect is full of hope. Not less but even more urgent is the call to missionary service, but to missionary service which is sane and sympathetic, educational, constructive, which undertakes 'not to destroy but to fulfill' the 'earnest expectation of creation for the revealing of the sons of God' in every quarter of the earth.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Matthew v. 17; Romans viii. 19.

## V. CHRISTIANITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

THE SUBJECT of our discussion to-day, the Psychology of Religion, is a comparatively new science. Prof. William James delivered his Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience, A Study in Human Nature*, at the University of Edinburgh in 1901-1902; and these famous lectures, still a classical text on the subject, marked the real beginning of large-scale scientific investigation in this field. It was, of course, inevitable that modern psychology should sooner or later turn its attention to the phenomena of religion, since no study of human nature or of human experience can pretend to completeness with religion left out of the reckoning—it bulks too largely in experience as a whole, both historically and in the life of the private individual. What a man believes and does religiously has too much to do with what he is as a human being, for a comprehensive psychology to ignore religion.

Later studies, following James, have explored still more of the field, and in fuller detail, so that at the present time a whole library of statistical, documentary, and interpretative studies has been accumulated, comparable both in quantity and

quality to the mass of special studies in other provinces of science, and sufficient to engage the entire attention of the specialist and well-nigh bewildering to the non-specialist. Particular attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of conversion, to the varied types of religious experience, and to the application of religious psychology to the practical tasks of religious education.

Somewhat less attention has been devoted hitherto to its application to the art of worship and to the work of Pastoral Theology—though here also students are now at work, and we may hope for valuable results before long. In the meantime, religious experience has come to be viewed as wider in extent than the crisis of conversion, which was one of the first of the phenomena to be examined; and the more normal course of religious development has come in for special study. This also is inevitable in the progress of science, and since it is inevitable must in the end prove wholesome and salutary. All that we can ask of a science is that it shall be true to itself, *i.e.*, a true science, observing scientific rules of procedure. What it does to our inherited views and tastes we must wait to see; but we trust that religion itself will not be harmed—only the alloy, not the pure gold, will be injured in the acid bath of scientific investigation.

It is true that there have been psychological *explanations* of religion in quantity, from Epicurus and Lucretius to the nineteenth century. Lu-

cretius, Hobbes, and Hume agree in identifying the essence of religion with fear—fear of the dark, of the unknown, of the unseen, of the imaginary. *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*.<sup>1</sup> A group of modern anthropologists, including Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer, are in general agreement with them. On the other hand, Schleiermacher saw in religion the feeling for the Infinite, native in every man, the sense of 'absolute dependence' upon God. For Plato and Plotinus and the later Platonists, religion is the love of the true, the beautiful, and especially the good, the 'recollection' of a better state in which the Good was loved for its own sake, and, thus prompted, the 'return' of the soul to God, 'its true homeland.' And beside these explanations have been several others, ranging all the way from a pantheistic self-consciousness of God Himself taking place in the finite soul, to the rationalist notion of religion as a trick played upon the stupid and credulous by priests and kings, in order to maintain their political or ecclesiastical hold upon them.<sup>2</sup>

What differentiates modern religious psychology as a science is that it begins with a study of the facts, not with a preconceived explanation; its method is strictly that of a science. For this reason we may be confident that the Psychology of Religion, if it succeeds in explaining religion, *i.e.*,

<sup>1</sup> Statius, *Thebais*, iii. 661.

<sup>2</sup> In the preceding lecture I have attempted to deal with some of these theories from the point of view of religious origins; our concern is now with the actual psychology of the individual.

in giving a causally-arranged description of it, will not 'explain religion away.' The seriousness with which William James set about the study, for example, may be seen from one of his letters, written at the time he was preparing the Gifford Lectures:

"The problem I have set myself is a hard one: *first*, to defend (against all the prejudices of my 'class') 'experience' against 'philosophy' as being the real backbone of the world's religious life—I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning; and *second*, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is *my* religious act."<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, the modern Psychology of Religion includes both the study and analysis of the facts and the application of new principles to the conduct of the religious life—in a word, it is a practical science, as Chemistry is, or the Psychology of Law or of Politics. It is true that agreement is not yet unanimous upon many a principle set forth by investigators: but is not this the situation in other

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<sup>3</sup> *Letters of William James*, ii. 127. On account of ill health James was able at that time to write for no longer than thirty minutes a day; there was more than a touch of heroism in his 'religious act.' His success far outmeasured the none too optimistic anticipations which he expressed.



sciences as well? At the same time the application of principles—already fruitful in more than one instance, as, for example, in altering the methods of Protestant evangelism—need not wait for the realization of full unanimity among specialists.

I shall not attempt to survey even briefly the field of contemporary Psychology of Religion, but shall plunge at once into the consideration of certain problems which it raises for the religious mind. A degree of familiarity with the facts and recognition of the problems we may take for granted on the part of educated Christians at the present day, and proceed at once to inquire what has been done toward solving some of the latter.

I. The first problem raised by the study of religious psychology, as by the History of Religions, arises from the recognition of the *variety* of religious experience. Like other sciences, the Psychology of Religion begins by recognizing diverse types. Biology began, in the days of Aristotle, with the classification of animals by species; Chemistry, much later, discovered the elements; Astronomy, even in its primitive stage, distinguished classes of celestial bodies, some 'fixed,' some planetary or 'wandering'; similarly Psychology of Religion begins by noting the existence of various types of religious experience, some of them abnormal, but many of the most diverse remaining thoroughly 'normal' and common. A whole gamut or spectrum of spiritual qualities is

identified, possessed in greater or less degree by all religious persons; it is only the excessive or superlative possession of one or more qualities that results in classification according to this or that or the other type. The legalist, the worldly-minded, the 'once-born,' the 'twice-born,' the convert, the saint, the ecclesiastic, the mystic, the rationalist, the philosophic-minded, the moralist, the ascetic—all these 'characters of men' are found in religion. And even the purest example of one type shares some qualities with others. Just as the biological species overlap: cows and swine have cloven hoofs, cows and horses eat grass; but horses and swine differ alike in food and hoof (phenomena which were noted in early Biology, and patent facts for generations of farmers before Aristotle), so the 'types' of religious experience overlap. Moreover, these types are widely dispersed in the religious world—like the dispersion of biological species over the earth: not all legalists are Hebrews, or vice versa; there are Protestant mystics, and Catholics who have experienced 'justification by faith' in conversion. Although there is assuredly reason for speaking of a 'Catholic' and a 'Protestant' type of piety, of the 'mysticism' of the Friends, and of a 'Unitarian' type of ethical idealism, still no one religious body enjoys a monopoly of the combinations of qualities symbolized by these 'types.' In a word, there is no strict uniformity in religious experience, not even so much as there is in the bio-

logical sphere—not to mention the mechanical uniformity of rocks or crystals. In fact, the higher we rise in the evolutionary scale, the greater the amount of freedom enjoyed, and the consequent greater diversity of experience. If we were to take cross-sections of a dozen Christian congregations in America at the present time, we would no doubt be amazed at the diversity of religious experience, of religious background, of antecedents, presuppositions, beliefs, motives, and of actual religious conduct exhibited. Contrasted moods, temperaments, appeals, conceptions, would strike us at once.

The problem arising from the phenomenon of variety is partly this, How can there be unity in the midst of so much diversity? Is 'religion' a term covering a distinct area of human experience, or is it an arbitrary and artificial category? And partly, also, the problem is the practical one, How can we provide for needs so diverse, in one Church, or even in one religion?

The two-fold answer is, I believe, first, that practical experience proves the category of 'religion' a real one: even while they hated one another the warring sects of earlier days had more in common than either shared with men who took no interest in religion or theology. And today the mystic and the moralist have more in common than either has in common with the wholly non-religious man and woman. Moreover, the diversity in religious experience, so closely paralleling

the diversity in general experience, suggests an approximation to universality of the religious classification. That is to say, every human being is at least potentially the subject of religious experience. One might parody the Roman dramatist's line:<sup>4</sup> "I am a man, and therefore nothing *religious* is foreign to me"; or, with perhaps equal truth, "I am a religious man, and therefore nothing *human* is alien to me."

Secondly, the type of worship and 'religious work,' instruction and activity promoted by the religious group ought to make provision for the various needs of different religious 'types.' Just because a clergyman is keenly interested in social reform is no reason why a whole parish should be forced to accommodate itself to a religion of civic moralism; or just because he himself is attracted to the study of mysticism it is not fair for him to narrow the religious life of a community down to 'the practice of the interior life.' The Episcopal Church frankly claims to possess the note of catholicity, and rightly scorns the title of 'sect' as one might resent an opprobrious epithet. By the same token no finer substantiation of its claim could be made than the practical one of provision for the religious needs of 'all sorts and conditions of men.' To do so requires a high degree of sympathy, versatility, and understanding, of both knowledge and skill, in her spiritual leaders. This is, of course, no easy task; but what is the minis-

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<sup>4</sup> Terence, *Heauton Timoroumenos*, I. i. 25.

try for, unless to attempt the difficult but not impossible task of serving as well as saving the souls of all kinds of men and women and children? By its very principle of catholicity, as opposed to sectarianism, the Anglican Church is committed to the attempt. In place of rigid uniformity, the Church must allow and indeed must cultivate diversity in the expression of its worship, thought, and activity.

II. Assuming a general agreement to this proposal—a proposal that is at the same time theoretical and practical, as a practical proposal based upon a theory—let us go on, with the way now clear before us, to discuss two aspects of this diversity, *viz.*, variety in *origins* and diversity in *goals*.

How does religious experience begin? What makes a man religious? Is there a religious 'instinct,' discoverable in every child of Adam? Is 'once-born' religion really religious? Or is a conversion necessary, or some degree of inward illumination, before the life of religion begins to stir in the soul? Such are the questions that now concern us.

I shall not try to describe the experience of conversion in the technical language of psychologists. Instead, let me simply observe that careful modern study of the phenomenon seems to make it clear that:

(a) It is very largely an *adolescent* experi-

ence, only infrequently occurring before or after this period.

(b) It comes, in some measure, as the result of *expectation*; social suggestion prompts it, *i.e.*, the theory held by the community or congregation or family of the subject, according to which conversion is the normal thing and therefore highly desirable.

(c) Its outward accompaniments are variable, its inner *content* more or less uniform: it involves a deep sense of sin, of weakness, and unworthiness, followed by an 'acceptance' of salvation, and this in turn is followed by a new sense of power, capacity, and progress, often with a positive and noticeable improvement in character and a real 'integration of personality.'

(d) But these *same results* may be obtained without going through the catastrophic and emotionally disturbing process of conversion; at least, the transition to integration may be made far easier if the previous experience of the subject has been wholesome, or, we might say, normally religious, without too much doctrinal emphasis on sin, death, hell, and expiation, and without abandonment to moral laxity or intellectual indifference.

(e) It can scarcely be forgotten that the crises of conversion usually occur in *two peaks* of early and later adolescence, and that these two periods are not unrelated to the sexual development of the subject. If, as we believe, the sexual

life may be orderly and wholesome in its development, certainly we shall be likely to agree that the mental coefficient of this process may be equally 'normal' and wholesome. And this we believe to be possible if the ultra-emotional type of religion is sufficiently discouraged or restrained, if the community ceases to set up a social standard of expectancy of conversion, if the religion of the child is sufficiently cultivated, and if certain grotesque and abhorrent emphases in our theological inheritance (both mediaeval and Protestant) are frankly abandoned. Among these are the notion of an 'unforgivable' sin, the elaborated doctrines of 'original sin,' 'eternal damnation,' 'the second death,' 'the fall of man,' and the like—doctrines taken over by early Christianity from earlier Judaism or paganism (or from paganism by way of Judaism), but simply irreconcilable with the gospel of infinite divine Love.<sup>5</sup>

This whole entanglement of ideas is worse complicated by the popular identification of 'original sin' with concupiscence,<sup>6</sup> largely under the influence of the Fifty-first Psalm.<sup>7</sup> The Church in reality owes nothing to this primitive, Judaized

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<sup>5</sup> This whole cycle of ideas was of fundamental importance in the systems of Augustine and Calvin. It is remarkable that although the systems have lost their hold upon modern orthodox religious thought, the terms and even the ideas they enshrine live on. The spiritual facts or 'states' symbolized by these ideas are no doubt real; but the emphasis given them, and the elaborated, often grotesque, form, were simply incompatible with the gospel of Christ.

<sup>6</sup> *Articles of Religion*, Art. ix.

<sup>7</sup> Psalm li. 5.

pagan theory of psychology, biology, and ethics—as is already partly recognized in the omission of the often misinterpreted phrase of the Baptismal Office from the Revised Prayer Book, “Forasmuch as all men are conceived and born in sin.”<sup>8</sup> The modern scientific, *i.e.*, biological and psychological, account of the sex-urge and of the way to its mastery is, I believe, far cleaner, sounder, and more wholesome than the traditional Hebrew-Christian, monastic, and Augustinian theory, and far more in accordance with the ethics of our Lord. One can scarcely avoid the feeling that early Christianity took over altogether too much of traditional material from two sources, *viz.*, from the social and ethical outlook of earlier Hebraism and from that of the surrounding Graeco-Roman world. Great as is the contrast between Hebraism and the Canaanite, Phoenician, and Babylonian cultures, it at the same time suffered from its contact with them. In a word, all Semitic religion was somewhat ‘over-sexed’—we may note how sex runs through the whole of the Old Testament legislation. Moreover, during the early Christian centuries the Church was definitely influenced by its environment; it grew up in the hot-bed of declining Hellenistic civilization; and civilization in its decline is apt to suffer from a warped attitude toward sex.

The clean, cool, humane estimate of sex

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *The Revision of the Book of Common Prayer*, Milwaukee, 1925, p. 202.



which modern science encourages, I for one believe is far more in accordance with the religious view of human life and its destiny than the more primitive one with which Christianity has labored unsuccessfully for many centuries. Once this is instated in the popular mind in place of the old and false tradition, the religious life of coming generations of young people will be far more wholesome than, alas, it has too often been in the past and is even in the present.<sup>9</sup>

To sum up this point, the emphasis upon conversion in American Protestantism, which made possible the statistical studies of Starbuck and other pioneers in religious psychology, and occupied so great an amount of William James' attention, is a passing one. The sooner it ceases to occupy the forefront of attention the better for the study of religion, and for its practice.<sup>10</sup>

Here also, then, the solution of the problem is a practical one: we must substitute wholesome,

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<sup>9</sup> One further incidental but important result will be the weakening of the case for identifying religion and 'sex'—an identification now so common, thanks to the Freudians, that Mr. Thouless devotes a whole chapter to it. Cf. *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, by Robert H. Thouless, 1925, Ch. x.—By the 'biological' view of sex I do not at all mean the scurrilous theories exploited by some of our contemporaries in the present riot of 'sex literature.' I mean the recognition of the fact of sex in life, its importance, its perfectly normal features and accompaniments, both physical and mental, and the necessity for as clear and open a handling of it as of any other physiological or psychological fact or phenomenon.

<sup>10</sup> The survival of the older emphasis is to be seen in such an episode as this: the writer was recently asked to address a group of young men on 'some phase of religious experience.' Upon my arrival I discovered that I was expected to speak on some aspect of *conversion*!

sane religion for the unbalanced, fanatical, emotional religion which has been so common in America since 1800. The Church has a great task before it in this regard.<sup>11</sup> Conversion is a type of experience quite necessary in the lives of some individuals, no doubt. But it is not thereby proved to be a normal stage or event in human progress. The child religious subject may develop into the adult religious subject with perfect normality, without ever passing through the throes and agonies of 'conviction, contrition, conversion.'<sup>12</sup>

Professor Paterson, as we have seen, distinguishes three stages which are observable in practically every higher religion: those of the natural man, the convert, and the saint.<sup>13</sup> What we must recognize is that religion is real at each of these stages. A 'once-born' religious man may be just as religious as the 'twice-born.' Indeed, I have known some 'once-born' men whose religion I thought considerably higher, more wholesome, more genuinely and steadily in touch with God, more dominant over the rest of their motives,

<sup>11</sup> All the more so now that popular critics are destroying confidence in the emotional, 'revivalistic' type of religion, without, however, distinguishing false emphases from true, the aberration from the norm. On the importance of conversion as a continued process, see K. E. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, 1920, pp. 49 f.

<sup>12</sup> Far more normal and wholesome than the evangelical 'three C's' is the series set forth in *Moral Theology*: 'repentance, confession, restitution.'

<sup>13</sup> *The Nature of Religion*, Chh. ii., viii., etc.—See the preceding lecture for the application of this classification to the History of Religions.

than the religion of more than one 'convert' whom I have come to know.

Now that we have somewhat evened up this one-sided emphasis upon one phase of religious experience, what are we to say of the origins of religion in the individual? Does he share a general predisposition to religion—what the German investigators call the religious *Anlage*, and which is clearly implied in Professor Otto's doctrine of 'the religious *a priori*'?<sup>14</sup> One cannot, of course, answer this question by deductive logic until he has framed a satisfactory definition of religion. With such a definition in hand, he should then need only to accumulate empirical observations, or logically correlate his definition with other defined qualities of 'human nature.' But such a procedure is out of the question at present. There exists no generally accepted definition of religion which can be so applied.<sup>15</sup> We are left, then, to a general surmise or working hypothesis (which is the one the Church has assumed all along), namely the supposition that all men have at least the capacity for a religious life, though the degree of its development must sometimes be measured on a minute scale. To date, only rare examples have been found of men apparently entirely devoid of 'the religious sense,' and most of them

<sup>14</sup> *The Idea of the Holy*, Ch. xiv. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 47. I must dissent from Mr. Kirk's view of 'once-born religion' set forth on p. 60.

<sup>15</sup> Though contrast Prof. H. H. Gowen in *Anglican Theological Review*, ix. 434; and Thouless, *op. cit.*, Ch. i.

have been either abnormal or arrested in mental, social, or physical development.

If the modern Psychology of Religion is correct, and in this it has the support of the History of Religions, the beginnings of religion are traceable to the root-feeling of reverence, or awe, the response to 'awareness of God,' and from it springs the motive to worship. I once had an excellent illustration of this in the words of a young friend who described his earliest religious impression as follows: "My earliest conception of God was of a perfectly holy and beautiful Being somehow connected with St. Luke's Church." There is much in such a testimony for the student of religion to ponder, and also for the pastor. In it were blended the impressions of Holiness and Beauty, to which the mind responded in reverence; God was localized, in a church whose architecture, services, music, ceremonial, all provided an air of mystery and majesty. "Surely the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not"<sup>20</sup>—until I discovered Him! William James was perfectly right: the roots of the religious life are not "high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning," but "prayer, guidance and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt"—reverence, mingled awe and love, worship. As Professor Otto observes it in its history, religion springs from man's response to the *numinous*, *i.e.*, the Deity present and localized, who is at one and the

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<sup>20</sup> Genesis xxviii. 16.

same time tremendous or awe-inspiring and also attractive: *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. Moses in the desert 'turns aside' to see the bush that burns but is not consumed; he reverently takes off his shoes, as he is standing on holy ground; but he cannot escape the compelling attraction of the mystery—it is '*fascinating*.'<sup>17</sup> Simon the fisher falls down at Jesus' feet and cries out, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!'—though he could not have endured the thought of himself departing from Christ.<sup>18</sup> Jacob on the mountain wrestles with the angel, but at the same time cries, 'I will not let thee go, except thou bless me!'<sup>19</sup> Again and again it is the same. Not rationality alone, which is largely secondary, not speculation, which is often an after-thought, but something primary and 'irrational,'<sup>20</sup> like love and hunger and curiosity—this is the real root or first sprouting of the seed of religion in the soul.

Some persons may conclude at this point that

<sup>17</sup> Exodus iii. 1-6.

<sup>18</sup> Luke v. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Genesis xxxii. 26.

<sup>20</sup> That is, non-rational, not anti-rational: cf. *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 36; *Aufsätze das Numinose Betreffend*, Essay xii. There are no doubt some who will assume that if religion is 'deeper than thinking' it must be emotion. But this category is not exhaustive, if we listen to what the mystics have to say. There is something deeper than emotion, the vital stuff of which living experience is made, to which emotion responds, and which reason attempts to analyze (not always with entire success). The profoundest mystics are very clear about this: the 'moment of intelligence,' as Augustine called it, may be as completely unaccompanied by feeling as by rational thought. (It must be admitted, however, that few of them were analytical psychologists: and that 'absence of feeling' may itself be a rare or refined type of emotion.) Doubtless no one can understand this unless he has himself experienced it.

since religion grows out of such crude beginnings it may well be discarded, as having served its purpose, when mature years are reached and with the growth of reflection, or when the individual has arrived at a state of rational, moral autonomy. But we need only remind ourselves that the origin of a thing is no measure of its final purpose or inherent capacities—a rule that holds good throughout evolution; and also that the higher development often almost completely sunders itself from the beginnings (*e.g.*, the development of the human organism from embryo to man). Who would discard love because it grew out of sexual attraction and has served a biological end? Who would discard curiosity because even sub-human species possess it in marked degree, when modern history has proved its almost limitless capacity for refinement in scientific research and invention? Or who would refuse an invitation to dine simply because primitive man tore off the raw, warm flesh of dying animals and gorged himself in company with his fellows? However crude and elemental the beginnings of religion, in society or in the individual—and they are not nearly so ‘crude’ as many rationalists represent—we cannot think of identifying the whole of religion with them. For not only in the historic past, but also in the present life of the individual, a vast evolutionary process has been and still is taking place, with the emergence of new powers and capacities, new ranges of thought and feeling. Goethe was not

wrong when he called this primitive awe 'man's best part.'

*Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil.*<sup>21</sup>

In it lay implicit the whole promise of man's higher development.

In the second place, the practical application is obvious. If our services of worship, our pastoral and educational work, our ministry to 'all sorts and conditions of men,' are to take into account the diversity of religious experience, they must also provide for the continuance and nurture of that element in religion really most basic to its experience, *viz.*, reverence.<sup>22</sup> Our services must be services of *worship*, worship of a present and not absent God, of communion and adoration and self-oblation. The kind we sometimes provide—cheerful gatherings in the interest of social service, unceasing stimulus to moral behavior, prophetic inspiration to civic righteousness, and so on—are altogether too narrow. The Church must be a garden of saints as well as a weekly lecture club for the promotion of social righteousness. We argue for and against services of Adoration and Benediction on theological or canonical or other grounds, not realizing half the time that the

<sup>21</sup> *Faust*, Part II, Act i, sc. iv. Cf. Wordsworth: 'We live by Admiration, Hope, and Love' (*Excursion* iv); and Psalm cxi. 10.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Otto, *Aufsätze*, pp. 49 f. The author makes a strong plea for objectivity in worship—for hymns referring to God in the third person ('*Er-Lieder*') rather than the too-frequent second person ('*Du-Lieder*'). Certainly many of our hymnals need revision upon a similar principle. Cf. *Anglican Theological Review*, x. 393.

thing those services mean in the lives of men is often the deepest and most living of all the roots of man's higher life: *viz.*, opportunity to abase themselves in humble reverence before the eternal mystery of the Love of God. If on theological or rubrical or other grounds we cannot allow the use of such services, then others must be provided to fill this need; at the very least, greater provision must be made for its satisfaction in such services as we do hold to be theologically and rubrically proper.

III. Closely related to the problem of the various origins of religion is that of its diverse *goals*; and this likewise has its theoretical and its practical sides. Perhaps in part as a result of its varied origins, religion has set up a variety of goals which run through a long gamut from tribal or community welfare to the mystic's rapt contemplation of the Divine Nature.

(a) We can see, *e.g.*, in Judaism a great *legalistic* religion developing out of primitive tribal sanctions and requirements: a code of ceremonial and social rules and taboos, gradually rising in eminence out of the patriarchal or nomadic stage until finally the religion embraced the noblest ethics to be found anywhere in the world of its time. All along, its object was the welfare of the community. 'Torah' was the revelation of God's will, God's requirements, but also of His loving-kindness and purposes of grace for Israel.



The covenant idea was fundamental. The Law was a social bond between God and Israel. Its goal was the perfect fulfilment of the Law of God by every member of the community—a goal which was finally transferred by the apocalyptists to 'the age to come' and ideally realized in the Kingdom of God. In Judaism the individual never stood as a lone integer; he was always one unit in the divine plan for 'all Israel,' *i.e.*, for Israel as a whole.

(b) Somewhat related in conception is the goal of religion as set forth by contemporary American and European *social idealism* and 'liberal' Christianity. It is no 'religion of the state' as in ancient Greece and Rome or as in mediaeval theory; Church and State are wisely kept apart. Yet the goal of religion is conceived in terms of social welfare, progress, and achievement. Its ethics tend to become social ethics pure and simple. The individual is called to 'lose himself' in social service. Its deepest motive is 'the social passion.' Mysticism, sacraments, dogmas, ecclesiastical organization—all these lose importance in view of the grand aim of saving society for a better life, *viz.*, the 'good life' of the citizen. One must be blind if he fails to recognize the significance of this contemporary movement, or to reckon with its appeal to many of the best minds in America and Europe to-day.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Its extreme outcome may be seen in 'Humanism,' the non-theistic religion of an ultra-left-wing Unitarian group, whose attitude toward God is one of 'questful seeking.' Cf. C. W. Reese, *Humanism*, 1926.

(c) Far less attractive to the modern mind is the religion of *individual piety*, which we may study historically in Puritanism, Pietism, and—much earlier—in Monasticism. We are all aware of the contemporary criticism of this ideal, *viz.*, its subjectivism or ‘individualism,’ its unconcern with social problems and needs such as poverty and hygiene, its historical association (in Puritanism) with bourgeois economics and social ethics,<sup>24</sup> its narrow and exclusive concern with ‘personal salvation’ and private progress in the life of piety. However, there was strength in that type of religion, and its goal must in some degree forever remain a real one for the human soul. ‘What doth it profit a man to gain the whole world’—even a hygienic, eugenic, and economically wasteless world—‘and lose his own soul’?<sup>25</sup>

(d) Allied to this is the goal of *sacramental* religion, *viz.*, union with God, appropriation of the divine life and nature with its immortality and power, its holiness and purity. On the large scale we see this in historical Catholicism, in the mystery religions, and even in phases of Protestantism where the Catholic tradition still survives—to name only factors in the history of Western religion. Its strength is real and its goal alluring; one may place it definitely higher than the goal of ‘social Christianity,’ with which, however, it is fortunately often combined.

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926.

<sup>25</sup> Mark viii. 36.

(e) Another goal of religion is the *mystical*, whose disciples would (very often) dispense with sacraments, Bible, and the whole of the social contacts and machinery of religion. It is rarer in its manifestations, but a real goal for an increasing number of Christians at the present time. Historically it is to be studied on the large scale in Hinduism, Sûfism, Neoplatonism, Eastern and Western Catholicism, and even in phases of Protestantism. A kind of nature-mysticism, wholly or partially divorced from Christianity, is fairly common here in America at the present time, due in some measure to the influence of R. W. Emerson and to those writers whom he directly influenced, and also to the spread of 'New Thought' and kindred cults.<sup>26</sup>

Now the problem arises, from even so brief a survey of the diversity of goals in religion, How is religious unity possible? How can religion be one? How can one religion—or Church—satisfy the longings of men who, each from his own point of view, expect religion—or the Church—to safeguard and guarantee or at least pursue these diverse goals?

I see no solution of this problem short of the recognition (already suggested) of a scale of values in religion, a scale of gradations in reality, each of which is somehow related to the whole,

<sup>26</sup> For an excellent and readable survey of contemporary religious thought, chiefly in America, see G. B. Smith, *Current Christian Thinking*, Chicago, 1928; also G. G. Atkins, *Modern Religious Cults and Movements*, New York, 1923.

though each—except the highest—is subordinate to others higher in rank. An alternative would be a frank pluralism, according to which each might maintain its right independently of the others, and in which final truth (by a kind of superlative pragmatism) would be only a matter of successful competition. If Hinduism, or Christianity, or any other religion, ends the struggle at some distant date by winning over the remaining adherents of all the other faiths, then it will have proved its claim to be the one true religion!

But without attempting to settle this problem of the finality of any one historical religion—which is after all scarcely a matter for logical demonstration—what shall be said of these varied goals as they are set before individuals whom we know, the men and women in our congregations?

Since the goals of religion are more or less related to its origins and social backgrounds (legalism to tribal society, State religion to imperialism, social idealism to democracy, pietism to social pessimism, and so on), the same solution may hold here as for the problem of variety. That is, the Church must try to conserve and synthesize the best elements in each. 'Gather up the fragments which remain, that nothing be lost'<sup>27</sup> might almost be taken as the motto of historical or Catholic Christianity, which was in a true sense a synthetic religion, gathering up the best of its

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<sup>27</sup> John vi. 72.

double inheritance from Judaism and Hellenism.<sup>28</sup> What we should try to avoid, it would seem, is a narrow and one-sided devotion to any one goal, exclusive of all others. Religion is too rich and varied a human product to do this and retain its full strength. In a word, our ideal must be catholic, whether with or without a capital 'C.' Provision must be made for the man whose religion naturally flows out into social service, and also for the man whose religion takes a mystical bent; for the intellectualist, the pietist, the moralist, and the philanthropist. At the same time we must endeavor to make sure that each understands (in some measure) and appreciates the others, and thus avoid narrowing down the Church to an exclusive sect, banishing from its doors (officially or otherwise) those whose view of religion does not harmonize with that of the majority—if there is a majority! 'Separation for opinion's sake' was Matthew Arnold's definition of the essence of sectarianism.<sup>29</sup> We do not want that. Instead, we want a truly catholic, truly inspiring, because living, truly varied and comprehensive Christianity, in which all men everywhere may find their spiritual home and the sustainer of their hopes.

IV. The problem of religious knowledge, *i.e.*, of the validity of religious experience and its epistemological value, has been treated with remark-

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<sup>28</sup> See the essay, 'Hellenism in Christianity,' in *The Church in the World*, by W. R. Inge, 1927 (reprinted from *The Legacy of Greece*).

<sup>29</sup> *St. Paul and Protestantism*, p. xi.

able skill and insight by Mr. Thouless, in his admirable *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*.<sup>30</sup> Does the psychological interpretation of the processes of religious knowledge and experience end in disproving the truth of religion? We scarcely know enough of psychological processes to enable us to say that psychology 'provides us with an explanation of the desires, thoughts, feelings, etc., of anybody.'<sup>31</sup> Of course, religious experience in itself and taken alone cannot claim to possess objective validity, nor does the way in which particular Christian doctrines fulfill mental needs prove their truth.

"The reduction of religious dogma to wish-fulfilment—the belief in God to the demand for a perfect lover or for the parent, the belief in immortality to the demand for continued personal existence and for the survival of those we love, and so on—cannot in itself be a valid logical argument against religion, for it would only be effective as evidence against religious truth if the hypothesis of the reality of God were ruled out on other grounds."<sup>32</sup>

Though no claim can be made of overwhelming proofs, such as may be made for mathematical processes, the strength of the testimony of religious experience lies in the convergence of hypotheses required to explain not only it but also the facts of history, of moral experience, and of nature generally. The truth of religion means the

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, Ch. xvii, 'General Considerations.'

<sup>31</sup> *Ib.*, p. 261.

<sup>32</sup> *Ib.*, p. 265.

rationalizing of more ranges of experience than just the religious.

"If the God revealed by religious experience is found to be, in fact, the God required by the moral consciousness, and to be the God required to explain the world as we find it, and to be the God revealed in historical Christianity, then the probability that each of these largely independent lines of approach to God is based on error becomes small. The probability that the concordant result of all four expresses some real insight into objective reality becomes proportionately great."<sup>33</sup>

I would supplement this position and modify it, if at all, by reference to Dr. Otto's exposition of the theory of the 'religious *a priori*,' to which frequent reference has already been made. Religious knowledge is not just an *inference* from religious experience, nor is it merely hypothesis: it is itself *given* in experience. That is, religious experience is the only stuff of which religious knowledge is made—just as our experience of the external world provides the sole material for our knowledge of it.<sup>34</sup> What takes place in the mind, if Kant is right, is a classification by means of categories which already exist, *i.e.*, exist *a priori*: although (if we hearken to what contemporary realists and many psychologists affirm) these latent categories are called into active, functioning existence only by the experience into which we

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<sup>33</sup> *Ib.*, p. 282.

<sup>34</sup> See Prof. E. S. Drown's lecture, *Religion or God?*, Harvard, 1927.

plunge upon our arrival in human society. Now for religious experience as a part of our general experience a similar situation is to be found, whether religious categories exist *a priori*, as Otto insists, or are only awakened by and in experience. The man who experiences God does not need to be told that it is *God* whom he experiences. He is no more confused, except in rare cases, than he is between what really happened yesterday and what he only imagined—though here also, of course, there are cases of confusion.

The first test of the validity of religious experience is the one William James proposed, in words borrowed from our Lord: "By their fruits ye shall know them."<sup>35</sup> That is, so to speak, a pragmatic test. At the same time, or in fact prior to this working test, there is the assurance of immediacy and certainty, a kind of intuitive certainty, given in the experience, which, if not for others, is certainly valid for the experiencing subject. "Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him."<sup>36</sup> "We speak that we do know . . . and ye receive not our witness"<sup>37</sup>—but the speaker's own confidence is not thereby disturbed. This accompanying intuitive certainty, or feeling of reality, is just as real as that by which normal persons distinguish ordinary sensuous experience from fancies, dreams, or memories.

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<sup>35</sup> *Varieties*, pp. 237, 327. Matthew vii. 20.

<sup>36</sup> Job xiii. 15.

<sup>37</sup> John iii. 11.



"Whoso hath felt the Spirit of the Highest  
Cannot confound nor doubt Him nor deny:  
Yea, with one voice, O world, tho' thou deniest,  
Stand thou on that side, for on this am I. . . .

"Who that one moment has the least descried Him,  
Dimly or faintly, hidden and afar,  
Doth not despise all excellence beside Him,  
Pleasures and powers that are not and that are,—

"Aye, amid all men bear himself thereafter  
Smit with a solemn and a sweet surprise,  
Dumb to their scorn, and turning on their laughter  
Only the dominance of earnest eyes."<sup>28</sup>

Frederic Myers has described in these words that type of 'absolute consciousness' which we find not only in St. Paul, but in all prophets, mystics, and true seers, in our Lord, and in every man whose religious experience is first-hand and real. For him there is no problem of epistemology; he does not 'choose to believe'—rather, he cannot choose but to believe. The problem exists for second-hand or inferential religion, or for the academic investigation of its phenomena; and as such—*i.e.*, the latter—it is our problem. How far is the prophet's vision transferable to us? You may think me unduly sceptical, but I must admit that I do not think it transferable at all without some accompanying share in the same kind of experience; it cannot be authoritative for us unless on similar grounds it comes as 'the vision of the

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<sup>28</sup> F. W. H. Myers, *St. Paul*, pp. 44 ff.

Highest'; and I would even say that it does not remain *religious* if transferred in any other way. "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself."<sup>39</sup> "He that is of God heareth God's words."<sup>40</sup> The religious preparation is all-important. And herein lies involved the whole problem of religious authority. As the fourteenth century author of the *Theologia Germanica* clearly put it,

"All the great works and wonders that God has ever wrought or shall ever work in or through His creatures, or even God himself with all His goodness, so far as these things exist or are done outside of me, can never make me blessed, but only in so far as they exist and are done and loved, known, tasted, and felt within me."<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> John vii. 17.

<sup>40</sup> John viii. 47.

<sup>41</sup> *Theologia Germanica*, ix (tr. Swanwick).

## VI. THE NEW BIBLE

SOME YEARS AGO Mr. H. G. Wells published a series of articles entitled, 'The Bible of Civilization.'<sup>1</sup> He suggested that a Bible, some kind of a Bible, is a valuable institution in society; it embodies the traditional beliefs and standards of men, the generally accepted view of the origins of the world and of the human race, its long backgrounds of history, its religious outlook and its ethical standards. Such a book is especially important as a factor in social solidarity, particularly in the instruction of youth, for it is designed to exhibit and hand on the religious-ethical tradition of the race. Almost all nations and religions have had their 'Bibles,' their collections of sacred literature—a vast steadying and sustaining influence in the course of their cultural continuity. He also suggested that the time has come to revise or perhaps entirely supplant the ancient Hebrew-Christian Bible of Western civilization, and provide one in which our modern view of terrestrial and human origins, of the beginnings of history and its general development, our own religious outlook and ethical standards, should receive expres-

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<sup>1</sup> Published in the *Saturday Evening Post* and *London Sunday Times*; later as Chh. iv.-v. in *The Salvaging of Civilization*, 1921.

sion. In place of Genesis, let us have a story of beginnings drawn from up-to-date astronomy, geology, biology, and anthropology. In place of Exodus, Joshua, Judges, Kings, and Chronicles, let us have a simple, compendious account of the history of all races and peoples, showing the rise of modern civilization. In place of the ritual, social, and moral law of the Jewish Torah, let us have a clear statement of the elementary doctrines of justice and right as they apply to the common life of the world we know. In place of the Hebrew Psalms, an anthology of the world's best religious poetry—and so on. As far as I recall, these were among the suggestions made by Mr. Wells in the articles described: a series which appeared some time before his famous *Outline of History*, and which unkind critics might possibly have come later to view as a covert announcement or preparation of the market for that really important work!

At the very least, Mr. Wells' critics might have argued, he recognized the importance of the old Hebrew-Christian Book as the 'Bible of Civilization'—of Western, European, certainly of Anglo-Saxon civilization—up to the present time. The very proposal of a substitute was an admission of the place the Bible had held in the life and thought of a large part of mankind in the past. To this implicit tribute might be added the testimony of many other writers, who have traced the influence of that Book in the civilization of the

Western world during the past nineteen or twenty centuries.<sup>2</sup> It mitigated the severity of Roman Law; it tempered the savagery of the rude northern peoples; it gave to the common man, either directly as in Protestantism or indirectly, through worship, statuary, music, architecture, and the other arts, as in Catholicism, a conception of God quite superior to those of the gods of our early European ancestors; it created standards in literature, especially through the Vulgate, the Lutheran, and the authorized English versions, which have been reflected in the poetry and prose of many nations; it gave to men a kind of philosophy of history, and a view of world-origins and world-destiny, far transcending in mystery and significance the generalizations of tribal legend and folk-lore which were to be found among the ancient Celtic and Teutonic tribes, or even among the enlightened Greeks and Italians.

The importance of this Hebrew-Christian Bible in the past cannot be questioned. The real question concerns its adequacy in the present. Has it not been outgrown? Can this one Book continue to supply the Western world—and eventually the whole world—with the outlook, backgrounds, standards of thought, feeling, and conduct, which are requisite for facing life today? Mr. Wells, and with him I am inclined to think an increasing number of thoughtful men, answer, No. Nor are such critics of the Bible to be found only outside

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. von Dobschütz, *The Influence of the Bible on Civilization*.

the ranks of professed believers and members of the churches. Religious journals reflect from time to time the impatience of the younger generation with the 'Jewish' features in the Christian tradition—at least this impatience is attributed to the younger generation, with what degree of fairness I am not entirely able to make out: it may be that in some measure it has been suggested by their elders! The late William Austin Smith wrote an editorial, which has since been more than once reprinted, on 'Judaizing the Argument,' in which he appealed to readers of the *Churchman* to free Christianity from its historical Jewish entanglements, as a religion *sui generis*, and no longer to be fitly arrayed in what I think Carlyle called Christianity's 'Jewish old clothes.' In a recent popular novel, the students in a theological seminary are described as filled with scorn for the religion and God of the Old Testament.<sup>3</sup> All His other features, of love, compassion, mercy, and long-suffering, are obliterated in the picture of that primitive God, Yahweh, a god of wrath, of war and battle, of vengeance and destruction, the smoke of whose nostrils hides his face in mystery and horror.<sup>4</sup> How can such a god be in any sense identified with the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, or with the God of Love presupposed in the New Testament? How can the sacred books

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<sup>3</sup> *Elmer Gantry*, by Sinclair Lewis.

<sup>4</sup> II Samuel xxii. 9. Cf. P. Volz, *Das Dämonische in Jahwe*, Tübingen, 1924.

of His religion be looked upon as in any sense inspired or 'profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness,' and capable of making any one 'wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus'?<sup>5</sup> The Old Testament religion is represented as one of fear, of hatred, of intolerance, of a commercial arrangement between Yahweh and his worshippers, according to which they pay tithes and offerings and He in turn guarantees protection and prosperity; both its ethics and its religion are outgrown and meaningless. Of what value, then, is the Old Testament to men and women in the modern world, even—or perhaps especially—to Christian men and women, who are pledged to a way of peace, love, gentleness, and self-sacrifice, and whose religion is one of spiritual aspiration and ethical progress, not of animal sacrifice and ceremonial cultus? Hence in the name of Christianity itself, of pure, spiritual religion, we are told that the Old Testament must be discarded as having no further practical value.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> II Timothy iii. 15 f.

<sup>6</sup> It is of course not sufficient to reply to this argument that the Bible as a whole is inspired, and therefore permanent; though there are some teachers of religion at the present day who seem to assume that this kind of 'blanket-policy' will insure its integrity and authority. For we need only point out that the whole conception of inspiration and of external authority upon which it is based is waning in influence and is itself in need of support. Nor, by the same token, can the Christian doctrines founded upon or derived from the Bible be taken as supporting its inspiration or authority. For this is an 'argument in a circle'; and a religious faith *entirely* founded upon authority has already lost touch with modern thought to an utterly hopeless degree.

In the next place, if the Old Testament goes into the discard—and along with it the Apocrypha (or rather, following the Apocrypha, in Protestantism since the Reformation)—then it is an easy step to discard the New as well. This step has no doubt been unconsciously encouraged by the very protagonists of inspiration, who refused to draw any distinction between Old and New Testaments in point of their inspiration or authority; the 'whole Bible' was the Word of God, and it stood or fell as one, like the two tables of the Law, which were both destroyed when flung from the angry prophet's hands.<sup>7</sup> As the Old Testament has been criticized for its 'Jewishness' (a term quite unfair and thoroughly question-begging), so at least parts of the New Testament have been objected to for the same reason: 'Paul the Pharisee,' 'a Hebrew of Hebrews,' 'of the tribe of Benjamin,' 'as touching the law blameless,'<sup>8</sup> was converted to Christianity by a mystic vision; but he never knew Jesus 'after the flesh,'<sup>9</sup> and his version of Christianity was Jewish from the start. It was he who saddled the notions of Atonement, Propitiation, Justification, Original Sin, Human Depravity, Predestination, and the like, upon the infant Church; and his baneful influence has prevailed through all the later centuries, giving rise to innumerable controversies and casting a sickly pall of Judaic theology over the pure, spiritual, and ethical religion of Jesus of

<sup>7</sup> Exodus xxxii. 19.    <sup>8</sup> Philippians iii. 5 f.    <sup>9</sup> II Corinthians v. 16.



Nazareth! We can go even further, for traces of Paul's influence are to be found in other writings of the New Testament; whereupon they likewise fall under the same condemnation. Moreover, the Gospel of Matthew is a 'Jewish' Gospel, containing the doctrines of legalism, of the Second Advent, and of an incipient ecclesiasticism; and the Epistle to Hebrews presupposes a wholly Jewish outlook, the sacrificial system of the Old Testament combined with a modified, Alexandrian-Jewish Platonism, neither of which makes for its understanding by modern readers. The Apocalypse of John, of course, is already recognized as practically meaningless for all but fanatical millenarians,<sup>10</sup> while the later Johannine literature, especially the Gospel, is keyed to a philosophy which (so it is assumed!) no one now takes seriously. It is evident that if 'Jewishness,' or indebtedness to the Old Testament, or expression in ancient forms of thought, is a disqualification, we shall have hard work salvaging any part of the New Testament from its general rejection as uninspired and unauthoritative for modern religion. Some persons would, it is true, maintain that the original gospel of Jesus, His teaching and the narrative of His life as preserved in the Synoptic Gospels, is free from these defects, and stands out vivid and compelling when cleared of its later

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<sup>10</sup> The Jewish elements in the Apocalypse of John are all but universally admitted. Its indebtedness to the Old Testament—to go no further—is apparent on every page.

accretions. But we must admit, upon this point, that present-day scholarship is inclining more and more to emphasize the 'Jewishness' of Jesus, His indebtedness to the religion of His fathers, the circumscription of His outlook by the religious thought and aspiration of His people;<sup>21</sup> and though there was something profoundly new in His teaching, and in His whole life and personality, it was new in a Jewish direction: it did not make Him un-Jewish or range Him among those seers and prophets for whom the past was meaningless, and humanity-in-general, as the Stoics said, their nationality.

It is clear, then, that if 'Jewishness,' or nationalistic particularism, or continuity with the past, disqualifies the Old Testament from forming a part of the inspired and authoritative Bible of mankind, the principle must also be applied to the New; and that if St. Paul is to be discredited and his writings expunged from the New Testament, the process must be carried further and the New Testament as a whole be cast out.

Now what I have said might perhaps be viewed as a *reductio ad absurdum* of this whole process of criticism; whereupon I shall be expected to build up a reasoned defence of the Bible

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<sup>21</sup> So especially R. Bultmann, *Jesus*, Berlin, 1926; the Strack-Billerbeck *Kommentar zum N. T. aus Talmud und Midrasch*, Munich, 1922; J. Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth*, 1925; etc. The 'Eschatological' and 'History of Religions' schools in New Testament criticism are at one on this point of view. Cf. also A. E. J. Rawlinson's Bampton Lectures, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, 1926, esp. Lects. i.-ii.

as a whole. 'Take it or leave it,' some will argue; but do not try to pick and choose; 'the whole Bible or none'; let in sceptical criticism at any point and it infests the whole citadel, and the sacred Book of the ages is destroyed; it is no longer sacred, no longer inspired, no longer authoritative, no longer a 'Holy' Bible. However, I do not believe this is a real solution of our difficulty. Certainly it is no solution of our problem as expounders and teachers of the Faith. Present that alternative to thoughtful modern men and women, and an increasing number will, I believe, refuse to leave the matter there. We can never safeguard religious values by presenting people with sharp-horned logical dilemmas. For a logical dilemma can usually be avoided by a third alternative which the would-be logician overlooks: at worst, by a practical retreat into indifference. Or perhaps there is a half-conscious suspicion that the dilemma is artificial, and that some other and better way can be found through the problem: let us steel our nerves, cast misgivings from our minds, and march straight ahead through the phantom! Hence I propose another and, I believe, a better way of dealing with the problem that confronts us. But first let us glance at the way the problem has been faced hitherto. For it is by no means a new difficulty that we face. It has troubled the Church for centuries, of course in some periods more seriously than in others.

It is a commonplace observation that the Church itself views the Bible differently to-day than it did a hundred years ago. Modern historical and literary criticism has done its work, and it is not likely that we shall ever go back to the naïve, pre-critical view of the sacred literature as all on one dead level, even if a high level, of immediate divine inspiration. There are 'mistakes' in the Bible—not only the 'mistakes of Moses' out of which Col. Robert G. Ingersoll once made capital as a lecturer and propagandist for 'infidelity,' in the stuffy three decades that followed the Civil War. There are not only errors in scientific explanation—or in the explanation of natural phenomena in a pre-scientific age: these we take for granted, to-day, without a qualm; but there are also errors in chronology, both of past and of future events, and even of some that must have been almost contemporary; there are errors in historical perspective, in the portraying of personality and of character, in the analysis of religious and ethical qualities, and even sheer misinterpretations of the religious significance of ideals and of hopes and of every-day events in the lives of the biblical writers. The prophet interprets the will of God as a command to 'hew Agag in pieces';<sup>12</sup> and the apostles understand Christ to anticipate an earthly kingdom with twelve thrones and a millennial reign of the saints upon earth<sup>13</sup>—which latter things never came to pass. Of course, along with

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<sup>12</sup> I Samuel xv. 33.

<sup>13</sup> Matthew xix. 28.

these 'mistakes' and misinterpretations went a high and noble discernment of religious truth, and an interpretation which the religious geniuses of later times have echoed as not false but true, and profound, and infinitely revealing. But it was the mistakes and misinterpretations that gave rise to the problem: an inspired book, men felt, must be wholly free from error; otherwise, its authority as a whole, and in every field, was questionable.

The problem, in fact, is as old as Christianity, and the 'changed' point of view was really implicit from the first. The New Testament is full of criticism of the Old. Our Lord Himself did not scruple to point out the errors of the past: the imperfections of the Law, the contradiction, *e.g.*, between Moses' permission of divorce and the original intention of the Creator.<sup>14</sup> And it is only by an amazing feat of intellectual dexterity that St. Paul retains the authority of the ancient Law along with its abrogation 'in Christ'; the writer of the Epistle to Hebrews frankly admits that the sacrifices under the Old Covenant 'could not take away sin.'<sup>15</sup> St. Mark and the Fourth Gospel agree in viewing the Jewish people as under a divine judgment of blindness—which cannot well be confined to their contemporaries or to the generation that rejected Jesus and put Him to death. The Epistle of Barnabas assumes that the whole scheme of Old Testament worship, with its temple and sacrifices and sacred ministry, was a huge

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<sup>14</sup> Mark x. 5 f.

<sup>15</sup> Hebrews x. 11.

mistake: God never commanded it at all.<sup>16</sup> In the Book of Acts, Stephen is represented as arguing against the validity of the Old Testament restrictions; the wholly spiritual revelation of God had been outraged by the crudity and stubbornness of a nation 'uncircumcised in heart and ears' who 'always resist the Holy Spirit.'<sup>17</sup>

The problem, thus raised, remained, and we see more than one attempt being made in the early Church to deal with it. Marcion and other Gnostics cut the Gordian knot in well-known fashion, by dividing sharply between the two Testaments, ascribing the Old to the hateful God of the Jews, a lesser deity than the God of Love to whom they ascribed the New—a fashion of criticism which, as we have seen, is not yet out of date. On the other hand, Origen and the Alexandrine School, and many others, taking a lead from the great Jewish interpreter Philo, who wrote in the first century, expounded all Scripture by a variety of principles of interpretation, among which was the allegorical. The crudities and barbarisms of the Old Testament were explained away as intended to be allegorically or mystically understood, not literally or historically: a method similar to that by which contemporary Alexandrine scholars, and especially the later Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans, 'interpreted' Homer and the Greek mythology and thus safeguarded the sa-

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<sup>16</sup> *Epistle of Barnabas* ii. 4-10; iii. 6; etc.

<sup>17</sup> Acts vii. 51.

credness and authority of the religious tradition.<sup>18</sup> These principles of interpretation prevailed, and, under modification, were handed down almost to our own time: more than once, in our youth, we heard sermons on the 'types of Christ' in the Old Testament; and the Authorized Version of the Bible still carries the mediaeval allegorization of the Book of Canticles in its chapter and page headings. St. Augustine, more Western than Eastern in his outlook, wrestled with this problem, and his famous dictum is known to us all: "What is latent in the Old Testament becomes patent in the New"<sup>19</sup>—a saying in which, I believe, we can catch one of the first gleams of the new dawn, *i.e.*, of the recognition of development, and with it ultimately the whole historical view of the Bible.

As the Western Church grew in influence and power, and developed a theology, a liturgy, a canon Law, and customs of its own, this attitude toward the Bible received a more definitely Western emphasis. It, of course, did not supplant the Eastern or early Catholic, but characteristically lived on side by side with it. The expositions of Holy Scripture by such Western writers as St. Gregory and St. Bernard, *e.g.*, might have been

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. *The People and the Book*, ed. A. S. Peake, Oxford, 1925, p. 419.

<sup>19</sup> *Quaestiones in Exodum*, lxxiii. There is truth in the charges brought against St. Augustine's exegesis in Dean Farrar's *History of Interpretation*; but the whole truth is not presented. Harnack, in his *History of Dogma*, gives a much fairer and more historical estimate.

written by Orientals; nor must we draw too hard and fast a distinction between East and West <sup>20</sup>—for the great Antiochene and Palestinian scholars, such as Theodore, Eusebius, and Jerome (who lived and wrote in Palestine) were products of the Eastern Church. But the Western emphasis, as we may call it, is clearly traceable after Augustine, whose influence pervaded and well-nigh dominated Latin Christendom for ten centuries and more. For example, the Catholic lectionary was a selected system of readings from the Bible. Not all parts of the Bible were used, nor indeed very long selections. The Epistles and Gospels predominated, on account of their use in the Mass; the Old Testament lesson, which in the East had once preceded these, making three lessons in the liturgy, was either omitted or reduced to a set form (the Decalogue in later Protestant liturgies, or the Psalm *judica me* in the Priest's preparation). In the Breviary offices, likewise, the Psalms were used selectively, and some of them far oftener than others. The contrast between this procedure and the later Protestant and Puritan lectionary, covering indiscriminately the whole Bible, and dividing the Psalter into sixty sections for use twice daily through the month, is perfectly clear. Moreover, not yet have we heard the last of the triumphant Protestant and Puritan claim to have restored the Bible to its rightful

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<sup>20</sup> As was done by the late A. V. G. Allen in his still valuable book, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*.



place, as against the Roman Catholic practice of 'keeping the Bible from the people'!<sup>21</sup>

What I wish to point out is merely the fact that the problems raised by the traditional view of the Bible have been recognized all along; and that tentative or more-or-less accepted solutions, either theoretical or practical, or both, have been put forward almost from the beginning of Christian history. The importance of the Old Testament was recognized from the first—no one has made this clearer than von Harnack, in his *History of Dogma*; but the problems it raised, even from the earliest periods, have been almost insuperable. The practical solution, in the lectionary of the Latin Church, may well seem to us a stroke of instinctive genius; unfortunately, the principle was not carried out with sufficient intelligence or with sufficient historical perspective. But of that we can make no complaint: historical views cannot be demanded of those who do not possess them. Thorough-going historical criticism is, of course, a quite modern achievement.

As we turn now to consider more fully the present situation in the Church we must note that considerable confusion exists. In the Episcopal Church, at the present time, ample latitude is allowed in the interpretation of the Bible; but along with this goes a somewhat ill-designed lec-

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<sup>21</sup> A charge not fully justified by the facts. Cf. J. M. Lenhart, in *Eccles. Review*, lxxviii. 3 (March, 1928), pp. 225-244.

tionary, whose chief defect is its conservatism. It follows too closely the Anglican daily system, with its four lessons; whereas the vast majority of American Churchmen go to church only once a week, and hear only the lessons at Morning Prayer on Sunday. The selections of Epistles and Gospels are in the main the traditional ones; while the Psalter, which by deletion, rearrangement, and selection might be made the most beautiful and inspiring antiphonal form of worship in the world, is still left in almost hopeless disorder—the disorder which is, of course, its traditional order and arrangement, the one in which it has come down to us from post-exilic Judaism.<sup>22</sup>

The confusion is not limited to the practical use of the Bible in public worship; it is to be found also in the minds of those who hear the Bible read, and also of those who are expected to teach or study it in the course of religious education. I even suspect that some of the clergy share this confusion; at least some of us have not decided, for example, just what weight to place on parts of the Old Testament, or just how to relate the modern view of the Fourth Gospel to our presentation of the life and teaching of our Lord. Did the plagues of Egypt take place, or not? Was the ritual-ceremonial Law of the Jews of divine authorization, or not? Did Jesus really say, 'I am

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<sup>22</sup> Some of these defects are corrected in the proposed Revision. Valuable as it is, the revision does not go far enough: *e.g.*, we shall still be reading the meaningless 'Kiss the Son' in Psalm ii. 12.

the Light of the World,' and 'Before Abraham was I am,' or not? And did he raise Lazarus from the dead and turn water into wine, or are those only allegories of His resurrection of dead souls to life and of His transmutation of Judaism into a spiritual world-religion?<sup>23</sup>

How are we to present the Bible to modern men and women in our parishes, from the pulpit, in the Bible- and Confirmation-Class, and to the boys and girls in the Church School? I fear that sometimes we ignore the problem and evade the difficulty, perhaps on the specious plea of 'not wishing to disturb anyone's faith.' But such evasion often leads to appalling results: either to 'Fundamentalism' or to scepticism, or perhaps to the fatal suspicion that the Church cannot really face the ordeal. And even apart from such disastrous results, we are losing the power and resources really latent in the Bible for educated, intelligent religion; a generation is growing up to whom the Bible is a closed book, and in consequence its religion suffers from the lack of historical perspective, balance, and the steadying influence of a rich and various tradition. We are allowing to take place—with a difference—the very thing against which our Protestant forbears cried aloud and from which they revolted with blood and tears. No elementary catechism of Christian

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<sup>23</sup> The complaint is set forth vigorously in the *Report of the Archbishops' Committee of Inquiry on 'The Teaching Office of the Church,'* 1919, pp. 8, 18. It applies here as well as in the Church of England.

doctrine, no Confirmation Class apologetics, no pulpit treatment of politics and social questions, or even exhortation to a spiritual type of piety, can take the place of the Bible in the lives of Christians.

And so I propose what seems to me another and better way, which I now have time only to outline, but which ought to be worked out in detail, and can well be accomplished in a full program of education, particularly of adult education, in the parish. The program must really start with the seminaries and the clergy; but it must not be allowed to stop till it has gone its full length in the whole field of religious education.

I. In the first place, we shall take for granted the principles of historical and literary criticism. Indeed, as modern men, no other course is open. Historical or literary criticism prevails in all modern knowledge, of History, Literature, Art, Philosophy, even Science. We cannot study Shakespeare and American History by such principles, and then refuse to recognize them when we come to the Bible. Their vast and universally admitted fruitfulness in other fields predisposes us to follow them in the study of the Bible. Furthermore, this procedure is now admitted on all hands; all Protestant schools take them for granted, with the exception of a few rather narrowly evangelical 'Bible' or 'Missionary Schools.' It is one of the glories of Anglicanism that it has never anchored

the Faith to any one theory of biblical inspiration, and its record has on the whole been one of freedom in interpretation. We look upon the biblical history, and the history of biblical religion, as a development, as an evolution. The books, like their component documents, are themselves 'documents' of this historical development. As a result we no longer think of placing Leviticus on a level with Isaiah or the Psalter, or the Apocalypse on a level with St. Luke. There are historical gradations all the way along. The fiery-tempered, jealous, vindictive Yahweh of the early Old Testament documents is not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, rich in mercy and loving-kindness; nor is he even on a level with the God of II Isaiah, who 'weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance,' and 'taketh up the isles as a very little thing,' 'the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity';<sup>24</sup> and yet, historically, it was out of that conception of a holy and jealous, if vindictive, desert-god Yahweh that there grew the conception of 'the Creator of the ends of the earth,'<sup>25</sup> who was in time revealed as 'your Father [who] knoweth what things we have need of, before ye ask Him.'<sup>26</sup>

II. At the same time these gradations in historical development are more or less closely matched by gradations in religious insight. It was 'in many parts and after divers manners' that God

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<sup>24</sup> Isaiah xl. 12-15; lvii. 15.   <sup>25</sup> Isaiah xl. 28.   <sup>26</sup> Matthew vi. 8.

'spake of old' to the fathers by the prophets, and at last spoke 'in His Son.'<sup>27</sup> Not that mere succession, or later date, guarantees a higher spiritual insight. There is no law of automatic progress, in religion or in anything else. Though later in date, the psalmist who wrote, 'O daughter of Babylon, wasted with misery,'<sup>28</sup> stood on a definitely lower level of spiritual vision than that mysterious prophet who rises out of the mists of heathenism and cries, in words that echo across the ages, 'Yahweh thy God is a merciful God';<sup>29</sup> and the seer who wrote, 'To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgivenesses, though we have rebelled against him, neither have we obeyed His voice,'<sup>30</sup> stands on a definitely higher level, almost at the very summit, of Old Testament revelation. And it is this variety in religious and ethical insight which disturbs many modern persons who have some acquaintance with the Bible. One Psalm, high and noble in its appeal, searching and humbling in its penetration to the inmost heart, lofty and sublime in its adoration, will be followed by another at Morning Prayer—in which the most perverse and outrageous sentiments are associated with religion: and apparently the Church makes no distinction between the two, though they be sundered by centuries in their origin and by an almost impassable gulf in religious outlook and pre-suppositions. Or a lesson that lifts the mind to the

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<sup>27</sup> Hebrews i. 1-2.

<sup>28</sup> Psalm cxxxvii. 8 f.

<sup>29</sup> Deuteronomy iv. 31.

<sup>30</sup> Daniel ix. 9-10.

very gateway of the heavenly city, and fortifies the will to go on and face once more some baffling problem in life, on one Sunday, will be followed on the next by a selection that recounts the sordid and legendary history of a Hebrew patriarch, or utters the screaming resentment of an early Christian apocalypticist at the delay in the divine vengeance upon the wicked. And apparently the Church approves all alike, without distinction. A better way, in this regard, would surely be to select, even more carefully than do the present or prospective Lectionaries, lessons that are chosen, not for their value in a scheme of rounded Bible-reading, but for their immediate religious value to those who hear them read: and, along with this, to provide explanations and illuminating settings for the passages read, with deletion of words, phrases, verses, or paragraphs, which can only cause stumbling.

Who can do this? Where is the priest capable of thus handling the Word of God? Where the Commission or Committee with the sufficient wisdom? I do not know; nevertheless this ought to be done; and if the Holy Spirit still guides the Church, perhaps He will use even crude and blundering efforts, if undertaken with the right motive and with as much skill as can be acquired by hard study and patient effort at understanding. Certainly, mortal and fallible men revised the Prayer Book, and translated it, indeed reorganized it, in the days of Henry and Edward; mortal and fal-

lible men are revising it now—a far more ambitious undertaking than the complete revision of the Lectionary; and we are not only still using the earlier revision and translation of the Prayer Book, but are attempting to improve it as an instrument of public devotion.

III. What we require, in fine, is a book, or a collection of books, or an anthology of selections from sacred literature which shall be, to use the old Liberal slogan, 'Inspired in the sense of inspiring.' We need not admire the logic of that slogan; but it means something, nevertheless. That Bible within the Bible is really to be found, if we search for it, and distinguish what inspires from what does not. Our fathers with their much-marked copies of 'the good Book'; with their Prayer Books and Lectionaries (the 'Sunday Lessons') bound up together, had such a Bible, more or less. The whole Old and New Testament Canon, either with or without the Apocrypha, 'contains,' as they said, 'the Word of God'—unless they were Calvinists or Puritans, when they insisted that it 'is' the Word of God.<sup>21</sup> As I see it,

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<sup>21</sup> The distinction is important, and has practical relevance at the present time. Article viii. of the Constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church reads, "No person shall be ordained . . . unless at the time . . . he shall subscribe and make the following declaration: 'I do believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments *to be* the Word of God, and to contain all things necessary to salvation . . .'" It goes without saying that the interpretation of this formula is to be found in the Book of Common Prayer, which was 'set forth' and 'established' and 'required to be received' as the Liturgy of this Church by



we all, if we read the Bible carefully, recognize passages that really find us, that throw light upon our path, that bring strength when our hearts are faint, consolation when we are in sorrow, and guidance in perplexity; that set up shining goals of aspiration when we are buoyant and full of youthful vigor; that bring wisdom and peace when we find we have battled in vain, and the assurance that somehow, somewhere, perhaps beyond our dim conceiving, 'all shall be well, and all shall be well,'<sup>22</sup> here and everywhere, for all men, and for those we love, and even for our own miserable, futile selves. They are beacons on the hills, lighting the advance toward social righteousness, proclamations of peace on earth and good will among nations, freedom from oppression, the end of hate and crime, of poverty and sin—all that; and at the same time 'the healing of the broken-hearted.' What a book! There is no ques-

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the same Convention, in October, 1789. The question asked in the Ordinal, in its fullest form in the Office for the Consecration of a Bishop, reads: "Are you persuaded that the Holy Scriptures *contain* all Doctrine required as necessary for eternal salvation through faith in Jesus Christ? Are you determined out of the same Holy Scriptures to instruct the people committed to your charge; and to teach or maintain nothing, as necessary to eternal salvation, but that which you shall be persuaded may be concluded and proved by the same?" The same sense is apparent in the *Articles of Religion* (Art. vi.), authorized in 1801. In a word, non-Scriptural doctrines, whether papal or Protestant, are definitely excluded; the Bible is the criterion of sound doctrine. The formula in the Constitution (Art. viii.) goes beyond this, in declaring the Bible 'to be' the Word of God; but the expression is inaccurate, does not represent the real consensus of Anglican belief, and should be altered. For the time being, it can only be 'interpreted' in the light of the Ordinal and the Articles.

<sup>22</sup> The repeated phrase of the mystic, Lady Julian of Norwich.

tion of dispensing with or discarding it; let this generation drop it, if it will, but it shall come back again. For no other book can take its place. Magnificent as are the other 'bibles' of the race, the sacred literatures of India, China, Arabia, Persia, Egypt, and Greece, and golden as are many passages which they contain, there is no book that speaks to our race, our civilization, to us of the Western world at least, as does this ancient Hebrew-Christian Book. And I say this soberly, and with full recognition of its defects, of its limitations, and of the fact that it needs more criticism rather than less for its pure gold to come out soft and shining and for its record of divine revelation and of spiritual religion to be made perfectly clear.

And so I arrive at a practical conclusion. There are three things we require of the Bible, three requirements which I believe it can meet.

(a) First, we require a knowledge of the history of religion, particularly of our own, the Christian, and with it the religion of Israel. It is no use pretending that the religious history of India or Arabia will do; we want our own background. Nor will the Druids or the Arval Brethren or the priests of Demeter or Apollo help us much; for the truth is that this book and no other is already the Bible of *our* civilization. As soon as our race had emerged from barbarism it found itself listening to stories from this ancient He-

brew-Christian book; staring in childlike wonder at the figures of David and Goliath, of Adam and Eve, and the Prophets, on the margins of the Church's missal; or bowing tenderly before the gentle but mysterious Virgin and her majestic, heavenly Son in whom rested man's hope of salvation from hell, while the light of flickering candles illumined their grave and solemn faces. With this Book in their hands the peoples of northern Europe were led out of barbarism into culture and *humanitas*.<sup>33</sup> Such is our background, much altered no doubt since those days, and not a wholly fair representation of the genius of Christianity at the time; but with such a background it is clear that the Bible of our civilization must continue in some sense to be that same old Book. No un-sacred, secular, or common book can take its place, as the supreme religious writing or collection. Such books do not grow in a day.

"Out of the heart of Nature roll'd  
The burdens of the Bible old."<sup>34</sup>

What Homer was to the Greeks, what the Koran was to the Arabs and their allies, what the Zoroastrian Gathas were to the Persians, the Vedas to the Hindus, and the books of the Old Testament

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<sup>33</sup> What Sir A. Quiller-Couch has maintained of English literature is equally true of western European culture generally. Many of its best elements are not indigenous but were derived from the classical culture spread over northern Europe during the four centuries of Roman imperial sway. *On the Art of Writing*, 1916, Lects. viii-ix.

<sup>34</sup> Emerson, 'The Problem.'

to the Jews, such at least is the Hebrew-Christian Bible to the races of western Europe. True, a new Bible may now and then supplement the old; as the New Testament was added to the Jewish scriptures, and as the Upanishads, Brahmanas, and Bhagavad Gita came to supplement the ancient Hindu Vedas. But the new, as a rule, does not supplant; it only supplements, completes, brings to a further stage of development what was implicit in the old. I am speaking of civilizations, of cultural unities; and I believe the analogy is practically the evidence of a law governing the growth of sacred literature. Our Bible, the Bible of our civilization, is the Christian Old and New Testaments, *i.e.*, the Hebrew Bible with its Christian supplement and in its Christian form.

But if we require this Traditional Book<sup>35</sup> for the background of our history and at least for cultural purposes, this does not mean that no parallels to it are to be found in other 'Bibles,' or that in the world-unity which human civilization seems destined some day to achieve this Bible must entirely supplant all others. Not one broken light of God's revelation can be spared! Too few and too precious are those revealing passages in which God speaks to man for us ever to think of consigning any sacred literature to the flames. Especially if, as many of us believe, God is truly and not falsely, though partially, revealed to India in

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<sup>35</sup> 'Traditional book,' in the sense expounded by Prof. Gilbert Murray in his *Rise of the Greek Epic*; *vide supra*.

the Upanishads, and to the Arabs in the Koran—in the midst of much else, as in the Hebrew-Christian Bible, that not only does not reveal Him but positively misrepresents Him, and cannot be accepted as final.

That is the first requirement we make of a Bible, of any 'Bible'; and we find this requirement satisfied in the sacred Book of our fathers. Here is the far-off spiritual background of our race and the story of a revelation that has meant almost as much in Europe and America as it did in Palestine. It gives us the documents—of course to be read critically—of the history of a religion which is still ours, though twenty centuries measure the gap between the primitive Church in Palestine and Christendom to-day. But, along with this history, which is of value to scholars, we must admit that it also contains much that has no particular value for certain other purposes for which a Bible ought to exist.

(b) The next requirement we make is a book for use in public worship. Like all the other higher religions of the world, Christianity is 'a book religion,' and it presupposes a 'reasonable service.'<sup>26</sup> It presupposes intelligence; it encourages education—and this not because we are pushing Westerners, nor because of the Greek strain to be found in Christianity, but because Judaism was an intelligent religion and a 'religion of a book.' The intelligence to know God and God's will, the ideal

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<sup>26</sup> Romans xii. 1.

of knowledge of the scribe and the priest, the ability to read and understand a sacred Book—all this Judaism took for granted in its religion: a quality sundering it immensely from the crude polytheism, magic, and demonology of its earliest Semitic origins.

But there is no need for trying to use all of the Bible either in public worship or in religious education. Rigorously selected books and passages are sufficient for this purpose, and taken alone will suffice, in the setting reconstructed by expert study of the literature as a whole. The Bible we use in public worship must be a purely religious book, without many of those interesting sidelights which engage the attention of the scholar and are indispensable for a total view, but which are meaningless, or worse, to the ordinary congregation. Somewhat as Arrian put together Epictetus' discourses, or Porphyry those of Plotinus, so the Lectionary Bible should be arranged in such fashion as to make it of greatest usefulness and least hindrance in the spiritual nurture of the members of a Christian congregation. At the same time, provision should be made, and is actually made in many parishes at the present time, for thorough historical, literary, and devotional study of the biblical literature as a whole, in the Adult Bible Class or Teachers' Conference.

(c) Finally, we ask of the Bible, as a sacred religious book, that it shall find, stimulate, guide, and inspire us in our private pathway of life.

Little use is it to us if it be only a social asset or treasure, like a set of laws or a Declaration of Independence or a political constitution. It must reveal God to each of us, if it is to be a Bible in the fullest sense. Alas, how many persons have tried to find this value in the Bible and have missed it! They looked for a collection of oracles; and lo, the chronicles of the Kings of Israel and Judah, and the sins they led men to commit, or the scarlet wool and hyssop and the sprinkling of blood, or the trumpets and vials of the Apocalypse and the horses breast-deep in human blood! We know what it is to look for light and find darkness, to search for wisdom and discover only dust and ashes, to hunt for the pearl of great price and find only the flotsam and jetsam of man's immemorial past that litters the shifting sea-floor! But they are there, light and wisdom and the pearl of great price, if we know how and where to look, and look with trained eyes, and keenly distinguish the true and important from the false and negligible. It is for the sake of the Bible itself that we must try to make this clear to men; and far more, it is for men's own sake, as children of God, hungering for the bread of life, and not deserving, far from deserving, to be turned aside with a scorpion or a stone!

I believe that the world would welcome a modern devotional commentary upon selected portions of the Bible, written with full historical knowledge, not blind to defects and limitations,

set in clear historical perspective, and written with sympathy for what is called the mystical point of view. It would be a 'mystical commentary,' not like St. Bernard's on the Song of Songs, but with modern knowledge, and with a historical point of view, not dragging in later doctrines or pious fancies or sugary rhetoric of the kind that now fills attics with antiquated 'religious literature.' It might begin with a book of selections, somewhat like von Harnack's little volume of *St. Augustine's Reflections and Maxims*,<sup>37</sup> and upon the basis of such a set of selections might grow up a modern 'mystical commentary' written with full recognition of the claims of historical and literary criticism. Such a book does not now exist, so far as I am aware—at least not with precisely the qualifications just set forth.<sup>38</sup> But some day it will be written or compiled; and meantime, perhaps, each one of us can do a little in the way of composing this new *Sacra Privata* by taking—or making—a book of selections and adorning it in some measure with the best thoughts, reflections, quotations he can find or otherwise provide, his own *Encheiridion* or spiritual *Vade Mecum*. This is no more than a hint or suggestion: but I may add in passing, for the benefit of my brethren of

<sup>37</sup> *Augustin: Reflexionen und Maximen*, Tübingen, 1922.

<sup>38</sup> There are a number of books of selections now in print; but the principle of selection in most is historical or literary, rather than devotional. And the fault of most 'devotional commentaries' has been the lack of a critical-historical point of view. If historians have not been sufficiently devout, devotional writers have certainly not been critical enough!



the clergy, that the great princes of the pulpit have ever been constant and devout students of the Scriptures, who thus studied them pen in hand. What veritable king's treasures their Bibles became to them after many years!

Thus while much is to be said for impatience with the Bible at the present day, much more is to be said for getting established a clearer notion of its real nature as a traditional book, as the documentary record of the rise of our religion, as a book that enshrines, like every traditional book, especially every sacred collection of such books, 'things new and old,' things fresh and things effete, things sublime and things outworn. And though its historical study by experts should continue unrestricted, its use in public worship demands a much more thorough and careful consideration than it has thus far received or is now receiving; while its private, devotional use needs reviving, with a selective use, and with a spiritual commentary written especially for our time, in the light of modern knowledge of its history. This is the sense in which, in our day, the religious teacher is called upon to show himself 'approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.'<sup>20</sup>

It is within these new horizons that the Bible will eventually prove itself still to be the priceless treasure of the historical Christian religion—of

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<sup>20</sup> II Timothy ii. 15.

the religion, that is, whose roots are found in history rather than either in metaphysics or solely in immediate spiritual perception or apprehension; a religion with a Church, with a tradition, with a set of doctrines, and aware of its responsibilities to society as a whole and to civilization, not merely to its individual adherents. For the Bible is the book of a religion, and of no sect. It is this new Bible, no longer merely the storehouse of proof-texts for particular doctrines but the Traditional Book of Christian civilization; now with its real meaning beginning to be clear from historical and documentary criticism, but still no less uniquely fitted to be the sacred book of our race, because of its significance in the past; it is this new Bible, itself, that forms one of the most significant and most auspicious horizons of Christian doctrine in our day. For the Bible, taken as a whole, traces the development of religion from its lowly beginnings in a crude, 'primitive' stage of social development up to the highest reaches of spiritual aspiration and devotion. The place of doctrine, the relation of doctrine to life, may here be studied both in individual detail and on the large scale of national history. The truth of religion, as set forth by the Bible, is proved by the logic of broad experience, not *a priori*, or by purely 'rational' deductions, or by mere appeal to external authority, or to any direct or peculiar intuition. The religion of the Bible is, as we have said, a thoroughly *historical* religion, rooted in

human experience; and, if history teaches anything, that is the only kind of religion that will ever make headway in the Occident. Hard-headed rationality, the perennial test of experiment, the continual demand for 'explanation'—these are native qualities of Western mentality, nurtured upon the Bible and in turn destined to find their satisfaction in no other kind of religion or sacred literature than this.

The gradual development of religion which is reflected in the Bible may be traced at one and the same time as a gradual evolution or as a gradual revelation, rising slowly out of the darkness of paganism and culminating finally in the full unveiling—as far as human eyes are capable of beholding—of the nature, the personality, the character, the supreme love of God. He is the Creator, the God of Nature—of this the Old Testament is full; but He is more, He is the Holy and Righteous One, the only true God, in contrast to the 'gods' of polytheism—of this also the Old Testament is full; even more, He is the Guardian and Redeemer of His saints; yes, even greater than that, He is the Saviour of all mankind, the One who loves and saves to the uttermost, who sent His Son, and whose Son, as representing Him, laid down His life that all men might live through Him. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man should lay down his life for his friends." "God showed forth His love for us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ

died for us." "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but might have everlasting life." <sup>40</sup> Here the religion of the Bible reaches its climax—in a gospel of the undying love of One who died that men might live.

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<sup>40</sup> John xv. 13; Romans v. 8; John iii. 16.

## VII. THEOLOGY AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

IT MAY BE true enough that religion has no immediate concern with philosophy; as one writer has bluntly put it, 'Religion has no business with philosophy.' But the statement does not hold true of *theology*. And it is hard to see how a doctrinal religion can avoid contacts with contemporary philosophy. It is true, a whole modern school of theology has been developed upon the principle of 'excluding metaphysic,' the school of Albrecht Ritschl and his followers. The origins of this school may, no doubt, be traced to Kant himself, the father of modern epistemological idealism, so that a philosopher can be said to have originated the principle of delimiting the spheres of religion and philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Kant did this chiefly by discarding the traditional 'proofs' of theism current in the schools of theology from the Middle Ages to his own eighteenth century; whereupon he set about reinforcing the Moral Argument to such a degree that he supposed it capable of bearing the full weight of a reasonable—*i.e.*, a 'rational'—

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<sup>1</sup> Though the later Schoolmen, with their distinction of faith and reason, are usually credited. Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, 1915.

theology. But Kant's conception of religion was too narrow, too rational, too moralistic;<sup>2</sup> and when the fuller tide of religious feeling set in, after the age of Rationalism had closed, men found themselves left without the intellectual support of those 'congruent ideas' which religion had traditionally provided. There was no intellectually critic-proof theology fit to express the presuppositions of religion in the period of the Romantic revival, and during the first half of the nineteenth century. Hence Albrecht Ritschl, influenced both by Kant (in his general intellectual outlook) and by Schleiermacher (in religion), came forward with the proposal to separate distinctly the fields of religion and philosophy, and to eliminate metaphysics entirely from theology. It seemed a reasonable and likely proposal, and it was hailed with considerable enthusiasm. His great three-volume work on *Justification and Reconciliation*, and his somewhat one-sided and unsympathetic *History of Pietism*, were read far and wide, and through them he set a permanent stamp upon German theology since his day; and upon theology not only in his native land but elsewhere, particularly in Switzerland, France, the Scandinavian countries, and in Great Britain and America. But his program, despite its immense influence and real usefulness in many respects, has failed to command

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. R. M. Wenley, 'Kant and Theology,' in *Anglican Theological Review*, vii. 121 ff.; C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, 1926.

the strict adherence even of his own disciples: modern 'Ritschlians' are prepared to make concessions to 'metaphysics' which to the master would have seemed unthinkable. As in most revolutions, the revolutionary program has itself become a dogma—even for those who demand its restatement or revision. And we see the 'value-judgment,' which Ritschl intended to be a substitute for all ontological affirmations, itself erected into a metaphysical principle. Largely, perhaps, under the influence of modern philosophy (outside the strict sphere of theology), a 'metaphysics of value' has come to occupy the place once enjoyed by the metaphysics of 'substance,' 'nature,' and 'essential being.' For, I suppose, if one wishes to substitute the 'religious value' of a doctrine for its metaphysical truth, it will nevertheless be necessary in the end to provide some metaphysical reason for so doing! If man is 'incurably religious,' he is also incurably metaphysical; he demands to know the reasons for things, and asks 'why the value' of his religious experience. No rough-and-ready pragmatic rule—'It works; therefore, it is true'—will suffice; for he insists upon knowing why 'it works.' Just as the electrical engineer requires a theory of electrons, and is not satisfied with blind experimentation, so the religious thinker requires some theory of ultimate reality, and is not content with a purely 'experimental' religion.

Although much of contemporary Protestant

theology is still under the influence of the Ritschlian program, and is characteristically concerned primarily with history, both biblical and ecclesiastical, with the psychology of religion and the history of religions, with social idealism and 'humanitarian' welfare, there are not wanting those who insist that a fully developed religious culture must include a theology, *i.e.*, a philosophically articulated body of religious ideas. Dean Inge, who is certainly no Ritschlian, maintains that "Christianity has been a philosophical religion from the time when it first began to have a sacred literature. It claims to be the one explanation of life as we know it, an explanation to which heart and head and will all contribute."<sup>3</sup>

If this is so, and we assume that the statement, in the sense intended, is historically justified, then it must follow that if Christianity is to be true to its own past, and is still to remain the religion it has been all along, it must continue to be a 'philosophical religion'; it must offer men a reasoned and defensible theology, and provide a real center for 'unity of thought' in the great concerns of the religious life. Modern philosophy may make this a very difficult achievement; but the Christian Church has not shirked onerous tasks of a similar kind in the past, and we must be prepared for difficulties. Both orthodoxy and modernism face this task: the orthodox theo-

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<sup>3</sup> Qu. in the *Bulletin* of the Australian College of Theology.



gian, if he is to maintain his contact with the living thought of the age—an achievement without which the great leaders in orthodox theology would never have succeeded; the modernist, if he is to have any theological standing at all. For even an unorthodox philosophy, if it concerns itself in the least with religion, in a positive way, cannot avoid working out some kind of a theology. The notion of Croce, like that of Comte, that religion must give way to philosophy—religious ideas merging into metaphysical, scientific, or historical, and reason being wholly substituted for ‘authority,’ ‘experience,’ or direct contact with the unseen—takes far too narrow a view of the significance and importance of religion in human life. Once again let us insist, religion is one of the primary experiences of mankind, with which, as with other ranges of experience, philosophy has to deal; and philosophy cannot fairly deal with it simply by identifying it with itself. For there is in religion too much of what Professor Otto has called ‘the irrational,’<sup>4</sup> for such a short and simple solution of the problem—too much that exists in its own right, and cannot be either rationally accounted for or directly identified with rationality; and this not only upon the lower levels of religious experience, but even on the very highest, the most intelligent, the most life-expanding, vigorous, and satisfying.

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<sup>4</sup> See Lecture iv.

Let us go back to the beginnings of the Christian religion and trace forward, briefly, the relations between Christianity and philosophy in the past. In the light of that historical process we may see somewhat more clearly the task that now lies before us.

In the period of the New Testament there was but little contact of Christianity with philosophy. Our religion arose as a religion, pure and simple, rooted in the soil of Palestine, and associated with the system of religious ideas familiar in contemporary Judaism. Our Lord was not a philosopher, and his apostles cherished no aspirations to appear as heads of a philosophical school. St. Paul taught in the school of Tyrannus, in Ephesus;<sup>5</sup> but only as occupying the hall in which that philosopher—if he was a philosopher!—delivered his lectures. After his almost completely unsuccessful attempt to win over the ‘philosophers’ of Athens, we hear no more of similar efforts on his part. He ‘determined to know nothing among’ the Corinthians, ‘save Jesus Christ, and Him as crucified.’<sup>6</sup> Various passages in the New Testament express the contempt of religious enthusiasts for ‘the philosophy and vain deceits’<sup>7</sup> of the world, and warn the Christian converts to beware of such soul-destroying artificialities. This attitude may also be attributed in part to the thoroughly Judaistic temper of the early Church. The ancient Jew had no genius for philosophy, at least not in

<sup>5</sup> Acts xix. 9.

<sup>6</sup> I Corinthians ii. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Colossians ii. 8.

his native habitat and in the age which we are considering. Philo of Alexandria and his immediate predecessors and successors are exceptions; but it is important to recognize that they were exceptions, and that they were 'Hellenists': they lived in a philosophical atmosphere which was thoroughly under the influence of late Platonism and Stoicism. Josephus, who also lived outside Palestine much of his life, got no further in philosophy than to identify, rather artificially, the sects of Judaism with the current schools of Graeco-Roman practical philosophy.<sup>8</sup> And though St. Paul, who was also a Jew of the Diaspora, may be classed with the philosophers (certainly with more right than our Lord or the other Apostles),<sup>9</sup> it is stretching the term a good deal to include him. The Old Testament religion had produced 'wise men and scribes'; but the teaching of the one group was largely prudential ethics, and of the other the detailed application of the sacred Law. 'Judaism,' as Moses Mendelssohn maintained, 'had no dogmas,' and therefore left speculation free to engage itself with fancies.<sup>10</sup> More-

<sup>8</sup> *Vita* (ii.) 12, etc.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. H. W. Carr, *The Unique Status of Man*, 1928, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. E. Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes* (4th ed.), 1907, ii. 410, 582; G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, 1927, i. 357.—It may be questioned if this statement is not altogether too sweeping; Judaism had such dogmas as the Oneness of God, Creation, Sin, Atonement, etc. But these were not speculative dogmas (like those of a school of philosophy), nor ecclesiastical (*i.e.*, set forth as *fundamenta* of theology, and binding upon all believers); nor were they worked up into an abstract and speculative system of thought. The great development of Jewish theology took place in the early Middle Ages, and later.

over, the philosophies with which Judaism came in contact were often such as would not create a favorable impression. The orthodox Jew 'knew the Law,' and was accordingly disinclined to add anything to that knowledge of God's will which was the alpha and omega of Judaism. Such references to Greek philosophy as we find in the Mishna, *e.g.*, the repudiation of the practical godlessness of the atheistic Epicureans, express this attitude quite clearly.<sup>11</sup>

And yet it was impossible for Christianity, as soon as it crossed the borders of Judaism (even as it had already become impossible for Judaism—as we see in Philo—once it was acclimatized in a thoroughly Hellenistic milieu), to ignore philosophy altogether, or to remain aloof from the strong currents of religious feeling with which Hellenistic philosophy was associated in the first century. Once the first disciple of Plato or Zeno or Posidonius to become a Christian had been baptized, the development of a theology on Hellenistic lines was inevitable. Traces of such a nascent development are already visible in the New Testament,<sup>12</sup> in spite of its aversion for 'philosophy and vain deceit.'

These tentative and preliminary steps were not much advanced by the Apostolic Fathers—men like the Christian 'prophet' Hermas, Clement

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<sup>11</sup> *Pirkê Aboth*, ii. 19.

<sup>12</sup> Classical examples are the first chapters of the Gospel of John and the Epistle to Colossians.

of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, 'Barnabas'; but by the middle of the second century the advance in the direction of a philosophical theology was made irrevocable by the Apologists. Justin, a converted philosopher, continued to wear his professional scholar's cloak as a Christian teacher, and it was symbolic of the new attitude. Athenagoras, Aristides, Melito, the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus*, Theophilus—all took for granted the possibility of setting forth Christian teaching at least in philosophical language, and in the literary form of the schools. Their theology, on some points, was not in a direct line of continuity between the New Testament and Nicene orthodoxy—*e.g.*, Justin's designation of Christ as a 'Second God';<sup>13</sup> much was tentative, experimental, and had to be abandoned later on. But its philosophical outlook, and its attitude toward classical Greek philosophy, is quite noteworthy. Nor must the reaction of the Church against the mythologizing, syncretizing, and really pagan tendencies of Gnosticism be overlooked.<sup>14</sup> Though the reaction produced a crystallizing of tradition, and resulted in such different and yet related productions as the Apostles' Creed, the Canon of the New Testament, the theory of Apostolic Succession, and Irenaeus' great work *Against Heresies*, still tradition was not the only defence against mythol-

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<sup>13</sup> Justin, *Dialogue* lvi, etc.

<sup>14</sup> Harnack has traced this process with minute care and real illumination in his *History of Dogma*.

ogy. Keener and stricter intellects had all along protested against taking fancy too seriously, and refused to identify rational faith with a theosophic *mélange* of pseudo-science, pseudo-philosophy, and primitive superstition. One does not wish to be ungenerous with the old Gnostics; for there was doubtless religious feeling, and also some measure of rational dialectic, behind their strange systems (*e.g.*, those of Ptolemaeus and Valentinus); but it must have been evident to many that Gnosticism was neither traditional Christianity nor good sound philosophy.

It was Clement of Alexandria who undertook to rescue the better element in Gnosticism—his ideal Christian is frankly named ‘the Gnostic’—and it was in the Alexandrine School, especially as represented in Clement and his disciple Origen, that rational or philosophical theology received its strongest, clearest defence. Here philosophy, along with science (*i.e.*, mathematics), letters, and the arts (*i.e.*, music), was assumed as the foundation of a Christian education. Such thinkers as Plato, Pythagoras, and the Stoics had been the teachers of the Greeks; and Philosophy had done for ‘the nations’ what the Mosaic Law had done for the Jews—it was ‘a Schoolmaster leading unto Christ’; and in both, in Jewish Law and in Greek Philosophy, Christ the Logos had manifested Himself (or rather, God) to men, in the measure in which they were able to receive the

revelation.<sup>15</sup> Such a principle was quite different from the Judaic one assumed in the New Testament,<sup>16</sup> though its derivation from Philo, the first century Jewish philosopher of Alexandria, is quite unmistakable.

Although Origen's teaching was in part rejected by the later Church, and even by his contemporaries, so that he missed canonization and commemoration with a festival, his influence was almost immeasurable. It was Origen who dealt the final blow to early millenarianism; it was he who propounded an interpretation of the Old Testament which saved it both from exclusion (on such a principle as Marcion had advocated) and from exploitation (by Chiliasts, 'Judaizing' fanatics, and other 'heretics'); it was he who marked out the lines for the fundamental structure of systematic Christian theology (in his great work, *On First Principles*). And in the Alexandrine School, as we see in the Cappadocian Fathers (St. Basil and the two Gregories), and as in St. Athanasius later on, the fundamental philosophy, in terms of which Christian theology is set forth, is Platonism. It is assumed that the real world is the world of the Ideas, of which this visible world is but a shadow. In this invisible,

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<sup>15</sup> *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, by Charles Bigg, is still the best exposition of the Alexandrian theology.

<sup>16</sup> Even in the Fourth Gospel, there is no clear statement of a revelation outside Judaism and the Old Testament. John iv. 22 and x. 8 considerably modify Ch. i. 9—though the text and exegesis of the second and third of these passages are far from assured, and questions of composite authorship arise.

spiritual world, God, who is pure Spirit, reigns eternal and supreme. Man's spirit is his real self, not his 'soul' or animal *psychê*, much less his mortal body. Hence immortality means a spiritual resurrection, a partaking of the Glory of God, an eternal spiritual life of harmony and blessedness:—some of these terms had been suggested by St. Paul, and they were duly underscored in Origen's exegesis. The universe is spiritual, at the core, and eternal, uncreated and indissoluble. The finite number of souls—or rather of spirits, that is, of personal spiritual beings whom God created—will in the end all be saved, when sin and death are at an end, and every evil is annihilated, and God is 'all in all'; even Satan shall find space for repentance at the last. This much, briefly stated, is sufficient to show Origen's thorough-going Platonism, and the importance of the classical Platonic view of the world for his theology.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, there was appearing in the world about this time, independently of the Church, a new emphasis upon Platonic philosophy which has been most variously interpreted: the School of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. How just was

<sup>17</sup> Westcott's great article in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography* still deserves study, and also his essay in *Religious Thought in the West*.—It is sometimes held that the School of Antioch, in contrast to that of Alexandria, was more Aristotelian, more 'realistic' (in the modern sense), less allegorical in exegesis, more scientific and historical in its outlook. The contrast is easily exaggerated, but at least it indicates in further measure the influence of classical Greek philosophy upon early Christian theology. At the very least, philosophy and Christian doctrine were closely associated, if any such contrast, reflecting a difference in philosophical approach, can be proved.



Plotinus' systematization of Plato's philosophy may be left out of present consideration: Plato, unlike Aristotle, left no lecture-notes behind him, and we can make out his 'system' only incidentally from the *Dialogues*. It is certain, however, that Plotinus looked upon himself as the expounder of his great master's genuine teaching,<sup>18</sup> much as Origen believed his exposition of the Bible to be the true exegesis of its divinely intended meaning<sup>19</sup> and Plotinus has had more than one advocate—as well as critic—of his philosophical orthodoxy. At the very least, he was himself a spiritual genius of the first order, and a great philosopher as well. And although Platonic philosophy had already become the Church's 'old loving nurse,' as the Cambridge Platonists said,<sup>20</sup> the influence of Plotinus' formulation of Platonism was destined to influence Christian theology for many centuries to come. Chiefly that influence passed into Christian thought through two intermediaries: through St. Augustine, in the West, and the Pseudo-'Dionysius the Areopagite,'<sup>21</sup> in the East. Through the one, St. Augustine,<sup>22</sup> all Western theology was

<sup>18</sup> Cf. 'The Modern Study of Plotinus,' in *Anglican Theological Review*, vii. 23 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Though Plotinus is remarkable for his purely dialectical method, and for the absence of the then popular 'allegory.' For a brilliant modern exposition of Plotinus, see Dean Inge's Gifford Lectures, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, 1918.

<sup>20</sup> W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 45.

<sup>21</sup> Perhaps of Syrian origin, about 500 A.D. An exposition will likewise be found in Bp. Westcott's *Religious Thought in the West*.

<sup>22</sup> It is significant that Augustine began the study of Neoplatonism as a Christian. Cf. E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity*, pp. 72 ff.; and

influenced by a modified, Christianized, Platonic philosophy for at least seven centuries, down to the revival of Aristotle about 1200; and under further modification, by Scholastic Aristotelianism and other influences, for at least three more centuries, down to the Reformation; and under still further and later modification (sometimes with the result of virtual neutralization) down to the present time. Through the other intermediary, the Pseudo-‘Dionysius,’ the Platonic influence largely shaped the theology of the Eastern Church, and then, moving westward, produced the mystical theology of Erigena, Eckhart, Tauler, the author of the *Theologia Germanica*, and later writers. This emphasis has likewise survived to our times.

Thus if there has been a ‘Platonic tradition in English religious thought,’ both before and since the Reformation, as Dean Inge has lately pointed out afresh,<sup>23</sup> this is only a part of a much wider and longer current of Platonism, streaming through the length and breadth of Christian theology and even of popular Christian thought. Apart from this influence much of Christian thought in the past would be thoroughly unintelligible, and much likewise of late classical, mediaeval, and even modern philosophy. For ex-

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M. Zepf, *Augustins Konfessionen*, 1926. His reading of Neoplatonic philosophy led to his ‘second,’ final, and complete conversion to the beliefs and practices of Catholic Christianity—or, as some hold, to the adoption of celibacy.

<sup>23</sup> Hulsean Lectures, 1926.

ample, the whole controversy of the mediaeval schools over Nominalism and Realism swings about the reality of abstract 'universals': are they only abstractions, 'names' arbitrarily adopted and maintained in use by human convention, or do they represent genuine realities in the universe, which are *ante rem*, or at least *in re*, and not merely *post rem*? This philosophical distinction profoundly concerned the mediaeval formulation of doctrine—as it does Catholic doctrine to this day. And it is significant (and I believe also fortunate) that Platonic Realism triumphed, albeit almost on the very eve of the Aristotelian revival which ushered in the thirteenth century.<sup>24</sup>

With the arrival of new translations of Aristotle, and the recovery of practically all of his writings, about the year 1230, a new task was set before the Christian theologian. So great had been the fame and veneration of Aristotle in the schools during the early Scholastic period, even on the basis of his *Logic* and one or two other treatises, that when the whole, or practically the whole, of the Aristotelian corpus was recovered, it was too late to challenge or discount his overwhelming influence. He was, for the Middle Ages, 'the' philosopher *par excellence*.<sup>25</sup> Hence there was set the two-fold problem of Christianizing Aris-

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<sup>24</sup> At the Synod of Soissons, 1092, which condemned the teachings of Roscellinus of Compiègnes.

<sup>25</sup> At least for the 'High' and later Middle Ages. Cf. the essay on 'Philosophy,' by C. R. S. Harris, in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1926.

totle, and of *Realizing* him, *i.e.*, interpreting his doctrines in accordance with the received Platonic Realism—which is quite another thing both from modern ‘realism’ and from what might be called Aristotle’s own historical ‘realistic’ or scientific philosophy. To-day it would be recognized as an impossible task; but not so by a scholastic dialectician. What was logic for if it failed you in the effort to bring two true positions into harmony—*i.e.*, two positions accepted as true, and not studied critically and historically?

St. Thomas Aquinas was not the only, but certainly the most conspicuous and influential, advocate of this harmonization of Aristotle with Christian tradition and with traditional Platonic Realism. “His amazing success was due to his unrivalled powers of systematization—a marvellous grasp of detail, and a faculty for lucid presentation which no mediaeval thinker could equal. But he attempted no less than the impossible, and the subsequent collapse of scholasticism was the direct result of the discovery of his failure.” “For the principles of the Aristotelian philosophy were really wholly incompatible with the Catholic faith, which both in its content and in its traditions was more closely allied to Platonism.”<sup>20</sup>

However, the importance of St. Thomas Aquinas is by no means limited to his efforts, success-

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<sup>20</sup> Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 242. É. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 14, calls the task ‘possible, but hard’; cf. H. Rashdall, *Universities*, i. 367.

ful at the time,<sup>27</sup> in Christianizing and Platonizing the philosophy of the Stagirite. Aquinas was no mean philosopher in his own right. It is only the accident of ecclesiastical controversy, and of his own greater emphasis on theology, that has obscured his greatness as a Christian philosopher. The voluminous *Summa Theologiae*, left unfinished at his death, casts in the shade the more modest *Summa contra Gentiles*, often referred to as the *Summa Philosophiae*; and although the two *Summae* cover the same ground, in part, since for St. Thomas theology included philosophy, the distinction which the author himself drew between them is clear—though it was destined to be woefully exaggerated by later mediaeval philosophers.

Moreover, much of the structure of Aquinas' theology (a theology which included a philosophy, as already noted) has remained intact to this day. It is, of course, the basis of modern Roman Catholic theology, increasingly so since the papal Encyclical of 1879, and as a result of the Neo-Scholastic revival in the Roman colleges and seminaries. And even outside the Roman Church, as in Anglicanism (*e.g.*, in Hooker) and even in Calvinism (*e.g.*, in Calvin's *Institutes*), the influence of Aquinas has survived, of course under severe restrictions and modifications, wherever the 'mediaeval synthesis' has been in any degree maintained. It is the syn-

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<sup>27</sup> Though not without opposition, even within his own order—a common fate of 'Modernists.' Cf. M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, ii. 37 ff.

thesis of Reason and Revelation; of Theology and Philosophy; of Science (so far as that was known and understood) and Faith (so far, likewise, as that was understood); of philosophical Platonic Realism and scientific, empirical realism (in the more modern sense);<sup>28</sup> of Plato and Aristotle; of the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures and the ecclesiastical tradition of the Faith. Although modern Protestantism tends to ignore this synthesis, and strikes out in new directions continually—and has done so most energetically since Kant and the beginning of the nineteenth century—it was by no means ignored by the more scholastically-minded Reformers of the sixteenth century; they, on the contrary, more or less took it for granted and endeavored to correct it through a greater emphasis on Scripture and with less emphasis on either philosophy or ecclesiastical tradition. Even John Calvin, I have no doubt, never thought of himself as founding a new tradition in theology, but assumed that he was simply correcting, revising, and purging the old. At any rate, much of the pre-Reformation, scholastic synthesis was left standing in the great theologies of the Continental Reformers, as also in the theology of the leading Anglican divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

It is against this background of fifteen centuries of steady growth, change and evolution

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<sup>28</sup> Of which, as of much more, Aristotle can of course be claimed as an early ancestor.

that we must study the influence of *modern* philosophy upon Christian theology.<sup>29</sup> For the orthodox theology of the modern churches is inexplicable apart from that long process, as is also the development of Christian thought as a whole. The theologies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in Protestantism, were the fruit of that long development—ripened, if you will, in the hot, late-August weather of the sixteenth century with its blazing controversies. And those theologies are still in some sense normative in Protestant formulations of doctrine: *e.g.*, the Thirty-nine Articles, the Augsburg Confession, the Reformed Covenant, the Congregational Articles, and so on. It may be taken as incontestable, therefore, that orthodox, historical, Christian theology has had 'business' with philosophy, in the past; and that philosophical theology has been one of the great creations of the Christian spirit in its advance through the centuries.

Let us get this matter clear. When we say that modern philosophy has an influence upon Christian theology, and when we propose to study the results of this influence of philosophy upon theology, we must recognize that ancient philosophy had such an influence upon its earlier de-

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<sup>29</sup> It is for this reason that a study of theology and *modern* philosophy must spend so much time on the influence of ancient and mediaeval philosophy upon the earlier history of doctrine: no similar development has taken place since the Reformation—as is recognized by writers of the 'History of Dogma' who, as a rule, stop short with the sixteenth century.

velopment, up to the sixteenth century; and that modern philosophy in dealing with traditional theology is dealing with a body of thought which has already been shaped in some measure by a philosophy—or a succession of philosophies—which was not modern but ancient. Much of the difficulty, and a large part of the problem, lies right here. It is primarily a contest of philosophy *versus* philosophy, not of philosophy *versus* theology. Some men give up the task as hopeless: let the old theology be kept intact, and be studied as an articulated whole, interesting as a product of human genius, but not necessarily adequate as a formulation of Christian faith. Others would keep the old theology intact, with all its traditional authority, and simply eschew all modern philosophy, as totally unfitted to express the dogmas of the Church—thus severing faith and reason once more after the perverse manner of some of the later mediaeval theologians. As if ‘What is true in philosophy need not be true in theology,’ and vice versa! But neither of these attitudes is satisfactory to a thoroughly rational religious view, or to a Church which takes seriously its mission to the educated modern world. Nor would either of them ever have satisfied Origen, or Athanasius, or Augustine, or Thomas Aquinas, or Richard Hooker.

There is one further and very important consideration to be brought forward at this point: we must not exaggerate the influence of philosophy



upon the traditional orthodox theology. Such doctrines as those of the Incarnation, the Atonement, Sin and the Fall, Predestination, Revelation, the Church and Sacraments, the Last Things, Eternal Life, are by no means the creation of any philosophy, though they have been influenced, in their historical formulation, by philosophic thought. The real data for such doctrines are to be found in religious experience and in the Bible, which enshrines the Hebrew, Jewish, and early Christian religious experience. On the other hand, the doctrines of the Divine Being and Nature, the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, the mode of the Incarnation, the nature of man, the Creation of the world, are far more extensively influenced by philosophical ideas than those which relate directly to Salvation. However, even these doctrines were not created by philosophy, but find their 'data' also in religious experience, *i.e.*, in the Bible and in the Church. Rather it is the total synthesis, the 'architectonic' whole of orthodox doctrine, as we see it in the received theology,<sup>30</sup> that shows most fully the creative work of ancient philosophy in its influence upon the early and mediaeval Church. For each single doctrine there are antecedents in revelation and in religious experience; but out of those antecedents was built up, under the influence of a philosophic conception—or series of conceptions—a vast and variegated mosaic, whose separate parts were derived from most di-

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<sup>30</sup> Especially in Augustine, Aquinas, and the great Anglican divines.

verse quarters, and which as a whole has been the theological inheritance alike of Protestantism and Catholicism, though with differing emphases or valuations.

Take, for example, the doctrine of the union of two Natures, divine and human, in one Person, Jesus Christ: the *antecedents* of that doctrine are certainly to be found in the New Testament, and also in later Christian religious experience, in Christian worship, and in the common Christian life. But the *terms* which made possible the formulation of the doctrine at Nicaea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon were derived from the more or less popular philosophy of the time, from the conceptions of 'nature,' 'substance,' 'person,' '*hypostasis*,' '*ousia*,' current in the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of our era. It is not denying the origin of these terms to point out that in orthodox theology they received a fixed and definite meaning somewhat modified from the current quasi-scientific, quasi-philosophical usage. There was nothing unjustifiable in this; it was no doubt the best possible procedure under the circumstances; but let us not forget the fact that this process really took place, and that the antecedents of the doctrine, in Christian experience, were no less important than the philosophical terminology adopted.

Or let us take as another example the doctrine of Transubstantiation. On the basis of the dominant Realism of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it is difficult to see how a more adequate

setting-forth of the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence could be effected than in the terms of this much-maligned doctrine. Taken historically it was anything but a 'materialistic' conception—in the modern sense. If all of nature is in essence sacramental; if each 'thing' is the outward and visible manifestation or 'sign' of the inward and spiritual substance—*substantia*—which makes it what it is; if the phenomena of nature are separate manifestations, each with appropriate *accidentes*, of distinct *rei*;<sup>31</sup> if the universals are real, and not arbitrary names or *nomina*, *flatus vocis*; if the 'ideal' is the truly 'real' and substantial; then it is only a step—and a sublime step—to identify the spiritual Body and Blood of Christ with the invisible *res* within each of the consecrated species.<sup>32</sup> It is poetry, it is imagination, it is faith, that takes this step! The main difficulty is that there is no evidence for such a miracle—though the Middle Ages possessed evidence satisfactory to the non-scientific mind;<sup>33</sup> nor is there conclusive evidence that nature really is such a system of *substantiae* manifest *per accidentia*;<sup>34</sup> moreover, there was no

<sup>31</sup> The *res* is really 'a metaphysical entity'; C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus*, ii. 114. Cf. the clear statements of St. Thomas in *De Ente et Essentia*, vii. Of course Thomas was a thorough-going pluralist (De Wulf, *History*, ii. 9), and did not speak of 'nature' as having one substance; 'nature' was the collocation of numberless examples of the union of substances with their accidents.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III. 75. i.-vi. Cf. J. H. Srawley, art. 'Eucharist' in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

<sup>33</sup> See St. Gregory's *Dialogues*, for examples!

<sup>34</sup> Though, remote as it is, may there not be some faint connection with modern realism and its restriction of our knowledge to bare 'aspects' of organic events?

guarantee that popular religious thought would maintain this high philosophic level; abuses arose, or survived, against which the doctrine of Transubstantiation was no safeguard; the Scholastic theology went to seed and lost its influence, and our Reformers rightly rejected the formula. But in the thirteenth century it was a brilliant hypothesis, and carried with it a satisfying religious significance; and it demonstrated the service which a highly developed logical and scientific philosophy could render to Christian faith. To this day, no similarly serviceable philosophy has arisen; and, in respect of the doctrine of the Real Presence, no equally adequate formula has been substituted by Protestantism for the mediaeval formula which was rejected in the sixteenth century. This may be just as well; for certainly the Real Presence of Christ is a mystery, and must be apprehended by immediate religious experience (since 'spiritual things are spiritually discerned' <sup>35</sup>), whether or not we can comprehend that mystery in any philosophical definition.

The beginnings of modern philosophy can be traced in the decline of mediaeval scholasticism. It is usual to date the dawn of modern philosophy with Descartes; and Descartes was both in training and outlook one of the last of the scholastics. And it is worthy of note that modern philosophy has all along been concerned with the problem of

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. I Corinthians ii. 14.

epistemology,<sup>36</sup> *i.e.*, the problem of knowledge: 'How can we know what we know—or think we know—about the world, about other persons, about God, about ourselves?' Of course, all philosophy has been concerned with that problem, and with others related to it; but the old common-sense answer, and the speculative answers of classical philosophy, have given way to a fresh, critical, scientific examination of the situation. The problem is, of course, of primary importance; for until we can establish our right to say anything positively and without fear of contradiction, as a definite, ascertained fact, no theology, no philosophy, no affirmations even of ordinary 'common-sense' can be accepted as final. And we can see the beginnings of this new emphasis even in the mediaeval period.<sup>37</sup>

Indeed, we can see it earlier still, in St. Augustine, who in this respect certainly justified von Harnack's appellation, 'the first modern man.' Page after page of his *Confessions*, *Soliloquies*, and *City of God*, is devoted to the problems of knowledge, of memory, of faith, of intuition. For the great Father of Western theology was schooled not only in Neoplatonism but also in Scepticism, in the Academic philosophy of contemporary 'orthodox' Platonists.<sup>38</sup> But with Des-

<sup>36</sup> Speaking generally, ancient philosophy was far more deeply concerned with ontology, cosmology, and ethics.

<sup>37</sup> Certainly as early as Abelard, and perhaps earlier—*i.e.*, as explicitly formulated.

<sup>38</sup> See his *Contra Academicos*, written in 386.

cartes the fresh tide of interest in the problem came sweeping into modern thought. Following him a long line of thinkers, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Bradley, and the modern Idealists and Realists, have revolved and resolved that problem and studied it from almost every conceivable angle. Ethical studies, or 'practical' philosophy, cosmology, and other subsidiaries of pure philosophy have not been lost sight of; but the main interest has been the problem of knowledge, right down to our own days, and these other studies have been required, one and all, to render final account to epistemology: 'How do you know that what you say is true? How does your ethics, your monistic or pluralistic ontology, or cosmology, your theory of the meaning of life, your notions of the One and the Many, your doctrine of the Absolute, or your principles of psychology and other sciences—*e.g.*, mathematics and physics—square with your theory of knowledge?' And if theology is to maintain its right to be heard in philosophical circles, and its claim to be 'queen of the sciences' is to be any more than an outworn jest, it also must take into account the problem of knowledge, must *begin*, one might almost say, with a theory or at least a hypothesis of the possibility of real knowing.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> It is noteworthy that this is how modern continental works upon Systematic Theology actually do begin. Part I, as a rule, is an '*Epistemologischer Teil*.'

It is in this respect that much of modern philosophy may be described as 'philosophy of science.' For when you press the philosopher for a concrete demonstration of the fact of knowledge he must take refuge in the laboratory. And from the laboratory he emerges with a theory framed by scientific induction from the observed phenomena of physics, mathematics, biology, psychology, and the study of human behavior. This procedure is likewise perfectly warrantable: for if we can find out the ways of knowing, or at least assure ourselves of its possibility, by scientific investigation—and do so more readily, more adequately, and more certainly than by a combination of general observation, introspection, and logic—then by all means let us resort to scientific investigation!

But not all modern thinkers are agreed upon the adequacy of scientific experiment and induction. Science itself, as we have seen, has a narrowly 'abstractive' method, working in fields which are also somewhat narrowly limited. Take sound, for an example of such a field, or light, or color: only a limited range of sound-waves can ever reach our sensory apparatus of hearing, only a limited spectrum of color can ever impress our vision—since the human organs were designed, not for scientific investigation but for biological purposes, for the survival of the human species in its struggle for existence. There are vast areas of possible data which no range of instrumental

power, no 'stepping-up' or 'stepping-down' by microscope or microphone, by telescope or electrical transformer, can bring sufficiently within our range of observation to enable us to affirm that we know nature as a whole. For example, telescopes may be vastly increased in size, in order to study the surface of Mars; but then the distorting heat-waves of our own atmosphere impede us, and apparently without remedy—not to mention the difficulty of cooling a large enough body of glass to be ground down to our super-lens. Or take the moon, a celestial body which appears much larger, and is certainly much nearer than Mars: but no conceivable instrument will ever bring within our range of vision its farther hemisphere, which is never turned toward the earth. And these are only simple and obvious examples of the limitations placed upon scientific investigation. Science knows only 'in part'; scientific knowledge is only piecemeal and fragmentary knowledge, after all, and to become a genuine knowledge of the whole of nature and of existence must fall back upon a 'synoptic' or synthetic view, which—while it must remain largely theory—will correlate these fragmentary data and give us a true perspective from which to envisage the whole.

'On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven a perfect round';<sup>40</sup>

—'in the heaven,' or in what Milton called 'divine

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<sup>40</sup> Browning, 'Abt Vogler,' ix.



philosophy,' which for the true philosopher is already the foretaste and realization—and perhaps guarantee—of heavenly bliss: here alone, at least so far as this world is concerned, in the airy structure of human thought, is satisfaction to be found. And so we find philosophers by whom these limitations of science are keenly felt tending toward the rehabilitation of a philosophy which takes into account the whole (though still fragmentary!) human pageant—history, law, ethics, spiritual imaginings, poetry, institutions—and working out a 'synoptic' view in consonance with all the facts of our varied human interests, so far, that is, as these are known to date.

The pure realists (in the modern sense, both of the 'New' and the 'Critical' schools) cling to the hope of a scientific solution of the problem—though one of them, and one of the greatest of them, Mr. Bertrand Russell, has lately confessed his belief that it will not be long until all scientific avenues of approach to reality will be thoroughly explored and exploited,<sup>41</sup> whereupon mankind will fall back upon—what must be to him a somewhat irrational practice of—'the good life . . . inspired by love and guided by knowledge.' Another frankly admits, 'There can be no absolute, eternal standards.' 'Value-experiences and value judgments should be spoken of less as true than as more or less adequate and sincere expressions and formulations of the possibilities of human life and

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<sup>41</sup> *What I Believe*, 1927, p. 20.

human living' <sup>42</sup>—whereupon it must appear that the modern realist's quest for knowledge, for absolute, certain, verifiable knowledge, either of ourselves or of the world we live in, has ended in a *cul de sac* of negation. We know that we do not know, and cannot know, and that is the end of the matter. <sup>43</sup> We live in a finite universe, whose transitory offspring are man and the other sentient species—in a finite universe, doomed to inevitable dissolution. Beyond that we have no assurance whatsoever! A more completely disillusioning conclusion of a *philosophy* can scarcely be imagined! Something is manifestly wrong—for men in general will never admit the truth of this conclusion; either the scientific bases are too narrow, or an incomplete inference from certain of the data of science has been falsely erected into a philosophy—which does not at all deserve the name—or else the data of science need supplementing by data from other fields, equally valid and worth consideration. <sup>44</sup>

And so we find idealists, like Croce, Gentile, Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison, Royce, and the Germans; Humanists, like Schiller; Pragmatists, like James; and others, taking in wider horizons and

<sup>42</sup> R. W. Sellars, *The Principles and Problems of Philosophy*, 1927, pp. 464, 469.

<sup>43</sup> Professor Sellars is fully aware of this, for at the end of Ch. xxix he writes, 'The analogy with cognition should cease.'

<sup>44</sup> Not all philosophers, nor all scientists, by any means admit the premises of this argument: see E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, and P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, already cited.

studying all human life, societies, philosophies, cultures, and the deliverances of the religious and aesthetic spirit within man, in the hope of a larger synthesis which shall escape the limitations and negations of the purely scientific-realistic outlook, and really find room for the rich and varied inner life of man upon the earth. In the words of Prof. A. E. Taylor,

"Philosophers are certainly tending, though not without exception, to range themselves into two camps. Those to whom the business of philosophy seems to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in providing a logical basis and a methodology for exact science appear to be identifying themselves with the doctrine of logical pluralism and taking up a definitely atheistic attitude which involves the denial of the objectivity of judgments of value; those, on the other hand, who are convinced that the business of philosophy is to make life, as well as science, intelligible, and consequently find themselves obliged to maintain the validity of these categories of worth apart from which life would have no significance, are, in the main, declared theists." <sup>45</sup>

And if 'extremes are bound to meet' and do actually meet, as the late Bernard Bosanquet maintained,<sup>46</sup> a unified 'modern synthesis' can be established only by confining realism within the area wherein alone it has a claim to be heard, *viz.*, in the philosophical examination of the processes

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<sup>45</sup> Art. 'Theism' in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, xii. 284b.

<sup>46</sup> *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1924.

of sensory knowledge, *i.e.*, within the psycho-physical mechanism through which we remain in contact with and exercise our wills within the external physical world. But this cannot be taken as the whole of philosophy, any more than it is the sum of possible knowledge, or the totality of man's life.

That such a tendency, to repress realism into its rightful place—along with a genuine recognition of its just claims within that sphere—is actually taking place, may be gathered from a perusal of the two recent volumes on *Contemporary British Philosophy*, edited by Prof. J. H. Muirhead.<sup>47</sup> The work represents only British philosophy, and not the whole of this; but the schools and individual points of view represented are so various, and philosophy is nowadays so much an international affair, that the volumes may be taken as not unfairly representing a large part of current philosophy in general. Again and again one is struck by the notes of optimism and assurance, indeed, of hope and of faith, which are to be heard in these 'personal statements' of contemporary philosophers. As the editor points out in the Preface to the second volume, certain lines of convergence are already beginning to appear: (a) the recognition 'that knowledge is in some sense an immediate revelation of a reality other than that of the knowing activity itself, and that this activity is not the *creator* of its own world'; (b) the

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<sup>47</sup> London, 1924.

abandonment of 'materialism'; (c) the recognition of 'an underlying *nisus* or urge in nature . . . to advance to ever higher levels . . .', 'a creative principle precipitating ever new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower'; (d) the recognition of 'trans-individual' and 'trans-social' values, which, whatever their origin, 'mean not only the opening up of new sources of enjoyment but a quickening of insight into the nature of the world, of which they are an effluence, and thus acquiring a status . . . of their own, by which our conceptions of reality are extended and enriched'—and along with this emphasis on transcendent values a revival of the Platonic philosophy; (e) finally, a recognition of the importance of mysticism and of religion 'as representing a level of human experience (perhaps the highest) at which new aspects of the world of reality reveal themselves to the soul'—a change in attitude 'which contains the promise of new and hopeful developments in what Aristotle called "the First Philosophy." ' <sup>48</sup>

It is no completed system, like classical Platonism, Stoicism, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, or mediaeval Realism, that we see in contemporary modern philosophy, but a group of systems, not all related, but betraying certain tendencies toward unity. It is these tendencies which are of the utmost importance and interest. No one system of 'modern philosophy' exists to provide

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<sup>48</sup> *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ii. 15-21.

the categories or terminology of a new formulation of Christian doctrine. As in the past, so today, the first efforts must be largely tentative and experimental. Some of these 'philosophies' are more adequate, some less adequate, to the purpose of formulating religious doctrine—some, as I have indicated, are wholly inadequate, unless they are to be quite thoroughly modified and supplemented.<sup>40</sup> But we cannot escape the period of experiment, criticism, and tentative formulations in which we find ourselves: it goes with our whole experimental outlook in this age. What I would plead for, in conclusion, is as follows:

I. A thorough-going, sympathetic, historical study and evaluation of the doctrinal formulae of the past; they still have much to tell us of the central life and spirit, outlook and urge of the Christian faith.

II. A tolerant catholic-mindedness and patience with experimental efforts in the present, confident that whatever is true is also mighty and will prevail, and along with this an effort to understand the motives and purposes back of each formulation, as well as the finished result.

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<sup>40</sup> That this modification and supplementation has already overtaken modern Realism is pointed out by Professor Muirhead: "As it has developed in its younger representatives, Realism . . . has found itself constrained to extend its idea of reality from the simple substances to which analysis leads so as to include the substance that is revealed through but not by sense, and, like the Platonic *εἶδη*, constitutes the stable element in space-time events." *Op. cit.*, pp. 19 f. Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Meeting of Extremes*, etc., ch. ii.

III. A recognition of the primary importance of religious experience, of faith, love, obedience, and hope, *i.e.*, of the Christian *life*, rather than theological formulae and definitions, which only attempt—and not always with complete success—to set forth these primary given data in rational and logical language. Christian doctrine has been, and ever must be, realist—in the old sense—to the core; and yet a real *knowledge* of it is ethically conditioned: as Lotze said, ‘The true beginning of metaphysics is in ethics.’

To paraphrase, I think not unfairly, the great saying of the Fourth Gospel, already quoted, “If any man will know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak it from myself, let him do the will of my Father who is in heaven.”<sup>50</sup> This principle may well be our guide through the mazes of modern philosophical thought, as it relates to theology and to religion. For we cannot remind ourselves too often that the Christian religion is, after all, preëminently a faith, not a philosophy.

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. John vii. 17.

## VIII. CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

WE NOW COME face to face with the problem which underlies the whole of this course, which is involved in more than one of the various questions we have considered, and is of paramount importance for the 'contemporaneous history' of Christian thought. It is the problem of the further continuance of the doctrines which have been associated with historical, orthodox Christianity almost from its beginning. In a world in which ideas, customs, received opinions, laws, institutions, and common knowledge are changing and enlarging every day, it is no wonder if the Church is also expected to change and 'modernize' its outlook, to discard antiquated doctrines, and adapt its teaching to the new conditions in which we find ourselves. In such an atmosphere, the conservative finds himself prejudged: for to adhere to the doctrines of the past seems in itself a confession of effeteness and inadequacy.

Not only outside the Church but also within it are found those who feel that our doctrinal position must be revised and modernized, or at least restated. *Foundations*<sup>1</sup> on one hand, and *Essays*

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<sup>1</sup> *Foundations, A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought*. By Seven Oxford Men; Int. by B. H. Streeter, London, 1913.



*Catholic and Critical*<sup>2</sup> on the other, to speak only of two outstanding recent works, both assume this necessity, though interpreting and applying it somewhat differently. 'Catholic' and 'Modernist' alike—to mention only the two most vigorous and extreme schools of Anglicanism—assume the need for revision of the current doctrinal position of the Church. Bishop Gore entitles his recent series, *The Reconstruction of Belief*,<sup>3</sup> while an old and thoughtful priest wrote me recently, in a private letter, of his hope that our theology might be "presented as inclusive and modernistic, with an outlook towards the future. The old theology will have to give way to a large extent, and our present ecclesiasticism will become obsolete." We may assume, then, this widespread feeling that traditional orthodoxy, in the sense of traditional orthodox theology, at least, if not of orthodox doctrine,<sup>4</sup> is inadequate and needs revision, re-statement, reformulation.<sup>5</sup>

The question at once arises, upon what principle is revision to be undertaken? And here at

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<sup>2</sup> *Essays Catholic and Critical*. By Members of the Anglican Communion; ed. by E. G. Selwyn, London, 1926.

<sup>3</sup> *The Reconstruction of Belief: Belief in God; Belief in Christ; The Holy Spirit and the Church*. By Charles Gore. New ed. in one volume, New York, 1926.

<sup>4</sup> A distinction not always made, sometimes not easy to make, and yet important and worth making.

<sup>5</sup> The late Ernst Troeltsch devoted considerable attention to the problem in his (posthumously published) Heidelberg lectures on Christian Doctrine, and summed up the situation in clear and cautious language. Cf. *Glaubenslehre*, 1925, pp. 22 f., 81-83. Unfortunately this volume, like the bulk of Troeltsch's work, has not yet been translated. Few

once the ways divide. Those Christians who naturally incline to identify religion with an institution, with a sacred order, a Church, an authoritative creed to which all must subscribe and which all are committed loyally to maintain, assume at once that the way out of our difficulties is to renounce Protestantism and go back to the simple faith of the undivided Church. Those who identify religion with social idealism, 'the social passion,' the struggle for human betterment in the large, outward, obvious sense, are naturally less enthusiastic about the Church and about orthodox dogma, and are prepared to abandon theological doctrine practically as a whole, ancient as well as modern, and substitute 'a theology for the social gospel'<sup>6</sup> under the guidance and inspiration of the New Testament and the example of Jesus. In between these two extremes of Neo-Catholicism and Sociological Christianity are found a number of other proposals. For example, it is maintained that 'our religion . . . is an ethic pure and simple,'<sup>7</sup> and Christian ethics requires no preparatory or supporting system of doctrinal affirmations. To which some will add: "Everyone knows and understands the ethics of the Gospel; let us teach and practise that, and not bother over theology!"

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thinkers of our time have wrestled as boldly with the gigantic problem of the bearing of history upon the finality and certainty of the Christian religion.

<sup>6</sup> The title of the well-known book by the late Walter Rauschenbusch, New York, 1917.

<sup>7</sup> E. F. Scott, *The Ethical Teaching of Jesus*, Preface, p. xii.

Still another example of a mediating position may be seen in the recent revival of Evangelical theology, especially in England, and in the better variety of Fundamentalism, in the United States. If only the traditional theology is better understood, if the doctrines are endued with the warm life of devotional feeling, and if a revival of evangelical experience accompanies the teaching, they will be found adequate without very much revision—or with a degree of ‘restatement’ only sufficient to rule out the errors of to-day, such as Biblical Higher Criticism and the scientific theory of Evolution! <sup>8</sup>

Thus the paths diverge, and if we are to take seriously the Christian doctrines which have been handed down to us from the past—and not simply discard them altogether—it is evident that we have no easy task on our hands in trying to set them forth intelligibly at the present day. And we may further assume that this task is in fact imposed upon us. At least within the Anglican or Episcopal Churches, which are certainly quite as much and perhaps even more Catholic than Protestant in their inheritance and outlook, there is no other alternative, short of abandoning doctrine altogether.<sup>9</sup> This latter alternative would be an entirely unthinkable procedure: we should then

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<sup>8</sup> To this extent, at least, a large number—probably the majority—of contemporary Roman Catholic theologians appear to be in agreement with the Evangelical-Fundamentalist position.

<sup>9</sup> *I.e.*, abandoning the doctrinal principle, whereupon particular doctrines begin to disappear.

have not a revised or remodelled type of Anglicanism, but something entirely different, a *res nova*, a Church without creed or dogma, a religion without doctrine. For Christianity, at least as Anglicanism has all along conceived it, is a doctrinal religion,<sup>20</sup> sent forth into the world to proclaim and teach certain truths—about God, about Christ, about salvation, about divine grace, and so on. As the Church has all along conceived and represented Him, Christ is 'the Truth,' as well as 'the Way and the Life.'<sup>21</sup> And although I am not in a position to speak for other Christian bodies, I believe the same holds more or less true of others than the Anglican groups. Certainly historically, Protestantism as well as Roman Catholicism has understood and represented Christianity as a doctrinal religion. The solution of our problem must be found, if found at all, within the Church, in continuity with its tradition, in loyalty to its general outlook, and not by way of the short and simple expedient of discarding all doctrine and abandoning much for which the Church has stood firmly and devotedly through the long centuries of the past.

Fortunately, the modern study of the Bible, of Church History, and of the History of Doctrine helps us very considerably in distinguishing between authentic Christian doctrines and later

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. A. E. J. Rawlinson, in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>21</sup> John xiv. 6.

accretions—between the original 'deposit' and later 'developments,' to use traditional terminology—and to trace the varying influences and resulting emphases in the slow evolution of Christian doctrine. If, for example, we find in the present a demand for 'a new Reformation,' this is only because the sixteenth century synthesis is now no more satisfactory to the twentieth century than that of the thirteenth was to the sixteenth, or than the early mediaeval and late patristic synthesis was to the thirteenth century. What men really mean, oftentimes, when they decry 'creeds and dogmas,' is not authentic historical Christianity as a whole, or even the basic doctrines of Christianity, but the 'articles' and 'confessions' and abstruse theological speculations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, set up as orthodox, authoritative, and final. If, on the other hand, we hear of 'the decline of Protestantism,' of 'passing Protestantism and coming Catholicism,'<sup>12</sup> we may perhaps interpret the announcement as significant of one more of those revolutions in religious thought and attitude which the Church has known in the past, and probably will know as long as human nature persists and human history continues.

"Time makes ancient good uncouth;  
They must upward still and onward,  
Who would keep abreast of truth."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The title of one of the late Newman Smyth's books.

<sup>13</sup> J. R. Lowell, 'The Crisis.'

At the same time, the modern study of Church History enables us to recognize that 'Catholic' Christianity is still an unrealized ideal, and always has been, in its full manifestation, an unrealized ideal. The true Catholic Church (of the Apostles' Creed, for example) is still in the future.<sup>14</sup> Though rooted in the past, and hence a thoroughly historical institution, no age in the past has ever fully realized the full potencies of this ideal. No revival of the thirteenth century, therefore, no ringing-in once more of 'the ages of faith,' no artificial restoration of pre-Reformation conditions can conceivably bring to pass the realization of the Catholic ideal.

Apart from the absurdity of such an effort to set back the hands of the clock of time, no century or period in the past ever actually saw a full realization of the Catholic ideal. Ages there have been, no doubt, in which this ideal exercised greater influence than it does at the present day; but those ages had their drawbacks and defects—in the sixth century, for example, the barbarism and superstition of the masses; in the thirteenth century, the caesaro-papal secularization and regi-

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<sup>14</sup> This is not to deny the appropriateness of the term 'Catholic' as applied to certain historical manifestations of Christianity in the past or present; it does deny, however, the right of any sect or group to claim exclusive 'Catholicity,' and even of any Church to claim it, completely and exhaustively. According to Article xix, the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch, and Rome 'have erred'; obviously, since a reformation was necessary, the same applies to the Anglican Church. In a word, the way to Unity and Catholicity is a way forward, not backward, and begins with the path of penitence.

mentation of the Church, the identification of spiritual with worldly power—which, though it brought with it some blessings, no doubt, at the same time entailed colossal disasters. If the Church is in truth the mystical 'Body of Christ,' 'the fullness of Him that filleth all in all,'<sup>15</sup> it is too much to say that such a Church has ever been fully realized in the historical institution known by that name in any age hitherto, or in the present age. The goal of the Church, the Church's 'fulness,' is future.<sup>16</sup> As Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton has put it in one of his famous paradoxes, 'Christianity has not failed; Christianity has never been tried.'<sup>17</sup> The Church has not altogether failed; but it certainly has never entirely succeeded. Though truly defined as in essence 'One, holy, catholic, and apostolic,' it cannot be accurately described as actually any one of these: its unity, its catholicity, its holiness belong to it as the ideal (which is also, in the Platonic and theological

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<sup>15</sup> Ephesians i. 23.

<sup>16</sup> One may view the current idealization of the Catholic past as related to the ideal Catholic Christianity of the future somewhat as the Jewish idealization of the reign of David and David's son were related to the Christian 'Kingdom of God.' 'What came,' as Loisy and Tyrrell maintained, 'was the Christian Church'—something new in form, and unexpected, and yet a realization or 'fulfilment' of the old Messianic dream of the Jewish people. Cf. my *Economic Background of the Gospels*, Oxford, 1926, pp. 136-141. In somewhat the same way the ideal Kingdom is spoken of in the Gospels, sometimes as present, sometimes as future—and in both senses with literal truth. (Of course the simple identification of the Church with the Kingdom of God does not follow from this analogy.)

<sup>17</sup> *What's Wrong with the World?*, 1910, p. 46.

sense, the real) Church, not as the actual, empirical, historical institution.

And what is true of other historical manifestations of the Church is true also of the expression of its doctrine. This is far from complete: there are doctrines of the Church which have never been fully and formally articulated—for example, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which has been neglected through age after age, though it was of fundamental importance in New Testament Christianity and in the teaching of our Lord. And although we by no means assume that Christian doctrine as a whole has been a false and erroneous 'development,' it is impossible to look to the past for complete finality:<sup>18</sup> there are doctrinal expressions of Christian truth, richer, fuller, completer and more satisfying, to be made in the future, than many that we find in the past.

Just as the Church's unity, when realized, will bring into the common Christian fold riches of spiritual life and experience now insufficiently known in various of the separated parts—the devotion of the Catholic, the enthusiasm of the Methodist, the scholarship of the Anglican, for example—so the true and adequate doctrinal expression of Catholic Christianity is something of which the past only offers anticipations: it belongs, so far, among the unrealized possibilities of the

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<sup>18</sup> A point maintained by both Dr. Rawlinson and Mr. Wilfred L. Knox in their essays upon 'Authority' in *Essays Catholic and Critical*. For a criticism see *Anglican Theological Review*, ix. 170 ff.



future. And when it has come to pass, we believe that it will not falsify and supplant all previous doctrinal developments, but it will supplement and perfect them—even though ‘when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.’<sup>19</sup> The old doctrinal statements and formulae will then merge and be absorbed in the more perfect, richer, and more adequate expression of the Christian faith. Many of them were no more than defences hastily thrown up against the errors of the time—like the breastworks on Bunker Hill, or the now grass-grown trenches at Ticonderoga.

The Thirty-nine Articles of Religion were such defences, hastily thrown up, by no means exhaustive of Christian teaching, marked by the spirit of compromise and by a thoroughly legal cautiousness, designed to meet an ecclesiastical-political exigency; and so likewise is many another Protestant and Catholic ‘body of divinity’ drawn up in those troubled times.<sup>20</sup> Going back even farther into the past, the great creeds and canons of the ecumenical councils do not fail to betray the marks of contemporary conflict. They were inevitable as historical formulations or documents; and they are no doubt true statements, as far as

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<sup>19</sup> I Corinthians xiii. 10.

<sup>20</sup> The motive that leads many Anglicans to desire the omission of the *Articles of Religion* from the printed Book of Common Prayer is clearly not disloyalty to their ecclesiastical principles, but a desire to remove unnecessary barriers in the way of Church Unity. Moreover, there is a strong feeling that they have no place in a manual of public worship.

they go; but they are by no means exhaustive statements of the Christian faith, or infallible, or to be looked upon as divinely inspired—save in the secondary and somewhat negative sense that the Holy Spirit is believed to prevent the whole Church (the 'ecumenical' Church) from falling into error.

And it is the doctrine lying behind creeds and formulae, partially if truly expressed in them but never fully or exhaustively, that we hope may some day be more adequately set forth than in any creed or at any council in the past: perhaps in less technical language; perhaps, let us hope, with less acrimony and contentiousness; perhaps in some altogether better way than in any Creed or Confession to which all are required to subscribe, and which becomes at times the more binding a shibboleth the less it is really understood.<sup>21</sup>

In brief, when we think of Christian 'doctrine,' is not this what we really have in mind: the *teaching* of the Church, *i.e.*, the Faith of the Church, so far forth as the Church has been able, up to the

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<sup>21</sup> In Anglicanism, at any rate, there are at present more than one vital Christian doctrine which are not matters of precise definition and explicit subscription: the doctrine of the Atonement, for example, and the Inspiration of Holy Scripture. It may justly be maintained that no dogma (*i.e.*, ecclesiastical decision) was *required*, since everyone (in the sixteenth century as in the fourth) accepted the doctrine or believed in the principle. All that the Church had to do was fix the limits of the canon (*i.e.*, the contents of the Bible), as a practical affair. Cf. W. Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 45. At the same time it is clear from the moderate and indeed largely negative language of Art. vi. and of the Ordinal that the Anglican Church endeavored, and with success, to avoid the common post-Reformation fault of over-definition in matters of faith.

present time, to articulate that Faith in rational, definable concepts? And is not this 'doctrine,' understood as a faith or a body of teaching, something larger and more inclusive than the explicit, dogmatic, authoritative utterances of the Church through its councils? Does not the principle, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*,<sup>22</sup> really include far more than Creeds and Articles and canonically established *dogmata*? And if this be so, is not a wide variety of doctrinal expression, and even a moderate amount of doctrinal divergence, compatible with 'the unity of the Faith,'—which is guaranteed, let us say, by some such minimum formulation as the Apostles' Creed? Such variety in unity and unity in variety we are familiar with at first hand in the Episcopal Church; and it is not unknown even in more rigidly doctrinal bodies, where 'pious opinion' provides ample room for disagreement on matters not of primary importance.<sup>23</sup> And is it not possible that eventu-

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<sup>22</sup> Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium*, ii.: "*In ipsa item catholica ecclesia magnopere curandum est, ut id teneamus, quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est. Hoc est etenim vere proprieque catholicum. . . . Sed hoc ita demum fiet, si sequamur universitatem, antiquitatem, consensionem.*" On the sometimes forgotten background of this well-nigh oracular utterance, see F. Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*, § 54.

<sup>23</sup> Though in Rome and in Protestantism alike there has been altogether too much defining—unnecessary defining—in matters of faith. The Council of Trent undertook for the Catholic (*i.e.*, Roman) Church what the various synods, councils, and assemblies of the Protestant world tried to do for the Anglican, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches. The result, all told, was such a crystallizing and stiffening of the Christian faith as was never known before, not even in the heyday of Scholasticism, and such as we are only now in the twentieth century beginning to get over, in Protestantism. In Rome, the evil has grown even worse. Since the

ally we may behold on a larger scale, even throughout the whole of Christendom, a recognition and application of this principle of doctrinal unity along with doctrinal variety, of unity without the requirement of uniformity? Stockholm, Lausanne, the World Conference on Faith and Order seem to point in that direction.

Some such conception, and likewise hope, follows, I believe, from a consideration both of the true nature of Christian doctrine and of its function in the historic life of the Church. It is quite conceivable that the Church might never have set forth its doctrine in the form of Creeds, Articles, and dogmatic formulae prescribed for acceptance by all orthodox, loyal Christians. For it was only the historical accident of the appearance of certain widespread heresies that rendered necessary the authoritative formulation of the Faith. But even without Creeds and dogmas, Christianity would still have been a doctrinal religion, and the Church would still have held its commission to teach the truth to all nations.<sup>24</sup> For Christian doc-

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triumph of 'Vaticanism' in the nineteenth century, there appears to be little or no room left that is not explicitly measured and marked off, not so much by the Pope himself as by the various papal commissions and congregations speaking authoritatively for the Church.

<sup>24</sup> No one will question the 'purity of the faith' in the days before its accurate formulation was attempted by the Church—say from the first century through the third. Heresies there were, it is true; but they were refuted, and perhaps with equal effectiveness before as after imperial recognition placed a new weapon in the Church's hands. Indeed, there is reason to believe that formal definition, with anathemas hurled at all who disagree, has never been a really effective method of advancing Christian truth or even of safeguarding the Church's doctrines. What

trine is more than a body of dogmatic, credal definitions; it is 'the truth as it is in Christ Jesus'; it is in substance a divine Revelation; and the particular doctrines are only the intellectual formulation or expression of the data or presuppositions of religious experience. Therefore doctrine varies, at least in emphasis, with the variations of religious experience; though it is likewise true that doctrines influence experience, and tend to mold it into uniformity in accordance with particular types of belief.

Thus the doctrines of the sects reflect the spiritual experience of the sects, and in turn tend to crystallize and stabilize that experience. And thus, likewise, normal Christian doctrine (or what is often called 'Catholic' doctrine) reflects the normal religious experience of 'the great Church'—a principle reflected in the famous saying of St. Augustine, which so decisively influenced John Henry Newman: *securus judicat orbis terrarum*—the whole Christian world is not likely to be mistaken! <sup>25</sup>

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I wish to insist upon is that the Church's *doctrine*, understood as teaching, is quite distinguishable from its formulation by acts of councils. Without that doctrine, the Church would not be a Church, but only a sect, or school, or society for human betterment; but this doctrine, or teaching of the Faith, is a higher thing than any body of formulated *dogmata* has ever succeeded in setting forth.

<sup>25</sup> "Quapropter securus judicat orbis terrarum, bonos non esse qui se dividunt ab orbe terrarum in quacumque parte terrarum." *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, iii. 24 (Ben. ed., Vol. ix. 143 D). The words were directed against the Donatists. J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, pp. 116 f. (Ch. iii.). Cf. Fr. Heiler, *Der Katholizismus*, 1923, p. 98 (where the reference should be corrected). The extraordinary fact about

What, then, becomes of the authority of a doctrine, if it is only the reflection of religious experience, or the rational formulation of its presuppositions?—It rests upon the testimony of a Spirit-guided, Christ-inspired body, the Church, which, though not perfect in its response to the divine guidance, is nevertheless not wholly mistaken (*securus judicat!*); and it finds its verification in the religious experience of this body. Not in Scripture alone, not in tradition, not in logical inference from some body of authoritative data or dicta, but in immediate spiritual experience: and that not the heightened, extreme, and sometimes pathological experience of mystics and visionaries, but in the normal, every-day experience of believers.<sup>26</sup>

We must, of course, distinguish between the few great and basic doctrines (or 'dogmas,' in the popular sense) to which the whole of the Christian religion stands committed, and other and secondary doctrines, which vary in their formulation and in the degree of emphasis placed upon them. By primary doctrines I mean such as the Existence, Unity, Personality, Freedom, Fatherhood, and Love of God, the Incarnation, our salvation

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this saying—as about many another of St. Augustine's—is its modernness. It is a classical statement of the evidential or theological value of normal religious experience, which Troeltsch, *e.g.*, has made one of the bases of Christian doctrine, and which Rawlinson and Knox (already cited), and many another contemporary writer, fully recognize.

<sup>26</sup> The principle is no doubt somewhat 'pragmatic,' if we are pressed for an exact designation of the type of inference involved; but at least it corresponds with the actual workings of the religious mind.

effected through the Atonement or Reconciliation, and the doctrine of divine Grace. By secondary doctrines I mean such as the mutual relations of the three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, the mode of the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth of Christ, the nature of the Church, the Sacraments, Eschatology, Justification, Revelation, and so on. These latter doctrines are clearly secondary, as inferential from, ancillary to, or congruous with the primary ones; they are not unimportant, but it is important to see that they rest upon and are supported by the greater and more fundamental doctrines. And although they likewise are to some degree verified by Christian experience, experience alone does not produce them any more than experience alone produces the primary doctrines.

For the process of formulating doctrine, *i.e.*, of setting forth in rational terms the presuppositions of religious experience, is not one that takes place *in vacuo*, or immediately. There is involved not only the direct experience, which is itself colored by all the current beliefs, ideas, hopes, and fears of the experiencing individual, but there is also involved the use of terms, notions, religious concepts (which are already at hand) in the very act of stating what the presuppositions of that experience are. Hence it is possible for a considerable process of inference to intervene—a process not wrong in itself, since reason is the gift of God—and so to produce secondary doctrines which go to make up the rounded whole of Christian belief

and teaching.<sup>27</sup> Thus the distinction between primary and secondary doctrines, both from the 'intellectual' and the 'spiritual' points of view, is a real one, and worthy of careful consideration. I venture to believe that the first step toward a real evaluation of Christian doctrine lies in a strict application of this logical distinction.

For Christian 'doctrine' is not one well-knit system, in which all particular doctrines are equally important—as in the old verbal-inspiration theory of the Bible, according to which each verse is on a par with every other. The doctrines of the Church are of varying import, as expressing in various aspects and relations the central Faith for which the Christian religion stands. Thus, for example, the Christian Faith, rooted in the Christian experience, is, in its relation to formal belief in God—so and so! But as related to belief in the temporal creation of the universe, the doctrine of Angels, the eternity of a spiritual, non-material 'world'—it is something else. In this latter case it is something quite secondary to, and more or less inferential from, the Christian doctrine of God. And yet there are certain doctrines, as we have already noted, and among them some of the most essential, which have never been de-

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<sup>27</sup> One might illustrate this by the varying doctrines of the nature of the Church: in the earliest New Testament period, a divine-human fellowship modelled on the Jewish conception of the *Qahal*, as the Messianic 'New Israel' (cf. E. F. Scott, *Beginnings of the Church*); in the patristic period, the imperial, ecumenical *Civitas Dei* (cf. Edgar Salin, *Civitas Dei*, Tübingen, 1926); and so on. The formulation varied; but there was real continuity at the heart of the conception.



finéd, which have never even been fully taken into account either in theology or in ordinary practice or instruction. Nor, in the next place, are the ancient formulations entirely satisfactory, since language varies in meaning: *e.g.*, such terms as 'person,' 'nature,' 'substance'; and since the heresies which they ruled out are no longer maintained—at least not in the same form: *e.g.*, Arianism, Sabellianism, or Eutychianism.

On a thoroughly rigid theory of doctrinal authority and with an ideal of complete doctrinal uniformity, it would be necessary to provide—or to acquiesce in—some form of papal infallibility, with a pope exercising his infallible powers far more vigorously than the successors of St. Peter have ventured to do since 1870; and with a 'syllabus of errors' and an *Index expurgatorius* issued not periodically and intermittently but almost continuously—like a loose-leaf encyclopaedia. But Christian doctrine, as we conceive it, is not such a system of mechanical and water-tight canals of truth.<sup>28</sup> Christian doctrine is a living whole, but its separate, particular doctrines—so far as they have received intellectual formulation—are only the least inadequate, historically conditioned expressions in rational terms of that mystic Faith which glows at the heart of the Church's continuous life. They are but the reflections and interpre-

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<sup>28</sup> Not even theology, let alone doctrine, can be classed with the 'exact' sciences; it is naturally more like philosophy. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I. i. 1-5.

tations of a continuous spiritual experience. Hence in speaking of 'Christian doctrine in the twentieth century' I mean the traditional Christian doctrines as expressions of that living faith, not all of them entirely satisfactory expressions, to be sure, either in the present, or in the past, or indeed at any conceivable point in history short of the consummation. They are human expressions—since 'we have this treasure in earthen vessels'<sup>29</sup>—and fallible; not inspired; and yet authoritative, with the authority of the body of Christian believers, and the verification of Christian experience, to guarantee the measure of truth which they contain and to suggest that greater measure which no human language has yet or perhaps ever can set forth. A doctrine which cannot be verified in Christian experience, and which lacks 'religious value,' may be reasonable, congruous with Christian faith, fitting and appropriate (*i.e.*, aesthetically or logically satisfying): but it certainly cannot be described as one that is 'necessary to salvation.'

After what has been said thus far, I can scarcely avoid going on to discuss various particular doctrines, or at least Christian doctrine generally, in a very brief and summary way, as it stands now at the end of the first quarter, and better, of the twentieth century, and surrounded by the new horizons of modern thought. One must overcome his diffidence as best he can, and at the

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<sup>29</sup> II Corinthians iv. 7.

same time make it as clear as possible that he does not intend to set forth one more formulation or series of 'articles' defining the Christian faith—though as one's own personal *credo* or *confessio fidei* it will perhaps be acceptable and in some small measure useful. My purpose is partly to ascertain loss and gain, and to see where we are after due recognition has been paid the positive developments of modern science and philosophy; and partly, also, it is to focus discussion in such a way that it will be practical and worth while and not a mere 'venting of opinions.' I may say in advance that I believe the changes in doctrinal formulae which have been made necessary by modern thought are not really so great as it is often assumed. I believe that a thorough-going Modernist, a thorough Catholic, and a thorough Evangelical could each really get along, and without suffering undue privation, with the maximum of Christian doctrine we are able to 'reconstruct' or 'restate' or 'reformulate' after 'taking seriously' the whole development of modern scientific, historical, and philosophical thought and research.

I. The fixed center of Christian faith, of Christian doctrine, and of Christian theology, is the doctrine of *God*. Though it be not independent of history, the doctrine of God is less dependent upon history than many of the other Christian doctrines, and than similar doctrines in some religions. For the idea of God, of the divine nature

and attributes, is alike the foundation and pinnacle of any system of religious belief. It crowns the whole structure; and yet if it be viewed as the final result or synthesis of all the various and sundry doctrines that go together in a reasoned body of religious thought, it must also be viewed as the controlling principle by which that synthesis of ideas has taken place. Whether men have realized it or not, their idea of God has been subtly molding the other religious ideas which they have either inherited or acquired in the process of mental development. Hence the idea of God is—and ought to be—the very last idea to change, in any religion. And in its doctrine of God should be found, at least implicit, all the other doctrines of any religion. And in the third place, the doctrine of God should contain the best elements of the thought of any religion, any civilization, any Church. If 'the test of a civilization is its idea of God,'<sup>30</sup> no less is it the test of a religion, a Church. Here, indeed, the whole problem of apologetics and philosophy of religion, of comparative theology and even of ethics<sup>31</sup> comes clearly to the fore.

How are we to conceive God? To answer roundly, I believe that the actual, objective existence of God—God the Eternal, Immutable, Infinite; the Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent; the Holy, Just, Supremely Loving—the actual

<sup>30</sup> *Ut sup.*, Lect. iv.

<sup>31</sup> Since 'theory,' as Bishop Rhinelander puts it, 'is only practice getting under way.' *Think Out Your Faith*, 1926; cf. *Anglican Theological Review*, ix. 445.

and objective existence of this God is not only indispensable for Christian thought but will be found in the end indispensable for modern science and philosophy.<sup>32</sup> And I believe, for my part, that this objectively real God, who is not to be lost sight of in an identification with 'purely subjective' values, or defined as the mere 'projection' of religious feeling<sup>33</sup>—though He of course may and no doubt must be thought of in terms of whatever idealism, realism, or other philosophy a man holds<sup>34</sup>—is still most satisfactorily conceived in the old-fashioned way as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 'Most satisfactorily,' or, at the very least, 'least unsatisfactorily': since we recognize the difficulty of securing adequate terms of thought at such a level of abstractness.

The doctrine of the Trinity is a metaphysical doctrine, without doubt; but its necessity—the necessity for some doctrine of a real plurality in unity within the Godhead—seems forced upon us by the facts of revelation (*i.e.*, the 'aspects' under which God has actually been revealed, not just in the Bible, but universally), and by the requirements of thought. For God is immanent as well as

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<sup>32</sup> For science, in so far as science is in any degree more than 'abstract' description and analysis of natural phenomena; and for philosophy, in so far as it concerns itself with its true task, the discovery of the ultimately real and the pursuit of wisdom for life.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. W. R. Matthews, *The Gospel and the Modern Mind*, 1925; E. S. Drown, *Religion or God?*, 1926; M. B. Stewart, *God and Reality*, 1926.

<sup>34</sup> Dante, for example, calls God the *Valor Valorum*; but he uses the term descriptively, not definitively.

transcendent, and transcendent as well as immanent; He is eternal, but He is also manifest in time; He is the Creator of man and the universe, and yet He is somehow identified with man and with His other creatures. No solitary divine unit, no supreme Monad-deity, can quite meet the requirements of the Christian experience of God: or if He does so, then He has already taken on some of the aspects of the orthodox Christian or Trinitarian conception of the divine Being—and it is really simpler to think of Him as 'Three in One and One in Three' than as a protean combination of immanence and transcendence, eternity and time; as a deity who combines in some unfathomably mysterious fashion the attributes of the God of Pantheism with the personal finitude and the historical or cosmic transcendence of less philosophic deities. The Christian idea, I maintain, is far simpler, though we must of course make it clear that the Trinitarian formula, as a formula, is true but not exhaustive; it is only the best the Church can do, with the terms of human language at its disposal, to set forth a mystery that quite transcends our full comprehension.

So far as modern science, philosophy, or historical criticism are concerned, I fail to see that taking modern knowledge 'seriously' requires of us any other position than the acceptance of the traditional Christian conception of God—of course with humility, with a recognition that faith is still necessarily faith, and with a realization

that the mystery of the divine nature is no less profound—in fact, even more profound—to us than it was to Job, who stopped his mouth in reverence and awe and refused to utter vain words.<sup>35</sup> The mystery is real; and though we are able to make some statements with great confidence, we are certainly in no position to become contentious, or intolerant, or exclusive, in our attempted formulation in merely human and strictly logical language of the truths concerning the being, nature, or attributes of the Eternal God.

Maintained in this spirit, I believe the orthodox Christian doctrine of God is not only a tenable creed at the present time but offers a really constructive contribution to modern thought which loses nothing in essential value for being many centuries old—a contribution whose value is recognized by more than one philosopher and scientist of to-day.

II. It is with the Christian doctrine of *Creation* that the modern scientific, evolutionary conception is most frequently thought to collide.<sup>36</sup> But that doctrine is not the result of a simple and

<sup>35</sup> Job xl. 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Vide sup.*, Lects. ii.-iii.—Strict 'Creationism,' in the arbitrary Calvinistic sense, is as dissonant with the general tenor of Christian thought as it is (though on somewhat different grounds) with modern science and philosophy. This appears to be the central—and least commendable—principle in K. Barth's 'theology of crisis' (cf. *Anglican Theological Review*, x. 116 f.). Rudolf Otto shares it to some extent, though in practice he recognizes some values in 'natural religion.' One can without difficulty pick out the strands of Calvinism, socialism, Protestant biblicism, and war-time despair of civilization, in Barth's theology.

uncritical attribution of 'all that happens' to God, as if divine causation were the 'omnium gatherum' for all otherwise unaccountable effects. The truth is, as Aristotle recognized long ago, an 'infinite regress' is impossible; there must be some beginning of causation; the cause of all causes must be a cause;<sup>37</sup> and even evolution must have some initial stage, something with which to begin evolving! And if, with Professor Sorley,<sup>38</sup> we conceive the doctrine of creation to imply the dependence of all things upon the divine will rather than the temporal *creatio ex nihilo* by divine fiat; and if, with Professor Morgan and others,<sup>39</sup> we conceive creative or emergent evolution to be an activity of Mind, with Mind (or Spirit) its goal and Mind its *fons et origo*; then I fail to see why either the initial act of evolution or the process of evolution as a whole cannot be called 'creation' and the Author of all be called 'the Creator.'<sup>40</sup> The 'religious value' of the doctrine is quite ob-

<sup>37</sup> *Metaphysics*, ii. 2 (994 a-b). The principle still holds—unless all 'causation' is forthwith to be abandoned.

<sup>38</sup> *Vide sup.*, Lect. iii.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* The real difficulty is in no small part due to the identification of the doctrine of creation with the imaginative representation of it in the first chapter of Genesis.

<sup>40</sup> It should be pointed out that the word translated 'Almighty' in the Apostles' and 'Nicene' Creeds, which has given rise to many difficulties, ancient and modern, is *παντοκράτωρ*. The title denotes, as Hort observed (*Comm.* on Rev. i. 8), 'not One who can do anything, but One who holds together and controls all things'; cf. Moulton-Milligan, *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, s. v., and Preuschen-Bauer, *Wörterbuch*. In popular usage the word doubtless tended to be identified with the restricted sense of 'All-powerful'—the evidence points that way; but its full meaning was broader, 'One who actually does hold sway and



vicious, not only as against Gnostic and Manichæan dualism, but against any and every theory that would either degrade the natural world and the natural life of man to the nadir of opposition to the divine, the spiritual, the eternal, or sink them in the bottomless, muddy slough of Materialism. Only on the basis of a natural order which is not evil, but in some sense 'good' <sup>41</sup>—even though impermanent, and hampered by genuine and undeniable evils—can a sacramental conception be erected: a super-nature, in the Scholastic sense, which is not the denial of nature but its completion, consummation, and fulfilment. The importance of all this, for Christian art, for Christian worship, for Christian ethics, indeed for the whole of an ideal of Christian civilization, cannot be too greatly emphasized.

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control the world'—a meaning which its association with the various derivatives of *kri* in general use would help to maintain (*κράτος*, *κρατέω*, etc.).

The emphasis in the Creed is accordingly, 'God the Father' (a biblical title, but having classical connotations as well, for Christians of the second to fifth centuries), All-ruler and All-sustainer, Maker of heaven and earth'; *i.e.*, the idea emphasized is the divine sustaining and ordering of all things, rather than the all-powerful creative fiat. For the latter the series would be: 'God the Father, Almighty' (*'omnipotens'*, as almost invariably in the Latin creeds [a characteristic note?], *i.e.*, All-powerful), Maker . . . ' ('Creator' in the early Latin creeds; 'Factor' and 'Conditor' appear later); *i.e.*, God, possessing all power, exercised it in the creation of the world. But the early Greek Creed conveyed the idea: God, the Sustainer and Ruler of all things, is also the Maker of heaven and earth.

The sense of 'Maker' is not defined; *ποιητής* perhaps implied Genesis i.-ii., esp. in the LXX, though some MSS read *δημιουργός* or *κτίστης*; there is little doubt that the phrase was a later addition and not a part of the earliest form of the creed; see Hahn, *Bibliothek*, and Lietzmann, in the Harnack *Festgabe*.

<sup>41</sup> Genesis i. 31.

III. What part is played by *Satan* in a modernly conceived scheme of Christian doctrine?—Much the same, I believe, as the part played heretofore; for it has been only in certain ages that Satan, or the devil, has been fully 'personalized' and treated as a concrete individual. Far more important has been his symbolic value as the representative of the abysmal mysteries of evil, as the arch-rebel, the ringleader of the opposition, as the tempter and seducer of souls, as the prince of hell. Much of this is 'picture language,' of course, and could not well be anything else. For the Christian solution of the problem of evil, so far as it is solved at all, is a practical one, not a speculative. The existence of evil is not denied; its power, its impressiveness, its horror, are not denied; what is denied is its permanence. There comes a time when, picturesquely put, the devil shall be in chains, and 'cast out,' and sealed in a dungeon;<sup>42</sup> or, less picturesquely, more abstractly, when evil shall be overcome of good, when sin shall be finally blotted out, death annihilated and 'God shall be all in all.'<sup>43</sup>

'There shall never be one lost good! What was, shall live as before;

The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound';<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Revelation xx. 1-3.

<sup>43</sup> I Corinthians xv. 28.

<sup>44</sup> Browning, 'Abt Vogler,' ix. Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, xxvii.: "God deems it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit evil at all." Also *Tract. in Joh.* xxvii. 10: "Like an artist God makes use even of the devil—and indeed as a great artist; did He not know how to make such use of him, He would never permit him to exist!"

—as a description of the Christian ideal, which is the Christian real, this is admirably put. Satan, then, may be defined as a poetic or fictional hypostasis of the 'principle' of evil in the world—though most Christians will not admit that 'principle' to be permanent and of anything more than relative, transitory significance. And the doctrine is as clearly 'secondary' as any to be found in the traditional scheme.

IV. Of the existence of *angels*, strangely enough, the modern Christian world seems even less willing to make any positive affirmation than of the existence of a spirit of evil—why this is so, one can hardly guess, unless it be that the existence of diabolical evils in the world (especially since the war) seems to require a more adequate personal accounting-for than the existence of angelic and heavenly blessings. If it is against the foil of normal, healthy, happy daily existence that the evils of life stand out the more sharply, demanding 'metaphysical,' or at least poetic and 'mythic' explanation, it is surely against the foil of a human life surrounded by *evils* and threats of danger that the heavenly succors, assistances, promptings which give rise to belief in angelic beings, stand out the more clearly defined. At least, this is the way the doctrine arose, and received emphasis, in the past.<sup>46</sup> But nothing could more

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<sup>46</sup> Especially as reflected in the Jewish apocalyptic literature of the Maccabean era.

clearly mark its 'secondary'—or even tertiary—position! When God is everywhere present, all-controlling, where divine 'grace' really operates effectively (at least in the thinking of believers), those blessed figures, those gentle, guiding, loving beings whom man has 'loved' for countless centuries,<sup>46</sup> begin to fade in the light of brighter day. They also fade, and many can tell us of this, in the gloom of a night of machine-driven materialism, the overwhelming burden of whose slowly sinking, leaden skies their gentle wraith-like hands are no longer able to support! <sup>47</sup> It is in ages of faith, of normal, 'natural' religion, with a somewhat strong emphasis on divine transcendence and likewise upon the dangers, physical and spiritual, that surround the lives of men, that the belief in angels thrives best. It is a part of the poetry of religion, part of its 'mythical,' imaginative envelopment, not of the essential core of belief, of faith, of doctrine. It seems to require the doctrine of demons as its foil—and that, too, is poetry, though often grotesque, sometimes satirical, sometimes bitter and disillusioned, and not the genuine core of religious belief.

One need not deny the existence, 'outside' or in addition to the Supreme Being, of other and doubtless higher (as well as lower) intelligences and moral natures in the universe than men. When one looks at a photograph of the Milky Way, and

<sup>46</sup> 'Lead, kindly light,' by Cardinal Newman.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. J. Rickaby, *Scholasticism*, p. 70.

considers the multitude of universes there displayed; when the eye travels inward from the edges, so that clusters and groups of stellar, solar systems become very clouds for denseness and relative proximity; when it is recalled that probably at least a billion such drifting masses of solar systems are in existence, in addition to our own group, within this particular galaxy, the so-called Milky Way—not to mention other and exterior galaxies;<sup>48</sup> when it is further considered that the human species is only one, and that a lately appeared and transitory one, upon a slowly shrinking planet revolving about an aged and really dying member of this particular stellar galaxy, many of whose components far outshine our sun in vigor and brilliance—our sun, which is so small that it would be invisible to the naked eye from many of the relatively nearby systems; when all this really takes hold of one's imagination, it begins to be the sheerest pride, the emptiest vanity, and logically the most contrary to all analogy, to suppose that the whole cosmos exists for man alone, and that no intelligences exist in all this universe save God, the Eternal Supreme, and man, the feeble creature dwelling upon this tiny planet! Analogy would surely suggest other purposes in creation, commensurate in some degree to the energy involved, other intelligent beings, made in the image of God, serving His purpose and obedient to His will—though whether they be 'angels'

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. F. R. Moulton, in *The Nature of the World and Man*, p. 25.

or not is another question. At the very least, one may say that modern science, unless it forbids altogether the use of the imagination,<sup>49</sup> must leave the door open to belief in super-human, extra-human, or angelic beings. The real question is, of course, not their possible existence, but their function: *i.e.*, the question of their actual functioning in human history and in individual life. And although he would be quite rash who should deny *a priori* the possibility of such functioning—more rash than any scientist, who certainly grants the possibility of ‘psychic’ phenomena, for example—still as a matter of practical value to the religious life we may admit that the doctrine of Angels is largely hypothetical. It satisfies certain poetic, aesthetic minds who demand the beauty of this heavenly hue in their picture of the world as known to the spirit; it satisfies the naturally conservative for whom the tradition of the past is not only precious but also in some measure self-evidencing—true, because it has been believed for so long; it also satisfies those who crave a concrete demonstration of the reality of the unseen world that ‘lies all about us’ not only in our dreams but likewise in our waking, though unperceived. But even on the best interpretation, the belief in angels as a matter of fact simply does not function in modern religion as in ancient—as in the Book

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<sup>49</sup> A thing science cannot conceivably do, since it constantly stimulates and encourages, and in experiment constantly uses, the imagination. Cf. Darwin: “No one can be a good observer, unless he is an active theorizer”; *Life and Letters*, i. 126.

of Tobit, for example, or in the Infancy Narrative of St. Luke. Its value for faith is evanescent; its value for doctrine is not positive, but consists chiefly in the filling-out of the theoretical, imaginative, poetic background of cosmology.<sup>50</sup>

V. Of the doctrine of *man's* creation in the image of God and with the capacity for moral and spiritual likeness to God and hence with the capacity for eternal life, we can only say that nothing in modern science, taken at its full value, forbids us to hold such a doctrine—though the form, the connotations, the drift of the conception is somewhat different as a result of 'taking seriously' modern science, especially modern psychology. For if one school of psychology emphasizes what is called 'behaviorism,' man's unnumbered ties with the lower creation, no less does modern psychology, taken as a whole, emphasize man's capacity to rise above the brute, and transcend his limitations. The structure of the brain and nervous system does not reveal the full secret of man's life: there is something in him no analogy with the ape and rat quite succeeds in making clear.

"What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!"<sup>51</sup>

It is this capacity for a higher life, higher than

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. J. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, p. 263.    <sup>51</sup> *Hamlet*, Ac. ii., sc. 2.

the brutes, higher than man's own past or present attainments, which is the sure evidence of that 'seed of a deiform nature' <sup>52</sup> which has been implanted in man—as reason, 'soul,' 'spirit,' or 'divine image.' It is true that this image is imperfect, either as the result of sin or through its merely partial development; <sup>53</sup> but the imperfection is only, as St. Augustine held, <sup>54</sup> the imperfection of that which is in itself good, the privation of the perfect, not something positively and equally real substituted in its place. Without man's capacity for good, or for God, the Incarnation could never have taken place—and that is the very heart of Christian doctrine. Without man's capacity for higher mental and social development, language, thought, social organization, the whole process of human evolution could never have taken place—and that is modern science. And as far as I can see both orthodox Christianity and modern science imply in the original nature of man something more than just the sum total of biological adaptations up to the moment of man's emergence.

The religious value of this doctrine is unquestionable: like the doctrine of the Creation of the world, though here more particularly, more con-

<sup>52</sup> *Works of Benjamin Whichcote*, Aberdeen, 1751, Vol. I, p. 8.

<sup>53</sup> And considering both the continuous evolution and the biological solidarity of the race—which in turn makes its evolution possible—science may be expected to agree that it is *both*.

<sup>54</sup> *E.g.*, *De Civitate Dei*, xiv. 11: "Good can exist without evil; but evil cannot exist without good, since the natures in which evil is found are—in the degree in which they really exist—good." Cf. *De natura Boni*, i.



cretely, the whole promise and possibility of man's higher life, salvation, blessedness, his social happiness in this world and the pledge of the continuance and meaning of his life beyond the grave, are involved. A theology which makes man nothing in order to make God all, which views human nature as the negation of the divine and all human goods and values as less than worthless in God's sight, in order to magnify the donor of eternal life—as in one phase of St. Augustine's theology, pushed to its extreme by Calvin and revived in our day by Karl Barth—seems a quite unfair rendering of the genuinely Christian outlook. It reflects, like pessimistic and unhealthy apocalypticism, the ethos of a moribund and morally desiccated age, not the fresh, creative spirit of a living religion.

So much, in brief, for the doctrines that concern the nature or structure of the universe, the cosmic background of religion; we turn now to the doctrines that concern more closely the historical, religious-psychological, specifically Christian elements in our religion. And since it is with the former, already surveyed, that contemporary science and philosophy have most to do, we can treat the remainder somewhat more briefly.

VI. The doctrine of the *Fall*, though not nearly so important in some theologies (for example, the early Greek) as in others (St. Augus-

tine's, and the Mediaeval and Reformation systems), is nevertheless a thoroughly orthodox doctrine. That is to say, it has been held generally, in some form or other, throughout Christian history. But even so it consists mainly of a reading-back of individual guilt into the past, in view of the certain and in one sense tragic principle of heredity.<sup>55</sup> The legendary element in it need cause us no concern: other religions have other legends: what concerns us is its testimony to the universal prevalence of sin, and the sense of frustration, defeat, and doom to which the recognition of this universal prevalence of sin has given rise. It may be that there was no historic, or 'pre-historic,' Adam; yet in some sense 'each man is the Adam of his own soul.' This much, at least, is true: though the elaboration of a precise and exact theory of the origin and propagation of sin—such as the Augustinian theory, the Pelagian, 'Semi-Pelagian,' and so on—may be left to those with the skill or inclination to do it. No particular theory of the origin of sin has ever received universal assent in the Christian Church. Augustinianism prevailed over Pelagianism, in public; but the real practice of the Church was based upon a 'Semi-Pelagian' theory for almost a thousand years, in some parts of the Church for much longer, or rather, indeed, has been so supported ever since. The legend of 'the Fall' must be let go; but the

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<sup>55</sup> See especially the recent Bampton Lectures by N. P. Williams, already cited.

universal and ubiquitous fact of sin, of man's sense of guilt, of man's longing for redemption, cannot be passed by in a realistic construction of religious thought. And to the widespread existence of this consciousness, much of the history of religions and much of religious psychology bear ample witness.

The value of the doctrine, then, we see in its testimony to a sense of frustration, incapacity, impotence, defeat; so that the saving act, the saving power, must come from God. 'There is no health in us.'<sup>56</sup> God alone can save and make us whole. As a construction or interpretation of actual religious experience we shall never, I believe, get beyond the need for some kind of doctrine of a 'fall': though it must be carefully safeguarded, not rhetorically exaggerated, and must be purged of all legendary elements and made to stand purely for a fact of the religious consciousness. Nor must its symbolic character be lost sight of, and further inferential doctrines be built upon it as if it were a literal truth whose full bearing we are capable of ascertaining.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Book of Common Prayer, p. 19.

<sup>57</sup> As already noted, one may compare Plato's doctrine of the Fall, where the symbolism (of moral experience) is clearly recognized. One wonders what would have happened if Platonism had completely triumphed in early Christianity, say at Alexandria, where it was most strong! Perhaps the result would have been a *too* mythological theory. The doctrine of the Fall, interpreted in terms of Genesis iii., carries with it a profound sense of the *historical* actuality of sin; moreover, it is a historical, and yet not quite a cosmical, event upon which it hinges—sin is in the world more as a 'functional' than an 'organic' disease. Therefore, also, the redemption is wrought out in a historical process, and not one supra-historical and purely cosmic, as in the Gnostic teachings.

VII. The doctrine of *Divine Revelation* in the past, of God's actual initiative in manifesting Himself to man, meets with no objection from the scientist or philosopher—certainly not from the one who thinks of God, and the divine initiative in evolution, in terms approaching that of 'Logos' in early Christian thought.<sup>58</sup> If God is really God, and therefore free, nothing could be more natural. Indeed, from any point of view approaching that of evolutionary monism, man's discovery of God, man's successive and sometimes successful guesses at truth, may be regarded at the same time as God's own acts of self-revelation.

That such a revelation gets itself preserved in Scripture, that is, in a written literature, is also natural; and so likewise is the fact that such a literature in time becomes sacred. It is only when the process is forgotten and the finished product is treated as something produced of a sudden by arbitrary fiat, with 'a Bible let down from heaven by a string,' that the doctrine becomes preposterous—and indeed it then has only a minimum of real religious value left in it!

VIII. The culmination of the whole system of Christian doctrine is the doctrine of the *Incarnation*.<sup>59</sup> And yet, strange as it may appear, so profoundly consonant is a serious acceptance of mod-

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Professor Morgan's words, cited above; Lect. iii.

<sup>59</sup> As the full unfolding of the Christian conception of God, which (as noted above, under § i.) is basic to the Christian religion. Cf. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 46.

ern science and scientific philosophy with a simple and realistic grasp of the Christian view of the world, that the doctrine of the Incarnation may be said to offer almost no difficulties and to require almost no revision in the light of modern thought, *i.e.*, chiefly, of modern science and philosophy. Of course the natures of God and man may be so represented as to be thrown into opposition; but such an emphasis, as has already been intimated, is not modern—it comes almost directly from the sixteenth century with its revival of absolutism,<sup>60</sup> and, earlier still, from the exaggerations of divine transcendence in rabbinic Judaism and in the later classical philosophy and theology of the fourth and fifth centuries.<sup>61</sup> Modern science is more monistic and naturalistic in its influence; God is closer to nature, is revealed in nature, if revealed at all, is in some degree realized in nature—and man himself is ‘organic to nature.’<sup>62</sup>

“So nigh is grandeur to our dust,  
So nigh is God to man,  
When Duty whispers low, Thou must,  
The youth replies, I can.”<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> That is, it comes in large part from the revival of absolutism in the Reformed theology, coupled with the dichotomistic epistemology of the decline of Scholasticism (Occam, etc.). In large measure the positive theology of sixteenth-century Protestantism was only a revised version of Scholasticism (as the Ritschlians maintain), lacking much of the religious *naïveté* of its earlier development and its thoroughly clear, penetrating logic. The revival of Calvinistic absolutism in K. Barth's theology is of a part with his renunciation of the leading conceptions of modern thought.

<sup>61</sup> Not to mention Gnosticism, Manichaeism, and other aberrations.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, Lect. vi.

<sup>63</sup> Emerson, ‘Voluntaries’.

So near is God to man in the modern view, both scientific and philosophical, that the union of the 'two Natures in one Person' is not only not impossible, not improbable, but, one may surely conclude, antecedently the most probable of hypotheses.<sup>64</sup>

As to the actual realization of an incarnation—or of *the* Incarnation—of God in Christ, that is a matter for history and for faith to decide. But of the *a priori* probability of it, there was never a time when it seemed more certain than precisely in these 'degenerate' days when the sea of faith is supposed to have completely ebbed! The miracles of Christ, like other miracles, are of course primarily matters of evidence; there is no longer any *a priori* probability either for or against their occurrence.<sup>65</sup> Our Lord's sinlessness, however, His perfect character, the quality of utter and consummate divine Love which filled Him, His supreme self-giving in sacrifice, 'the persuasive power of his self-sacrificing love,' the Reconciliation or Atonement, its effect in us and in others—all these are either matters of direct religious experience, verifiable in greater or less degree directly and immediately, or are matters of value, which depend upon recognition, insight, not upon logical, historical, or scientific demonstration; and

<sup>64</sup> *Vide sup.*, Lect. iii., § iii.

<sup>65</sup> Even the greater miracles, such as the Resurrection and Virgin Birth, are of course really historical questions, first of all, not matters of faith to be settled independently of history.

modern science and philosophy have not one word to say against them.

In fact, the antecedent probability, as I have said, seems all the other way. For in a world of gradual emergence, the eventual revelation or manifestation of the highest values, and indeed of God Himself, is all but a certainty;<sup>66</sup> and the functional activities of a God, or of the supreme values, thus manifested—*i.e.*, in such a world as we know this one to be, and in man as religious psychology discovers him to be—could hardly be better conceived than in just the way orthodox Christianity has all along conceived the functional activities of the God-man, Christ Jesus. Much of that function, let us admit, is described in myth, not in language that applies directly to the historical Jesus of Nazareth; but no one denies the fact that the *language* is myth<sup>67</sup>—that it is merely the *least-inadequate* terminology that could be discovered or devised for setting forth the meaning Jesus Christ has come to have in Christian experience: *i.e.*, for the functional activities he actually exercises in the life of the world. That at least is not 'myth,' but the realest of facts!

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<sup>66</sup> This assumption underlies the whole system of Prof. S. Alexander, for example; though there are obvious differences between the metaphysics of *Space, Time, and Deity* and Christian theology.

<sup>67</sup> *E.g.*, the use of the terms 'Son' and 'Father' to describe the relations between the Second and First Persons of the Blessed Trinity; or the 'ascension' of Christ to 'the right hand' of God. Cf. A. E. J. Rawlinson, *New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, pp. 227 f. In a measure this principle covers and explains the Ritschlian affirmation that Christ 'has the value of God' for the Christian consciousness; too often, however, it is understood in a watered-down sense.

And yet neither the employment of mythical, 'picture' language, nor the sublime fact which that language was designed to set forth, is disapproved by modern science. Where the fact impinges upon history, and the world of other concrete facts, the question is primarily one of evidence. And where we are concerned with the inner consciousness of saved, believing men and women, this also is fact; but here sight must be supplemented with insight if we are to make a true appraisal of the situation. True science does not dream of ruling out facts of such an order, or of denying their existence; while philosophy, as we have noted, inclines more and more to value religion precisely for the insight it offers into the reality behind the manifold phenomena of the universe.<sup>68</sup>

IX. Of the doctrine of the *Holy Spirit*, rich in its implications and values for religious experience despite the slight attention paid to it in Christian theology; of the doctrine of the *Church*, its origin, ministry, and sacraments; its 'supernatural' qualities; its combination of the historic and institutional with the ideal and eternally real, as 'the extension of the Incarnation'; its 'social' as well as its 'spiritual' connotations; of the doctrine of *Grace*, as the correlate of freedom in God and

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<sup>68</sup> There are of course philosophies, claiming to be strictly scientific, which do rule out facts of such an order, or empty them of their significance; but the irrelevance of such philosophies is proved by their incapacity to deal with any but a privately selected range of phenomena.



man, and of Fatherhood and filiality in the Creator and His creature, as divine help to meet our great human need; of the Christian *Eschatology*, the conception of the end of all things, Immortality and Resurrection, death, judgment, paradise, heaven, and hell—whereupon we are once more back in the realm of the cosmic, the ontological, and have left the historical and psychological—of all these doctrines there is not time to speak. Nor do I need do so, I believe, after what has been said of the other doctrines. The principles already applied apply here also: though the observations I have offered are intended to be no more than suggestive. They are one way of looking at the problems and of viewing the situation that confronts us. In the end every man has to think out his own position. What I have tried to offer will, I hope, prove useful to others in working out their own intellectual position; and when a number of us have succeeded in doing this, it may perhaps be said that each has done his modest share, and made his own small contribution, toward the solving of what until then must remain the most imposing problem and difficulty of Christian faith at the present time, *viz.*, the problem of loyalty to Christian doctrine in the world of modern science and scientific philosophy.

In lieu of any further consideration of particular doctrines, I wish to offer, by way of epilogue, four final observations on the general na-

ture of Christianity and its relation to knowledge:

(a) First, it is necessary to recognize, simply and completely and in entire frankness, the real primacy of the ethical element in Christianity. As Professor Webb has said, "Christianity inherited from the prophets their ethical interpretation of the holiness ascribed to the God of Israel and of the sacrificial language employed by religious tradition; and, after it had made for itself a home among the Gentiles, it inherited also from Plato his canon of theology that nothing but what is good may be ascribed to God."<sup>69</sup>

There is, there can be, nothing in God—or in religion—which is not of meaning for ethics. There is nothing in ethics which is not significant for religion. 'Ethics,' to quote Lotze once more, 'is the true beginning of metaphysics'; and although metaphysical elements are unavoidable, it is best to recognize them for what they are, and not try to slip them in under the guise of matters of faith. For Christianity is a purely ethical faith, not a philosophical theory of the universe. It conceives religion not as a means to knowledge, or a supplement to knowledge, but as existing in its own right—like aesthetics, like philosophy, like science, like ethics itself;<sup>70</sup> or, if it is a means to

<sup>69</sup> C. C. J. Webb, *A Century of Anglican Theology and Other Essays*, p. 124. Cf. also the conclusion to his *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*.

<sup>70</sup> In which of course knowledge has its rightful and inalienable place; but none of these, save science, exists purely as a means to knowledge.

any end, that end can be nothing short of the highest, the true life which is the eternal.

(b) As an ethical religion with a minimum of philosophical content, Christianity can dispense with certainty on many points on which our fathers demanded oracular knowledge. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, stated this principle vigorously:

"Divine truth is better understood as it unfolds itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives than in all those subtle niceties into which curious wits may lay it forth. And, therefore, our Saviour, who is the great master of it, would not, while He was here on earth, draw it up into any system or body, nor would His disciples after Him; He would not lay it out to us in any canons or articles of belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the world with opinions and notions, as with true piety, and a God-like pattern of purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope was to promote a holy life, as the best and most compendious way to right belief. He hangs all true acquaintance with divinity upon the doing God's will. 'If any will do His will, he will know of the doctrine whether it be of God.' This is that alone which will make us, as Peter tells us, 'that we shall not be barren or unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour.'"<sup>71</sup>

Much of the controversy over Christian 'dogma' is due to misunderstanding of the proper function of religion and the real limitations of its

<sup>71</sup> Cf. F. J. Powicke, *The Cambridge Platonists*, pp. 105 f. John Smith, 'Concerning the True Way or Method of Attaining Divine Knowledge,' in *Select Discourses*, Cambridge, 1859, p. 12.

sphere. Its sphere is very real, and vitalizes the whole of life—like Aristotle's divine sphere enclosing and moving all the others. But it is not intended to convey knowledge on many points not of religious significance. Among these are not only certain scholastic questions, which were valuable for dialectical exercises but not valuable or vital to religion or even to philosophy; but also many of the points of theological controversy in the past—and some in the present—most of them really of minor significance.

Contrasted with the theological controversy of the past, our Lord's wholesome reserve stands out most clear and compelling. There are many things 'not for you to know,' since they are 'set within the Father's authority'; of many things 'not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son,' have accurate knowledge.<sup>72</sup> How little some theologians have attended to our Lord's example in this regard! The principle sweeps through the whole of the traditional theology, and eliminates many a point of doctrine which has been 'the work of men,' in Christology, Ecclesiology, sacramental doctrine, Eschatology. But what we have left, after the application of this principle, is important and valid, and religiously significant in the highest degree.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Acts i. 7; Mark xiii. 32. Though the sayings are 'late'—one a post-Resurrection saying, the other a part of the 'eschatological' discourse—both are sufficiently 'characteristic' of our Lord.

<sup>73</sup> It will doubtless be said that this principle is Kantian, and such no doubt is the emphasis we sometimes find placed on it to-day. Dr. Percy

(c) In the third place, as the complement to what has just been said, I would emphasize a point already made, *viz.*, Christian doctrine is not empirical knowledge, but, so far as is not impossible in our circumstances, it is a setting-forth of *the implications of religious experience*: it unfolds the postulates required to account for, and the legitimate inferences from; the positive data of the religious life—and in the Christian sense this includes the moral life. It must give us, if possible, a rounded view of the world, and of human life *sub specie aeternitatis*, an outlook in harmony with the religious experience. For religion is one of the great primary experiences, as primary as our experience of the external world; and in a world of choices, a world we ourselves help make, a world that is relativistic throughout, this experience has every right to such an outlook in which reason and faith are harmonized. It has this right so long as religion itself is criticized by reason, and reason is freed from the artificial shackles of a narrowly 'scientific' outlook, tied to the observation, analysis, classification, and unification of merely material phenomenal events.

Hence theology may be relatively simple, but it must be thoroughly religious. A non-religious

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Gardner, in his recent work on Modernism, for example, emphasizes the debt of the movement to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. But I believe we can find it at work long before Kant, here and there in the Christian tradition: in Abelard, *e.g.*, and in the Cambridge Platonists who, through Locke, Hume, and the English tradition eventually influenced Kant himself—though Kant may never have recognized it.

theology, though perfectly possible, is a monstrosity and has no right to exist!

(d) However, it must be remembered that this is theology, not faith. As theology can exist apart from faith, so faith can exist independently of theology, *i.e.*, of any thought-out construction of ideas. Now faith is indispensable for the Christian life, but theology is not; and in a Christian theology faith should strictly guard the door,<sup>74</sup> admitting only those doctrinal or theoretical elements which are compatible with itself, and no others, rigorously excluding every idea that does not harmonize with the data or presuppositions of faith. It is reason's task to correlate, harmonize, criticize, and explain these data admitted by faith. Some of these elements may be metaphysical, but their limits should be strictly marked. For example, the doctrine of Predestination or of Election may have a valid root in religious experience; but its metaphysical extension or 'projection' must be strictly controlled or we shall have an impossible caricature of the divine nature, a God who spares some of His creatures and damns the rest,

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<sup>74</sup> This may be thought to be a slip for 'Reason must guard the door.' But such a statement might imply pure rationalism. Dropping all metaphor, whether it be Faith or Reason that exercises the function, the necessity is very real. There must be nothing in faith that is not of religious value—*i.e.*, of value for religion. 'The' faith must not be made to cover beliefs, doctrines, theories, or traditions that lack spiritual meaning or value. That this principle is not 'rationalism' is evident from the fact that certain doctrines may claim religious value without being capable of rational analysis or demonstration—*e.g.*, the doctrine of the Sacraments.

by an arbitrary decree—as in the systems of Augustine and Calvin. And though as a religious mood a perfect willingness to be damned for the glory of God may be a mark of pure (and of thoroughly Puritan) piety, the irrationality of such a mood and the grotesqueness of its correlative doctrine of God are equally glaring.

It is *faith* that saves, not doctrine or theology. Theology, as we have said, is our best effort to think out the theoretical presuppositions of the experience of faith; but faith is prior, and it is the Christian faith that a Christian teacher must be concerned with first of all, not his own theology (even though a theology of his own is indispensable for clear thinking). Faith is the steadfast turning of the will to God, by a free act of our own, *i.e.*, by choice, in a situation which is ethically conditioned throughout. Without that, no Christianity, no religion at all, is possible.

It is this general and growing recognition of the priority of faith over theology, and of the futility of their direct identification (as in the ultra-theological symbols, confessions, and other pronouncements of the past), that appears to be the most promising feature in the present-day situation of Christian doctrine. The new horizon is lighted by the dawn of a new and better day, for Christianity, and for intelligent and spiritual religion generally. It is the living Spirit sent forth into the world, as the very Breath of God, who is to 'guide into all truth,' who is to show forth

'things to come,' and 'take of mine,' as Jesus said, in ever fuller measure, 'and show it unto you.'<sup>75</sup> It is 'He that sitteth on the throne' who saith: 'Behold, I make all things new.'<sup>76</sup> In no age have men begun to grasp the import of these words more clearly than we may do to-day, with the whole universe unfolding, fresh and vivid as on the morning of Creation, before our fascinated gaze.

If the new age is full of promise for science, for philosophy, for social welfare, no less is it so for religion, for sound doctrine, and for theology. The great age of the Church is still to come. We are still 'in the morning of the times' and the early period of the Church's history is not yet over. Perhaps we in this very generation are among those 'that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Kingdom of God come with power';<sup>77</sup> perhaps the time is 'at hand' when

"Out of the shadows of night  
The world rolls into light;  
It is daybreak everywhere."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> John xvi. 13 f.

<sup>76</sup> Revelation xxi. 5.

<sup>77</sup> Mark ix. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Longfellow, 'The Bells of San Blas.'



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